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ABSTRACT 
 
Islamic finance is rapidly gaining momentum around the world. Interpretations of 
Shari’ah, or Islamic law, state that investments must be free from elements of riba 
(interest), gharar (uncertainty), maysir (speculation) and haram (unethical) business 
activities. Islamic equity investing, therefore, utilizes a set of business activity screens 
and accounting-based screens to exclude firms considered non-permissible under 
Shari’ah. Despite increased academic interest, there is still much uncertainty 
surrounding the financial implications of these investment principles. This Ph.D. 
thesis, comprised of three empirical essays, aims to contribute to this debate. The first 
essay offers a comprehensive examination of Islamic equity index performance. The 
findings show that Islamic equity indices have exhibited abnormal returns on a global 
and developed market level, primarily due to their exclusion of stocks in the financial 
services sector. The second essay attempts to study the determinants of Islamic 
investments’ financial performance, with a particular focus on the role of country-
level factors. The third essay studies performance related issues associated with the 
accounting-based screening process. A significant proportion of these screens are 
documented to contribute positively to risk-adjusted performance, most notably in 
periods of financial market turmoil.  
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
3 
 
1.1  Research background 
Although historically centred in the Middle East, Islamic finance is currently gaining 
momentum globally. Motivated by the strong liquidity within the sector, Western 
economies have started to make significant efforts to accommodate the need for 
financial products and services that adhere to Islamic principles. For instance, during 
the 2013 World Economic Islamic Finance Forum, the UK Prime Minster David 
Cameron expressed his ambition for “London to stand alongside Dubai and Kuala 
Lumpur as one of the great capitals of Islamic finance anywhere in the world” 
(Hutton, 2013).1 One can currently witness similar trends in other important market 
contexts, such as Australia, Canada, France and the United States. Islamic financial 
institutions are currently present in over 70 countries (Warde, 2010) and the industry 
is estimated to be worth over $1.8 trillion (EY, 2013). With an annual growth rate of 
more than 10% (Maslakovic, 2013) Islamic finance is widely considered one of the 
fastest growing sectors of the financial industry.   
 
Islamic finance is about financial activities that are performed in accordance with 
Shari’ah or Islamic law. Interpretations of Shari’ah state that economic and 
commercial transactions must be free from elements of riba (interest), gharar 
(uncertainty) and maysir (speculation). Conventional financial instruments, such as 
fixed-income bonds, derivatives and futures, are therefore considered non-permissible 
from an Islamic perspective (Ayub, 2009; El-Gamal, 2006; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2011). 
                                               
1 In 2014, the UK government issued the first ever sovereign Sukuk (a form of Islamic bond) outside the 
Islamic world. 
4 
 
In the light of these constraints, equity has emerged as a particularly important asset 
class for investors seeking Shari’ah-compliant returns (Khatkhatay & Nisar, 2007). 
Consequently, there are now thousands of Islamic mutual funds and equity indices 
available to investors around the world. These investment vehicles undertake so-called 
Shari’ah-based stock screening to rule out firms that do not comply with Islamic 
principles. This process comprises both business activity screening and accounting 
based screening.2 The business activity screening aims to exclude firms that generate 
income from activities considered unethical, such as alcohol, conventional financial 
services, pork production and tobacco. The accounting-based screening, on the other 
hand, is concerned with firms’ financial structure, which discourages excessive use of 
leverage and interest-bearing income (Derigs & Marzban, 2008; El-Gamal, 2006).   
 
Academic interest in the performance attributes of Islamic equity investing has, not 
surprisingly, gradually increased in line with the industry. The central empirical 
question in this body of literature relates to the financial impact of employing 
Shari’ah-based stock screening. In addressing this issue, previous studies have 
examined the performance of Islamic equity indices relative to unconstrained market 
benchmarks. However, the empirical evidence in this literature stream is mixed.3 
Arguably, the uncertainty surrounding the performance of these indices is likely to 
harm investor confidence, hence threatening the future growth of the industry. One of 
                                               
2 In the literature these screens are also referred to as sector/qualitative screening and 
financial/quantitative screening.  
3 For instance, Islamic indices have been reported to exhibit both underperformance (Habib & Islam, 
2014; Hussein, 2004) and outperformance (Jawadi, Jawadi, & Louhichi, 2014; Lean & Parsva, 2012; 
Walkshäusl & Lobe, 2012a, 2012b). 
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the major challenges faced by Islamic finance researchers, at least historically, has 
been the limited availability of comprehensive data. In fact, equity investing was not 
approved by Islamic authorities until the 1990s (Naughton & Naughton, 2000) and the 
first major index tracking the performance of Shari’ah-compliant firms was launched 
as late as 1999.4 Hence, long-horizon studies have not been feasible until recently. 
Another limitation in this literature stream is the common use of rather simplistic 
performance measures, such as ratio analysis and single index asset pricing models 
(Albaity & Ahmad, 2008; Habib & Islam, 2014; Ho, Rahman, Yusuf, & Zamzamin, 
2014; Hussein, 2004; Jouaber-Snoussi, 2012). The first essay of this thesis, entitled An 
Islamic Equity Performance Puzzle, aims to address these gaps in an attempt to deepen 
the understanding of Islamic index return and risk characteristics.   
 
Shari’ah-compliant assets have not only grown immensely in size, but also in 
geographical distribution. By the end of 2012, it has been estimated that 
approximately 60% of the total asset base were distributed outside the Middle East 
(EY, 2013).  Behind this trend lies an increased openness among Western 
governments to facilitate Islamic banking and finance, together with Muslim investors 
seeking to diversify their oil wealth (Mansoor & Ishaq, 2008). It could be argued that, 
with these assets becoming increasingly integrated into the global economy, it is 
critical to understand whether country-level characteristics impact the performance of 
Islamic equity portfolios. While previous studies have been interested in measuring 
                                               
4The introduction of the global Dow Jones Islamic Market Index in 1999 is widely considered the first 
major launch of an Islamic index. However, it was not until half a decade later that other providers 
launched Islamic indices on a broad scale, such as MSCI and S&P.  
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the performance of Islamic indices relative market benchmarks, almost no attention 
has been given to the role of the country environment. The second essay of this thesis, 
entitled Determinants of Islamic Index Performance, aims to consider this issue.  
 
One important limitation of analysing Islamic mutual funds and indices is that the 
financial impact of the Shari’ah screening can only be measured collectively. That is, 
the performance of these investment vehicles is essentially the collective outcome of a 
large number of business activity screens and accounting screens. Hence, it is highly 
improbable to separate, for instance, the merits of the different accounting screens that 
are used to define the asset universe.  The importance of this issue is strengthening by 
the fact that Shari’ah screening norms adopted by financial institutions are not 
universal (Derigs & Marzban, 2008). For instance, while some institutions use 
accounting ratios based on market capitalization to define firm value, other use total 
assets. Similarly, there are disparities concerning the classification of unethical 
industries. Effectively, these inconsistencies result in Shari’ah-compliant asset 
universes that are likely to differ in terms of sector allocation, size and firm-level 
characteristics. Consequently, this raises the question whether individual Shari’ah 
screens are more efficient than others in terms of return and risk. The third essay of 
this thesis, entitled The Financial Impact of Shari’ah-based Accounting Screens, aims 
to address this issue.  
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1.2 Summary of contributions and main findings 
1.2.1 Essay I: An Islamic Equity Performance Puzzle 
This essay makes several contributions to the literature. First, it studies the return and 
risk characteristics of a comprehensive dataset of 32 global and regional Shari’ah-
compliant indices from five major index providers (i.e., Dow Jones, FTSE, MSCI, 
Russell, S&P) over the period 1996 to 2012. The large number of indices (relative 
previous studies) is advantageous, as it increases the robustness of the results and 
permits performance comparison across geographical markets.  Furthermore, using 
data from different index providers allows to study the potential financial impact of 
the unique Shari’ah screening criteria adopted by each provider, respectively. Second, 
the analysis addresses a number of methodologies shortcomings typically present in 
the literature. The performance evaluation is carried out in both a single and a 
multifactor regression setting, and is robust to matched index pairs (Kreander, Gray, 
Power, & Sinclair, 2005) and tailored investment style risk factors. The matched pair 
approach means that each Islamic index is benchmarked against its unconstrained 
index counterpart. Any difference in performance can hence be directly traced to the 
impact of the Shari’ah screening, avoiding potential biases such as differences in asset 
universe and index construction methodology.   
 
The main analysis shows that several Islamic indices have yielded significant and 
positive risk-adjusted returns. This outperformance is particularly visible in a global 
and developed market context. For instance, four out of the five global Islamic indices 
report a significant four-factor alpha of between 26 and 41 basis points per month. In 
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explaining this performance puzzle, a number of potential behavioural, fundamental 
and research design related explanations are investigated. When the effect of the 
financial services sector is eliminated from the conventional benchmarks, the recorded 
outperformance is heavily reduced or disappears entirely. Hence, the study concludes 
that the relatively good performance of Islamic indices in recent years has been due to 
their low exposure to financial stocks.  
1.2.2 Essay II: Determinants of Islamic Index Performance 
Moving beyond traditional measures of relative performance, the second essay 
contributes to the literature by investigating potential determinants of Islamic index 
risk-adjusted returns. This area has not previously been explored in the literature. 
Based on a large sample of Islamic indices across 46 developed and emerging market 
countries, it is examined whether their risk-adjusted returns can be explained by 
country-level factors, such as cultural, economic, governance and religious variables. 
Furthermore, it is also examined whether variables related to the screening intensity of 
Islamic indices are significant determinants of performance.  
 
The cross-sectional analysis shows that the country environment can be important to 
consider when constructing Shari’ah-compliant investment portfolios. The stock 
market environment appears to have a negative impact, suggesting that Islamic indices 
perform relatively worse (better) in bull (bear) market periods. The findings further 
suggest a positive relationship between risk-adjusted performance and the money 
supply environment (M2) and the level of the Muslim population. Furthermore, the 
analysis indicates a positive correlation between performance and accounting screens 
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based on market capitalization. However, the cultural and governance environment 
appears to be irrelevant in explaining the performance.  
 
This essay is subject to a number of limitations. First, the analysis is limited to the 
period 2008 to 2012. This is because historical return data for country level Islamic 
indices is barely available prior to 2008 and it is not until recently that relevant 
macroeconomic data has become available for 2013. Second, the analysis includes an 
estimated dependent variable (i.e., alpha coefficient) which introduces some statistical 
uncertainty. Two alternative variables are considered to minimize this uncertainty. 
Finally, some relevant country factors have not been considered due to limited data 
coverage across the countries included in the sample. 
1.2.3 Essay III: The Financial Impact of Shari’ah-based Accounting Screens 
This chapter offers new evidence on the role of Shari’ah-based accounting screens. By 
analysing the performance of 25 hypothetical portfolios constructed in accordance 
with the specific rules of individual screens, we can measure the financial impact of 
these screens in isolation from each other. The results of this analysis can hence be 
viewed as a significant contribution, as existing evidence concerns only the collective 
impact of these screens. The findings of this chapter contribute extensively to Islamic 
equity performance literature. The debt screens seem to generate significant abnormal 
returns, although this is only true for screens based on a market capitalization based 
rulebook.  
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Analysing the time-varying difference, however, revealed that this outperformance is 
not persistent over time but stems entirely from the period covering the global 
financial crisis. Furthermore, the liquidity screens using a market capitalization based 
rulebook also contribute positively to performance, although significantly less than the 
debt screens. In contrast, interest screens appear to have little or no impact on financial 
performance. Taken together, the findings presented in this chapter suggest that the 
accounting based screening process does not harm investors’ financial performance. 
Rather, it appears to serve as a risk management function in periods of market turmoil, 
excluding firms subject to risky characteristics. This appears to be true, however, only 
when market capitalization is used as a divisor.   
1.3 Implications of research findings for different agents 
The findings of the research conducted in this thesis is likely to appeal to several 
groups of agents, including academic researchers, policymakers & regulators, 
investors and professional fund managers. In Chapter 4 for instance, it is documented 
that several Islamic equity indices have outperformed their conventional benchmarks 
on a risk-adjusted basis. Although Chapter 4 is designed to evaluate the performance 
of Islamic investment principles, the implication of this finding is, arguably, more 
relevant for conventional investors. It is apparent that the recorded outperformance 
implies that the Shari’ah-compliant screening process could have the potential of 
adding economic value. From the perspective of an Islamic investor, however, the 
Shari’ah compliant universe (represented by an Islamic index) is per definition the true 
universe, and its return is therefore the true benchmark return. An unconstrained 
11 
 
conventional investor, on the other hand, could incorporate Islamic investment 
principles to (possibly) achieve better than benchmark returns. The second group of 
agents likely to benefit from the findings is fund managers, both Islamic and 
conventional. Islamic fund managers could benefit particularly from the findings in 
Chapter 6, which reveal that certain screening methodologies are more efficient than 
others in terms of return and risk. Following the logic in the previous paragraph, this 
presents an opportunity similar to the conventional investor. That is, to incorporate 
certain screens to achieve better than (Islamic) benchmark returns. As for conventional 
fund managers, the results of all empirical chapters suggest that incorporating Islamic 
investment principles into investment decision making could improve their risk 
management, particularity in periods of financial turmoil.  
 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 illustrate how the variety in existing screening methodologies 
can influence an asset universe both in terms of characterises (e.g., sector allocation, 
size) and returns. These findings could be considered relevant for policy-makers and 
regulatory bodies of the Islamic finance industry, as imposing different guidelines and 
rules may have a diverse impact on investors’ ability to generate returns. MSCI, a 
leading Islamic index provider, announced in a recent press release the launch of a 
new Islamic index series based on a market capitalization-based rather than total 
assets-based screening rulebook that “[…] addresses client demand for financial 
screening criteria based on market capitalization” (MSCI press release, September 
2015). Arguably, this could be viewed as a market response to this issue. Finally, the 
findings of this thesis could have implications for the academic community when 
12 
 
conducting research on Islamic investments. It has been illustrated that carefully 
acknowledging the nature of the Islamic screening process, such as the impact of 
individual screens, could be beneficial when examining performance related aspects.  
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
This Ph.D. thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides a background to Islamic 
equity investing and a critical examination of the Shari’ah screening process. Chapter 
3 covers the theoretical background underpinning this thesis, starting with a review on 
the literature on expected return models followed by a discussion of performance 
measures. Chapter 4 presents the first empirical essay, entitled An Islamic Equity 
Index Performance Puzzle.  Chapter 5 presents the second empirical essay, entitled 
Determinants of Islamic Index Performance. Chapter 6 presents the third empirical 
essay, entitled Financial Impact of Shari’ah Accounting Screens. Finally, Chapter 7 
presents the conclusions and directions for future research.  
13 
 
Chapter 2 
 
BACKGROUND 
14 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter comprises two parts. Part one, entitled Institutional background, 
introduces the fundamental principles of Islamic finance. The purpose here is not to 
provide a comprehensive discussion about Islamic Finance, but rather to contextualize 
aspects relevant for the research that is to be carried out in this thesis. The discussion 
departs from the historical development, followed by the sources of Islamic 
jurisprudence and the main prohibitions which make up the foundations of the Islamic 
finance model. This section also introduces the basic principles Islamic equity 
investing followed by an overview of the Islamic finance market and its main 
investment vehicles.  
 
Part two of this chapter, entitled a critical examination of Shari’ah-based stock 
screening, provides a critical examination of the cornerstone of Islamic equity 
investing, namely the Shari’ah based stock screening process. The objective of this 
examination is twofold. First, it will introduce and emphasize the different elements 
involved in constructing Shari’ah-compliant investment portfolios, and further 
consider a number of conceptual issues currently present in the industry. The second 
objective is to shed light on a critical issue not extensively examined in the literature, 
namely the extent to which Shari’ah based screening reduces impact the size and 
characteristics of the stock market universe.  
15 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Elements covered in the chapter 
 
 
The following figure provides an overview of the chapter. Part one covers the institutional background, including the 
emerging of the industry, an overview of the Islamic equity market and its investment vehicles. Part one also 
provides a by brief introduction to Islamic jurisprudence and how it shapes the practise of Islamic equity investing. 
Part two providers a critical examination of the Shari’ah-based screening process, including both conceptual 
differences and the stringency (i.e., impact) of the different screens.   
  
2.2 Part I: Institutional background  
2.2.1 Emergence of modern Islamic finance 
The economic principles embedded in Islamic values have been practised for many 
centuries. During the early medieval period, riba-free transactions were common 
between European and Arab traders along the silk road (Abdul-Rahman, 2009). 
Modern roots of Islamic finance can be traced back to the mid-1960s. The 
Conceptual differences Conceptual differences
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Chapter 2
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establishment of the Egypt bank Mit Ghamr in 1963 is widely considered to mark the 
birth of modern Islamic finance (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2011; Venardos, 2011). The bank 
offered interest-free loans to promote the productivity of rural farmers. Other 
important establishments in this early era of the Islamic finance industry include the 
Pilgrim’s Management and Fund Board (Malaysia) in 1969, The Nasir Social Bank 
(Egypt) in 1971 and the Dubai Islamic Bank (United Arab Emirates) in 1975 (Iqbal & 
Mirakhor, 2011). The great success that then followed was largely due to booming oil 
prices starting in 1973. This resulted in a large inflow of so-called petrodollars from 
oil-producing Gulf countries into interest-free banking systems, which resulted in 
“[a]rmies of commercial bankers and investment bankers landed in these oil-
producing countries to expand the existing small riba-based banking operations and to 
link them efficiently with the international banking system” (Abdul-Rahman, 2009, p. 
62). With the rapid increase in demand for Shari’ah-based financial products and 
services came a need to formalize Shari’ah principles within the context of banking 
and finance. It was during this period that many of todays’ Islamic investment 
practises were developed by Shari’ah scholars (Abdul-Rahman, 2009). 
2.2.2 Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence  
Shari’ah is a divine law that regulates the lifestyle for Muslims. Its two primary 
sources are the Quran and the Sunnah.  Muslims consider the Quran to be the last 
revealed book (and hence the direct sayings) of the Prophet Muhammad. Hence, the 
Quran provides guidelines for all aspects of human life, including economic matters. 
The Sunnah (Arabic for path or way) makes up the words and acts of the Prophet 
Muhammad. The Holy Quran and the Sunnah are considered equally important (Ayub, 
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2009). The Hadith (tradition) are written work parts of the Sunnah. Naturally, the 
Holy Quran and the Sunnah cannot provide guidelines for all situations and aspects of 
life. In such situations, Islamic jurisprudence relies on a set of secondary sources. 
These include Qiyas; a form analogy in which the Hadith and the Quran are put in 
relation to each other, Ijma; a form agreement or consensus among Islamic scholars, 
and Ijtihad; a form of independent reasoning of how to interpret the Holy Quran. 
Furthermore, an important element of Islamic finance is Fiqh, which can be described 
as the science of understanding these sources (El-Gamal, 2006; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 
2011; Warde, 2010).  
2.2.3 The main prohibitions in Islamic finance 
To ensure compliance with the principles and objectives of Shari’ah, Islamic finance 
rests on a number of prohibitions. Together these prohibitions shape the structure and 
asset allocation of Islamic investment vehicles (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2011). The 
prohibition of riba (often translated to usury or interest) states that any form of gain 
must be justified by an effort or risk-taking. Hence, transactions that yield capital 
gains derived from interest or risk-free investments is not permissible. This means that 
Islamic investors cannot make use of fixed income products such as government 
bonds. The ban of riba also have implications for borrowers as these cannot finance 
projects based on interest-based loans. Although Islam currently is the only religion 
that recognizes interest as sinful, historically this has also been the case in several 
major religions such as Hinduism, Judaism and Christianity. For instance, Lewis 
(2007, p. 64) notes that “[t]o medieval Christians, the taking of what we would now 
call interest was usury, and usury was a sin, condemned in the strongest terms”. From 
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an Islamic perspective, the prohibition of riba also serves an important role in 
enhancing the justice between partners in business transactions. For instance, Zaher 
and Kabir Hassan (2001, p. 157) point out that “the removal of riba results in the 
sharing of the risk of a project between the borrower and the lender”. Further, Ayub 
(2009, p. 44) notes that “there is no difference of opinion among Muslims about the 
prohibition of riba and all Muslim sects consider indulgence in riba-based transactions 
a severe sin”. Advocates of Islamic finance principles stresses that the ban of riba has 
positive economic implications, such as returns dependent on productivity (Zaher & 
Kabir Hassan, 2001).  
 
The prohibition of gharar (uncertainty) stipulates that transactions subject to 
uncertainty or hazard caused by lack of clarity regarding the subject matter or the price 
in a contract or exchange must be avoided. One such example would the structure of a 
conventional insurance contract, or conventional derivatives, where the financial 
outcome lies with the future.  According to El-Gamal (2006, p. 60), “gharar 
incorporates uncertainty regarding future events and qualities of goods, and it may be 
the result of one-sided or two-sided and intentional or unintentional incompleteness of 
information”. The prohibition of maysir (gambling) implies that one cannot increase 
wealth by the games of chance. Maysir is often considered closely related to gharar as 
both of them relates to uncertainty about future events. Financial markets not 
considered gambling as it requires knowledge and analytical efforts, although 
excessive speculation is, as risk involved with that can be associated with high 
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uncertainty. Finally, the prohibition of haram products and services states that 
investors should not invest in products that do not comply with Shari’ah.  
2.2.4 Fundamentals of Islamic equity investing  
From an Islamic perspective, equities are a suitable asset class to invest in since 
musharakah, a form of partnership structure deeply rooted in Islamic finance, suggests 
that potential profits or losses should be shared among all parties involved in a given 
investment (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2011; Jaffer, 2004). Nevertheless, the prohibitions 
discussed in Section 2.2.3 (i.e., riba, gharar, maysir, non-permissible income) imply 
that many stocks available to the public do not qualify as Shari’ah-compliant. The 
exclusion of such firms is a critical element for Islamic fund managers and index 
providers when constructing Shari’ah-compliant asset universes, whereby they engage 
with so-called Shari’ah screening. In its essence, this screening process can be 
described as a two-level analysis concerned with (i) the degree of involvement in 
unethical business activities and (ii) level of engagement in non-permissible financial 
activities. 
 
The motivation behind the business activity screening is to make sure that firms that 
generate profit from sectors perceived unethical from a Shari’ah perspective are 
excluded from the investable universe. Examples of such sectors include alcohol, 
gambling and tobacco. Although business activity screening is rather similar to the one 
used in socially responsible investing, a number of additional sectors are considered. 
Such examples include the production of pork and conventional financial institutions 
offering interest-based products and services.  
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Beyond considering the ethical dimension of firms’ business activities, Shari’ah stock 
screening also considers the financial structure of firms. The accounting ratios used in 
this part of the screening process address issues related financial leverage, liquidity 
and interest income, all of which are associated with riba. Since almost all publicly 
traded firms are exposed to riba simply by being part of the interest-based global 
economy, these accounting ratios include so-called threshold levels. Figure 2.2 
Overview of the Islamic screening process illustrates a generalized version of the 
Shari’ah based screening process, where an unconstrained asset universe is reduced 
throughout each level of screening. The Shari’ah-compliant universe in the bottom 
represents the investable universe available to Islamic investors.  
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Figure 2.2 Overview of the Islamic screening process 
 
The following figure illustrates the process of constructing a Shari’ah-compliant asset universe. Stocks that are 
rejected in the business activity screening are not considered in the accounting based screening process. Stocks 
constituting the Shari’ah-compliant asset universe have passed all screening levels.  
2.2.5 The function of Shari’ah Advisory Boards 
Shari’ah Advisory Boards form a key function in all Islamic finance institutions. 
Comprised of Shari’ah scholars, their principal role is to ensure that all activities are 
performed in line with Islamic principles. This includes overseeing financial activities 
and issuing fatwas (i.e., religious rulings) regarding the Shari’ah-compliance of 
products or services offered by the institution. One such example would be defining 
the screening methodology of Islamic funds and indices (further discussed in Section 
2.3).  
Shariah-compliant asset universe
Accounting ratio:
(non-permissble income)
Rejected
Rejected
Rejected
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Unconstrained asset universe
Business activity screening Rejected
Accounting ratio:
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2.2.6 Current state of the Islamic equity market 
The first major milestone of Islamic equity investing took place in 1992 when the 
Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academia (CIFA)5 issued a fatwa (a form of legal 
opinion) and hence approved equity investing as an investment mode compliant with 
Islamic principles (Naughton & Naughton, 2000). Theoretically, the Islamic equity 
market is represented by all public stocks that are permissible with Shari’ah 
(Shanmugam & Zahari, 2009). However, most Islamic investors gain access the equity 
market by investing in mutual funds offering Shari’ah-compliant investment 
strategies. These funds originate from the concept of musharakah, which is a form of 
partnership structure common in Islamic finance that emphasizes the sharing of profits 
and losses between all parties (Khatkhatay & Nisar, 2007). In this context, investors in 
the fund are the partners and where the fund managers act as investment agents on 
behalf of the investors. Apart from ensuring compliance with Shari’ah, Islamic mutual 
funds have the same investment goals as conventional funds in the context of 
maximizing risk-adjusted returns.    
 
Islamic mutual funds have for long been the fastest growing segment of the Islamic 
finance industry (Elfakhani, Hassan, & Sidani, 2005). As displayed in Figure 2.3, 
between 2007 and 2013 the total asset under management (AUM) of Shari’ah-
compliant funds doubled from US$28 billion to US$56 billion. During the same 
period, the number of Shari’ah-compliant funds has increased from 576 to 1065. 
Despite a temporary decline in number of funds, the total AUM increased steadily in 
                                               
5 The CIFA is considered “the leading authority on Islamic belongings” (Hayat & Kraeussl, 2011, p. 
191) 
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the wake of the global finance crisis. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this could be 
because the conservative principles of Islamic investing are perceived more appealing 
among investors (Ahmed, 2010).  As revealed in Figure 2.4 these funds are typically 
centred in major Muslim economies such as Malaysia and Iran, together with Western 
fund management hubs, such as Luxembourg, Ireland and Jersey.  
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Figure 2.3. AUM of global Shari’ah-compliant funds 
 
The following figure reports the number of Islamic mutual funds and their assets under management (AUM) in US$ 
billions between from the end of 2007 to the end of 2013. During this period that the AUM has doubled in value 
from US$ billion 28 in 2007 to US$ billions in 2013. During the same period, the number of funds has increased by 
85% from 576 in 2007 to 1065 in 2013. Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
Figure 2.4 Domicile of Shari’ah-compliant funds 
 
The following figure reports the number of Islamic mutual funds per country and their assets under management 
(AUM) in US$ Millions as of 2013. The data illustrates that Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are the biggest hubs of 
Islamic mutual funds, with approximately 30% (Malaysia) and 18% (Saudi Arabia) of the funds/AUM. With 91 funds 
but only US$ Millions 248 AUM, the average fund in the rest of the world is significantly relative the countries 
presented in the figure. Source: Thomson Reuters 
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Stock market indices make up several important functions in capital markets around 
the world. First, by comparing the performance of portfolios relative stock market 
indices, investors can obtain important information regarding the return and 
characteristics of their investment strategies. Second, stock market indices also signal 
that its universe is accessible to institutional and international investors. It is common 
practise among institutional investors to invest only in stocks that are listed on stock 
market indices. Third, indices also serve as the underlying factor for many investment 
instruments, such as index funds and exchange-traded funds.  
 
A major concern when Islamic mutual funds started to appear was the lack of proper 
market benchmark. Initially, the investment community often relied on conventional 
market benchmarks which were not ideal.  As a response to this, in 1999 Dow Jones 
launched the first index which explicitly tracked the performance of Shari’ah-
compliant stocks. This marked an important step in the development of the industry as 
there now was a reliable market benchmark. The launch by Dow Jones was followed 
by FTSE in 2000, S&P in 2006, MSCI in 2007 and Russell-Jadwa in 2009. Today, 
these providers offer hundreds of indices which track tens of thousands of Shari’ah -
compliant stocks all over the world.  
 
Most Islamic indices are based on the universe of broader unconstrained indices. For 
instance, The Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index is represented by the Shari’ah-
compliant sub-universe of the Dow Jones Global Index. Similar to Islamic mutual 
funds, the creditability of Islamic indices is represented by Shari’ah advisory board. In 
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contrast to many Islamic mutual fund managers, however, Islamic index providers are 
fully transparent concerning their screening methodology and Shari’ah board 
members. Islamic indices are becoming increasingly important given recent trends of 
passive index-based products.  
2.3 Part II: A critical examination of Shari’ah-based stock screening  
Section 2.2.4 introduced the rationale for the Shari’ah-based stock screening, the 
process which forms the very basis of Islamic equity investing.6 However, screening 
firms for Shari’ah-compliance has proven to be a controversial issue in the industry. 
For instance, comparing the screening norms of nine Islamic index providers and 
mutual fund managers, Derigs and Marzban (2008) found disparities concerning both 
the business activity screening and the accounting based screening. Ultimately, this led 
them to conclude that “different guidelines generally results in different companies 
into halal [allowed] and haram [forbidden]” (p. 299). Hence, the purpose of this part of 
Chapter 2 is to critically examine the conceptual and empirical implications of 
employing different Shari’ah screening methodologies.  
 
There are several potential factors driving inconsistencies in Shari’ah screening 
practises among Islamic financial institutions. Parallel to the growth of Islamic finance 
                                               
6 “The difference between conventional and current Shari’ah portfolio management is the application 
of sector screens and financial screens by which the asset universe is reduced” (Derigs & Marzban, 
2009, p. 1166). 
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there has been an increased presence of regulatory organizations7 with the objective to 
“prepare and promulgate […] governance standards based on the Shari’a[h] precepts 
for Islamic financial institutions” (Karim, 2001, p. 173). However, these organizations 
rarely offer homogenous interpretations of Islamic sources, which has resulted in 
“various approaches taken by supervisory authorities to regulate Islamic banking” 
(Karim, 2001, p. 182). Consequently, how Islamic financial institutions choose to 
define their screening methodologies largely depend on which guidelines they adhere 
to. Furthermore, with limited enforcement power, it is likely that these regulatory 
standards serve more as guidelines rather than rules to follow, while the ultimate 
responsibility lies in the hands of the Shari’ah board of each institution, respectively.  
 
The remaining sections proceed as follows. Section 2.3.1 discusses the collection of 
Shari’ah screening data. Section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 discusses conceptual differences 
between different business activity screens and financial screens currently used in the 
industry. Finally, Section 2.3.4 examines the stringency of the screens.  
2.3.1 Collection of screening data  
Classification theory stresses the importance of complete information when structuring 
and analysing information within a given problem complex (Bailey, 1994; Doty & 
Glick, 1994). When collecting screening data currently used in the industry, we 
therefore carefully review all potential sources of screening information. First, we 
review all screens covered in the existing literature, using a range of keywords related 
                                               
7 Examples of such organizations include The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), The Shari’ah Advisory Council of the Security Commission Malaysia 
(SAC) and The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). 
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to Shari’ah screening. Second, we scan through fact sheets, methodologies and 
websites of all known (i.e., several hundreds) index providers and mutual fund 
managers offering Shari’ah-compliant investment products. Third, we review the 
official guidelines set by Islamic finance regulatory bodies around world.  
 
Inspired by the idea of morphological thinking, “a method for identifying and 
investigating the total set of possible relationships or “configurations” contained in a 
given problem complex”  (Ritchey, 1998, p. 3), all unique screens are listed following 
the structure of a ‘morphological box’ (Table 2.1).8 That is, each screening type (e.g., 
debt ratio, liquidity ratio) is treated as a unique dimension within the morphological 
box, and each dimension is assigned so-called parameters, represented by the total 
number of variation of that screen. Structuring the screening data in this way comes 
with two advantages. First, it provides a clear overview of all screens currently used in 
the industry, and all dimensions and parameters can easily be conceptually compared 
to each other. Second, reading the table from left to right, it represents a detailed 
overview of each step of the screening process and the different dimensions it 
contains.  
                                               
8 For further reading regarding morphological analysis, see, for instance, Ritchey (1998) and Zwicky 
(1948).  
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Table 2.1 Morphological box of the Shari’ah-based stock screening process 
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2.3.2 Business activity screening 
Table 2.1 shows that a total of 18 sectors is considered non-permissible with Shari’ah 
by various institutions in the industry. For clarification, it should be noted that some 
institutions are more detailed in their disclosure than others. For instance, Dow Jones 
states that their Islamic indices exclude the entertainment sector while MSCI list 
gambling, music, hotels, cinema and adult entertainment as prohibited sectors.9 It can 
be observed that the business activity screening used in Islamic equity investing in 
many ways reflect the one of socially responsible investing. Both branches exclude 
sectors such as adult entertainment, alcohol, gambling, tobacco and weapons.  
 
Some sectors excluded by Islamic investors do not seem unethical at a first sight, such 
as advertising & media, cinema and music. The rationale for excluding such firms is 
that they are subject to forbidden content.  There are some inconsistencies concerning 
the tolerance level of the business activity screening. Specifically, one approach is to 
exclude firms that have any involvement prohibited activities while a less stringent 
approach allows such activities as long as it is not the core business activity. One 
example of the latter would be an airline company which core business is 
transportation while profit also is generated from alcohol sales. Finally, Table 2.1 
shows that there is a disagreement whether biotechnology, hotels, trading of gold & 
silver and weapons should be considered Shari’ah-compliant,  
                                               
9 For the sake of comparison, Table 2.1 includes all alternatives. 
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2.3.3 Accounting based screening 
2.3.3.1 Debt screens 
There are several approaches to screen firms for financial leverage. First, debt is being 
defined as either interest-bearing debt or total debt. The former appear somewhat more 
precise from a Shari’ah perspective, as it accounts only for debt associated with 
interest payments. In contrast, institutions using total debt assumes that all debt comes 
with the payment of interest. Second, in determining the value of a company, 
institutions employ either market capitalization or total assets. While market 
capitalization suggests that the market best determines the value, proponents of using 
total assets would argue that it is “a trusted accounting perspective and each 
measurement is independent from any external market influences or speculations” 
(Derigs & Marzban, 2008, p. 291). In what appears to be an attempt to smooth out 
possibly volatile outcomes of using market capitalization, some institutions use the 24 
or 36 months trailing moving average, respectively. Third, there is a clear 
disagreement concerning the acceptance level of debt, with threshold levels varying 
from 25% to 37%. According to Table 2.1, the abovementioned differences result in 
15 approaches to screening for debt currently used in the industry.  
2.3.3.2 Liquidity screens 
There are also many different approaches to screen firms for liquidity. Concerning the 
definition of liquid assets a number of accounting items are being used: account 
receivables, cash, deposits, interest-bearing investments, short-term investments and 
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non-compliant investments.10 Clearly, there is a lack of consensus concerning which 
items that should be regarded as liquid assets. For instance, while some institutions 
use account receivables, others use account receivables plus cash and short-term 
investments. This lack of consensus is also reflected in the threshold levels, ranging 
from 30% to 90%. However, it appears that ratios that include more liquid assets have 
less stringent threshold levels. According to Table 2.1 there are currently 21 liquidity 
ratios used in the industry.  
2.3.3.3 Interest and non-compliant income screens 
There are fewer variations among industry participants concerning screening for 
interest and non-compliant income. The main difference concerns the use of either 
cash & short-term investments (in relation to market capitalization or total assets) or 
interest income (in relation to total revenue). The rationale for measuring the amount 
of cash & short-term investments is the assumption that firms holding such assets is 
likely to enjoy interest income (Derigs & Marzban, 2008).   
2.3.4 Stringency of Shari’ah screens 
To further increase the understanding of the impact of different screens, this part of the 
analysis will examine what impact business activity and accounting ratios have on a 
given asset universe. The analysis is based on firms included in FTSE All-World 
Index between January 2002 and December 2013. As noted in Section 2.3.3, many of 
                                               
10 Typically, index providers and fund managers do not provide detailed information of what the 
respective accounting item entail. Hence, it could be the case that some of the ratios displayed in Table 
2.1differ only in terms of terminology.  
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the financial ratios currently used in the industry are based on market capitalization. 
Theoretically, this implies that the stringency of these screens should vary depending 
on the overall market environment. Here, the length of the sample period allows us to 
examine the stringency of screens in periods of both bull markets (post dot.com 
bubble) and bear markets (subprime crisis).   
 
The dataset is constructed as follows. First we create a list of all FTSE All-World 
constituents between 2002 and 2013. To enable an examination of (i) the impact of the 
accounting screens in different sectors and (ii) the impact of the of the business 
activity screens, all constitutions must have a sector code allocated. Here, we rely on 
the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) which is a widely used taxonomy-type 
classification framework for stock market sectors. While the ICB have sector codes for 
most business screens, i.e., Advertising & Media, Alcohol (3533,3535), Financials 
(8000), Media (5500), Gambling (5752), Hotels (5753), Tobacco (3785) and Defence 
(2717), firms involved in adult entertainment and pork-related products has to be 
identified with an alternative method. To identify these firms use we S&P Capital IQ 
service to screen for firms for relevant keywords in the business description. In order 
to construct the accounting screens, we next download a large set of accounting data 
for all firms. From Thomson Reuters Datastream we obtain (i) account receivables (ii) 
cash (iii) interest income (iv) market capitalization (v) total revenue (vi) short-term 
investments (vii) total assets (viii) total debt.  
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The dataset is subject to three limitations. First, it is not possible to to analyse the 
difference between the two parameters of the business activity screens (i.e., any 
involvement, core business) as the ICB only assign sector codes for the main business 
activity. Second, it lacks accounting data needed to calculate the non-permissible 
income ratios. Hence, the analysis of the accounting screens is limited to the debt, 
liquidity and interest ratios. Third, we have taken the liberty to simplify some of the 
financial ratios. For instance, in the morphological box (Table 2.1) it can be observed 
that different of debt are being used, namely interest-bearing debt and total debt. 
Since we are unable to isolate interest-bearing debt, we use total debt in all cases. 
Table 2.2 reports the impact each screen has on the asset universe, as measured by the 
percentage decrease. While the majority of the screens have a marginal impact on the 
asset universe (0.01% to 1.9%), the financial sector screen reduces the asset universe 
with approximately almost 22%. The latter is noteworthy and suggests major 
differences in sector allocation between conventional and Shari’ah-compliant asset 
universes.  
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Table 2.2 Stringency of business activity screening  
Sector Stringency 
Adult Entertainment 1.5% 
Alcohol 0.9% 
Biotech 0.4% 
Defence 0.4% 
Financials 21.8% 
Gambling 0.7% 
Hotels 0.6% 
Media Agencies 0.4% 
Pork 0.2% 
Publishing 1.3% 
Restaurants & Bars 0.7% 
Tobacco 0.5% 
Total reduction 29.4% 
The following table reports the stringency of each business activity screen respectively. Collectively, these screens 
reduce almost 30% of the universe although the majority (21.8%) is due to the exclusion of financial stocks.  
 
As illustrated in Table 2.1, excluding firms involved with prohibited business 
activities is the first step in constructing a Shari’ah-compliant asset universe. Hence, to 
capture the realistic impact of the accounting based screens, we construct a sub-
universe that contains all constituents of the FTSE All-World Index, excluding all 
industries in Table 2.2.  Table 2.3 reports several interesting variations in the 
stringency between different debt ratios. First, using total assets rather than market 
capitalization as a divisor results in a less constraint universe. For instance, at a 33% 
threshold level, the total assets (market capitalization) based ratio results in a reduction 
of between 22.8% (26.1%) and 32.6% (45%) throughout the sample period. Second, 
focusing on the period 2007 to 2009, there is a sharp increase in the stringency of the 
market capitalization based screens. This implies that fluctuations in the overall 
market environments significantly impact the stringency of financial ratios based on 
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market capitalization. Third, for the total assets based ratios, the threshold level appear 
to be an important determinant of the screening stringency. The difference between the 
30% and 37% threshold level varies between 9.9% (2011) and 16% (2002). Finally, 
the most stringent ratio is the one where both market capitalization and total assets are 
used a divisor. This indicates that the two types of divisor exclude different types of 
stocks.  
 
Overall, the liquidity screens are much less stringent than the debt screens. In fact, 
when account receivables (both with and without cash and short-term investments) are 
put in relation to total assets, there is almost no reduction in the asset universe at all. 
Typically, the total assets based screens do not reduce the asset universe with more 
than 3%. Fundamentally, this is not too surprising though. For instance, the laxest 
liquidity screen (i.e., AC+C+SI/TA<90%) suggests that all firms with less than 90% 
liquid assets will pass then screen. This minimal reduction in asset universe is also true 
for the interest income ratios that measures the cash and short-term investments in 
relation to total firm value, while the  interest income to revenue  ratios  are somewhat 
more stringent (especially  with a threshold level of 3%).  
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Figure 2.5 Time-varying difference in stringency between MC-based and TA-based 
screens at 33% threshold level 
 
The following figure illustrates the difference in screening impact between financial ratios based on market 
capitalization (MC) and total assets (TA) at a 33% threshold level. Three interesting observations can be made 
from this figure. First, the sharp increase of the MC-based screens in 2008-2009 clearly illustrates how their 
stringency correlates with the valuation of the stock market. Second, with a stringency between 8% and 20%, the 
MC-based liquidity is significantly more stringent than its TA-based counterpart.  Finally, it can be observed that 
neither of the interest screens has any impact at all on the asset universe.  
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates how the impact of debt, interest and liquidity screens based on 
market capitalization and total assets, respectively, can fluctuate over time. Several 
interesting observations emerge from this figure. First, despite a fixed threshold level 
(i.e., 33%) there is a significant gap in stringency between market capitalization and 
total assets. For debt and liquidity, a market capitalization based screening rulebook 
result in a smaller universe throughout the entire sample period. Second, while the 
stringency of the total assets based screens remain relatively constant throughout the 
sample period, the market capitalization based screens are much more volatile. The 
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sharp increase in 2008 suggest that the stringency of market capitalization based 
screens is largely determined by the overall market environment, where a lower 
valuation result in more stringent screening. At the two spikes in the global stock 
market valuation during that sample period cover in Figure 2.5, that is, in 2007 just 
before the financial crisis breakout and the end of the recovery period in 2013, the 
stringency of the two types of debt screens is almost identical.  Although the sample 
period is too short to draw any definite conclusions, this observation suggests that the 
stringency between market capitalization and and total assets based debt screens is 
very similar when the valuation of the market is high. Finally, it is evident from Figure 
2.5 that the interest based screening, independent from using market capitalization or 
total assets, has next to no impact during the duration of the sample period.   
.   
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Table 2.3 Stringency of accounting based screens 
Portfolios 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Debt screens                         
TD / TA < 30% 0.39 0.35 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.34 
TD / TA < 33% 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.27 
TD / TA <33,33 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.27 
TD / TA <37% 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.20 
TD / MC < 30% 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.48 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.33 
TD / MC < 33% 0.39 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.45 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.29 
TD / TA&MC <33% 0.45 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.50 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.39 
Liquidity screens                         
AR / TA <33% 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
AR / TA <45% 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR+C/TA<50% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.20 
AR+C/TA<70% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.15 
AR+C+SI/TA<67% 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
AR+C+SI/TA<90% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR/MC<30% 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.12 
AR/MC<33% 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.11 
AR/MC<45% 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.07 
AR/MC<49% 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.06 
AR+C+SI/MC<70% 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.08 
Interest screens                       
CSI/TA<30% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CSI/TA<33% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CSI/MC<30% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CSI/MC<33% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Interest income/Rev<3% 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Interest income/Rev<5% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Interest income/Rev<10% 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
The following table displays the impact of each financial ratio (in percentage) between 2002 and 2013. 
Column one reports the ratio specification and subsequent threshold level, respectively. AR= Account receivables, C= Cash, CSI= Cash 
plus short-term investments, D= Deposits, FD= Financial debt, IBD= Interest bearing debt, IBI= Interest bearing investments, ID= Interest 
bearing deposits, II= Interest income, MC= Market capitalization, NCI= Non-compliant investments, OE= Owners Equity, TA= Total 
assets, TD= Total debt. 
2.3.4.1 Screening impact in different sectors 
Fundamentally, firms with more (less) intangible assets (e.g., intellectual property, 
patents) are likely to have relatively higher (lower) market capitalization to total assets 
ratios. This section, therefore, aims to investigate whether there are any cross-sector 
differences in the stringency of the financial ratios. Following the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB), the original dataset is divided into the following nine 
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sectors: Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Health Care, 
Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities and Technology.  
 
The results, displayed in Table 2.4, provides a number of interesting observations. 
First, the stringency of most financial ratios appear to be sector sensitive. For instance, 
at a 30% threshold level, the debt screen based on total assets excludes 19% of the 
technology universe and 69% of the utilities universe (i.e., a 50% difference in 
screening impact), and using market capitalization as divisor results in a 65% 
difference between healthcare (20%) and utilities (85%). Second, the results suggest 
that the threshold level for a given ratio is a significant determinant of stringency. For 
example, for the utilities sector there is a 21% difference in impact between the 30% 
and 37% threshold level of the total asset based debt screen. Third, in some sectors 
total asset based debt ratios appear to be more stringent than market capitalization 
based screening, such as the health care sector.  
 
To visualize the issue of screening impact, Figure 2.6 provides an overview of the 
screening stringency across nine common sectors (Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, 
Industrials, Consumer Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, 
Utilities and Technology). Following the structure of Figure 2.5, a sample of debt, 
interest and liquidity screens based on market capitalization and total assets, 
respectively, are compared at the common 33% threshold level, showing the mean 
difference in screening stringency over the period 2002 to 2013. Based on this 
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comparison it is evident that the screening stringency is determined largely by the 
characteristics of a given industry.  For instance, while the debt screen based on 
market capitalization exclude less than 20% of healthcare companies, more than 80% 
of firms of the firms in the utilities sector would fail to pass this screen. 
 
Figure 2.6 An illustration of screening stringency across sectors 
 
The following figure illustrates the mean difference in screening impact between financial ratios based on market 
capitalization (MC) and total assets (TA) at a 33% threshold level across different sectors. For many screens, the 
difference in stringency across sectors is significant.  For instance, the MC-based debt screen excludes 83% of the 
utilities sector, but only 18% of the health care sector.  Furthermore, it can be observed that the difference in 
stringency between the screens is significant in sectors such as utilities and telecom while being much more even 
in technology and healthcare sector 
.  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Debt	(TA-based) Debt	(MC-based) Liquidity	(TA-based)
Liquidity	(MC-based) Interest	(TA-based) Interest	(MC-based)
42 
 
Table 2.4 Stringency of accounting based screens across sectors 
		 		 Sectors 
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Debt TD / TA < 30% 0.27 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.41 0.59 0.69 0.19 
  TD / TA < 33% 0.22 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.34 0.52 0.61 0.16 
  TD / TA <33,33 0.21 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.22 0.34 0.51 0.60 0.15 
  TD / TA <37% 0.17 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.28 0.43 0.48 0.12 
  TD / MC < 30% 0.45 0.55 0.54 0.45 0.20 0.52 0.63 0.85 0.30 
  TD / MC < 33% 0.41 0.52 0.51 0.42 0.18 0.50 0.59 0.83 0.28 
  TD / TA&MC <33% 0.44 0.54 0.54 0.47 0.28 0.54 0.66 0.85 0.30 
                      
Liquidity AC / TA <33% 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.12 
  AC / TA <45% 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 
  AC+C/TA<50% 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.10 
  AC+C/TA<70% 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 
  AC+C+SI/TA<67% 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.09 
  AC+C+SI/TA<90% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  AC/MC<30% 0.28 0.33 0.41 0.34 0.13 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.28 
  AC/MC<33% 0.26 0.29 0.38 0.31 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.25 
  AC/MC<45% 0.18 0.20 0.29 0.20 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.18 
  AC/MC<49% 0.17 0.17 0.27 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.17 
  AC+C+SI/MC<70% 0.17 0.19 0.32 0.25 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.24 
                      
Interest  CSI/TA<30% 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.32 
  CSI/TA<33% 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.27 
  CSI/MC<30% 0.13 0.16 0.28 0.26 0.10 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.31 
  CSI/MC<33% 0.11 0.14 0.25 0.23 0.08 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.28 
  Interest income/Rev<3% 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.05 
  Interest income/Rev<5% 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 
  Interest income/Rev<10% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
The following table displays the mean impact of each financial ratio (in percentage) between 2002 and 2013. 
Column one reports the screening category and column two each ratio specification and subsequent threshold 
level, respectively. AC= Account receivables, C= Cash, CSI= Cash plus short-term investments, D= Deposits, FD= Financial 
debt, IBD= Interest bearing debt, IBI= Interest bearing investments, ID= Interest bearing deposits, II= Interest income, MC= 
Market capitalization, NCI= Non-compliant investments, OE= Owners Equity, TA= Total assets, TD= Total debt. Column three 
to eleven report the screening impact in each industry, respectively.  
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2.4 Chapter summary 
Part one of this chapter was concerned with the institutional background of Islamic 
finance. Economic activities based on Islamic values have been performed for several 
centuries, although the modern form of Islamic finance started to develop as late as 
four decades ago. Based on the principles of Shari’ah, Islamic finance prohibits 
involvement in interest, speculation, uncertainty and unethical business activities. 
Islamic equity investing started to grow significantly after its official approval in 1992, 
and is now a multi-billion dollar industry with thousands of funds and indices 
available all over the world.  
 
Part two offered a critical examination of the Shari’ah-based stock screening process, 
which can be considered the cornerstone of Islamic equity investing. Due to the 
absence of universal standards, there are currently major inconsistencies in how this 
screening process is performed. The results presented in this chapter illustrated the 
diverse impact this could have in terms of size and asset allocation. This suggests that 
the choice of Shari’ah screening norms could be an important determinant of return 
and risk. 
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Chapter 3 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
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3.1 Introduction 
With its roots in the mean-variance efficiency paradigm of Markowitz (1952) modern 
asset pricing theory is concerned with describing the relationship between returns and 
risk of financial assets in market equilibrium. From both a chronological and 
fundamental perspective, it makes sense to start any such discussion with the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)  developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and 
Mossin (1966). Ever since its inception, the CAPM has had a tremendous influence on 
how academic researchers and industry participants understand financial markets. Not 
only has been argued that the model “[…] marks the birth of asset pricing theory” 
(Fama & French 2004, p. 25) but it is also one of the most frequently used models to 
measure financial performance and estimating cost of capital (Bodie, Kane and 
Marcus, 2005). The CAPM specifics an algebraic relationship between the expected 
return and risk of assets in market equilibrium. Specifically, it postulates that the risk 
of an asset is defined by the extent to which it co-varies with the overall market. If 
investors are risk averse, as implied by the mean-variance efficiency logic, then 
investors would require higher returns for taking on risk.  
 
The precise predictions made by the CAPM regarding the pricing of financial assets 
have from start been subject to scepticism, and many empirical tests have been 
performed to validate its conjecture regarding the relationship between risk and the 
cross-section of asset returns. Despite its widespread popularity, empirical tests have 
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largely come to disprove CAPMs predictions. For instance, early work such as Friend 
& Blume (1970) and Black, Johnson and Scholes (1972) presented empirical evidence 
that the slope of the security market line is flatter than predicted by the model. That is, 
less (more) risky assets earn higher (lower) returns than what is predicted by the 
model. More recent work such as Basu (1977), Banz (1981) and Jageedesh & Titman 
(1993) reveal the existence of market anomalies, which in the world of the CAPM 
should not exist. The overreaching conclusion drawn from this body of literature is 
that beta, the systematic risk factor within the CAPM framework, fails to explain all 
variations in the cross-section of asset returns. This insight led to the emergence of 
models that incorporate additional factors in an attempt to add explanatory power to 
cross-sectional differences in asset returns.  
 
The first objective of this chapter is to review the asset pricing literature and the most 
significant developments of expected return models. This discussion departs from the 
theoretical foundation of the CAPM, followed by review of its empirical tests and the 
subsequent emergence of multifactor asset pricing models. In light of these expected 
return models, the second objective is to review a series performance measures that 
can be employed to meet the research objectives of the present thesis.  
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3.2 The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
3.2.1 Theoretical foundation 
The theoretical foundation of the CAPM departs from the mean-variance efficiency 
model introduced by Markowitz (1952) and the so-called separation theorem proposed 
by Tobin (1958). Markowitz’s model, which is concerned with portfolio selection 
under uncertainty, spans over a single period horizon where investors form a portfolio 
in the beginning of the period (t-1) which delivers a randomly distributed return at the 
end of the period (t). In this context, the model states that under the assumption that 
investors are risk averse, the only parameters that are ought to be of interest are the 
expected mean and variance (risk) of asset returns. This implies that investors choose 
portfolios that maximize the expected return for a given level of risk, and minimize 
risk for a given level of expected return (i.e., portfolios that is mean-variance 
efficient). Incorporating the notion of risk-free lending and borrowing risk- into the 
mean-variance framework, Tobin (1958) showed that there is in-fact a single efficient 
portfolio, the market portfolio, and that investors adjust their risk by different weights 
in risky and risk-free assets.  
 
In addition to the mean-variance logic, which imply a positive linear relationship 
between expected return and risk, the predications of the CAPM is underpinned by 
several assumptions. First, investors are believed to have homogenous expectations 
regarding the distribution of asset returns over a single period horizon. Second, in light 
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of Tobin’s separation theorem, investors are believed to have access to unlimited 
borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate (Fama & French, 2004). Third, financial 
markets are believed to lack imperfections, meaning that elements such as transaction 
costs and taxes are not present and finally, these markets are subject to perfect 
competition, meaning that no single investors can influence stock prices.  Based on 
these assumptions, the CAPM specifics the following prediction regarding the 
expected return of risky assets: 
 E R# = R% + β#(E R) − R%) (3.1) 
 
where E R#  denotes the expected return of asset i, R% is the risk free rate and	R) is 
the return of the market portfolio m. β# represents the systematic risk and is defined as 
the covariance of the return of asset i to the return of market portfolio m divided by 
variance the of the market portfolio m. Hence, β# is a measure of the extent to which 
asset i tend to co-vary with the market portfolio. One of the key implications of this 
specification is that investors will be rewarded only by taking on higher systematic 
risk, while idiosyncratic (unsystematic) risk, as proven by the mean-variance model, 
can be eliminated through portfolio diversification.  
 
3.2.2 CAPM critique and empirical validation 
The CAPM has since its inception been subject to much criticism, and has been widely 
debated in the empirical asset pricing literature. The amount of attention received in 
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this literature stream is largely an outlet of the specific predictions made regarding the 
relationship between expected return and risk. Specifically, the model predicts that (i) 
asset returns and their respective market betas is positively and linearly related, (ii) 
cross-sectional differences in excess returns can be explained only by proportional 
differences in asset betas and (iii) the market premium (i.e., market return minus the 
risk-free rate) is positive, implying that its expected market return should be greater 
than assets uncorrelated with the market.  
 
Initial tests of the CAPM aimed to examine whether the intercept equal the risk-free 
rate, and whether slope of the security market line reflects the market premium. The 
latter refer to the theoretical linear relationship between expected return and risk, as 
predicted by the model. The main approach to examine these predictions was to 
regress individual stock returns on their respective betas in a cross-sectional setting. 
As discussed by Fama & French (2004), this approach turned out to be problematic for 
two particular reasons. First, the residuals of the regressions were driven by unique 
industry effects, where “[p]ositive correlation in the residuals produces downward bias 
in the usual ordinary least estimates” (p.31). Second, the standard errors of the 
estimated betas of individual stocks were too large to statistically explain asset returns. 
To overcome this issue, and improve the estimates of beta, it became standard 
procedure to use portfolios rather than individual stocks.  
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Analysing a set of US stock portfolios, Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) found 
stocks with low beta values to earn higher return, and stocks with high beta values 
earn less return, than predicted by the CAPM. Furthermore, the authors found that 
“high-beta securities had significantly negative intercepts and low-beta securities had 
significantly positive intercepts” (p.44). When analysing two subsamples of US stock 
returns between 1960 and 1968, Friend and Blume (1970) found a non-stationary 
relationship between asset returns and beta. Specifically, they documented a negative 
relationship between return and beta in the first sample period (January 1960 to March 
1964) and the reverse for the second sample period (April 1964 to June 1968). These 
findings were hence interpreted as a clear violation of the CAPM, as it suggests a non-
linear (and possibly non-stationary) relationship between asset return and beta. 
 
More recent tests examine whether there are other variables that add to the explanation 
of cross-sectional return differences. If the prediction made by the CAPM is correct, 
then beta should be the only significant determinant of asset returns. Since these tests 
started in the mid 1970s, there has been an increasing amount of empirical evidence 
that contradict the CAPM. Specifically, there is substantial evidence that beta fails to 
explain returns associated with cross-sectional differences in firm characteristics. so-
called market anomalies.  
 
The first evidence of market anomalies stems from the work of Basu (1977). Using a 
sample of US stocks over the period 1957 to 1971, Basu found that stocks with high 
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earnings-to-price ratios (so-called value stocks) significantly outperform stocks with 
low earnings-to-price ratios (so-called growth stocks). Banz (1981) and Reinganum 
(1981) documented stocks with small market capitalization to exhibit higher risk-
adjusted performance than stocks with large market capitalization. Furthermore, both 
Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) find evidence that firms 
characterised by high book-to-market ratios have higher returns than stocks with firms 
with low book-to-market ratios.  
 
Bhandari (1988) finds firms with high financial leverage to outperform firms with low 
financial leverage. There is also empirical evidence that predictable power can be 
found in historical returns. For instance, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) find that over 
longer time horizons, historical returns are inversely related to future returns (i.e., a 
contrarian effect), while Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document previous winning 
stocks to outperform previous loosing stocks over a short-term horizon (i.e., a 
momentum effect). Together, these empirical observations contradict the CAPM 
prediction that beta is the only relevant variable to explain cross-sectional variation in 
asset returns. Rather, they suggest that there are additional variables capable of better 
explaining cross-sectional variation in stock returns.  
 
Drawing on the aforementioned empirical observations, Fama and French (1992) 
examined the explanatory power of market beta, size, leverage, book-to-market equity 
and earning-to-price ratios on US stock returns in a cross-sectional regression setting 
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between 1963 and 1990.  It was found that the cross-sectional variation in stock 
returns linked to these variables is well captured by risk factors related to size and 
book-to-market equity. The seminal work of Fama & French (1992) is widely 
considered to represent a landmark in the asset pricing literature. Specifically, by 
addressing the empirical failings of the CAPM, the study incentivised research efforts 
to find models superior the CAPM in explaining variations in asset returns. 
 
3.3 The emergence of multifactor models 
A frequently used argument for the empirical failings of the CAPM rests on its 
underlying assumptions, some of which appear unrealistic in a real world context. For 
instance, with regard to investor behaviour under uncertainty, the model assumes that 
investors make decisions over a single-period horizon. That is, they selection 
portfolios in the beginning of a period and care only about the expected return in the 
end of that period. Furthermore, the fact that the model predicts all cross-sectional 
variation in asset returns to captured by a single factor (beta) can appear too simplistic. 
In response to these (arguably) unrealistic assumptions, a number of alternative 
expected return models emerged. What most of these models have in common is that 
they make use of multiple factors to explain variations in asset returns.  
 
Merton (1973) contributed to the asset pricing literature by introducing the 
Intertemporal Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM). In the world of the ICAPM, investors, 
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when selecting portfolios, also consider how future changes in state variables will 
affect their wealth. The logic here is that if an asset has the tendency to do relatively 
better during periods of economic downturns then the demand for this stock will 
increase, resulting in a higher equilibrium price and hence lower expected return.  To 
capture this change in investment opportunity, Merton (1973) prospered an extension 
of the original CAPM which also include relevant state variables. Using a different 
approach, Ross (1976) introduced Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) which defines the 
expected return of assets as a function of macroeconomic variables. Perhaps the main 
limitation of both the ICAPM and the APT model is these variables are not defined.  
 
Fama and French (1993) introduced a three-factor model that uses abnormal returns 
rather than state variables to capture the cross-section of asset returns. Building on 
their previous work in Fama and French (1992), and under the assumptions that 
markets rationally priced, the authors claim that the return differentials between stocks 
with small market capitalization and big market capitalization (the size effect) and 
stocks with high and low book-to-market ratios (the value effect) serve as good risk 
proxies associated with unknown state variables omitted by the market beta.  The 
three-factor model describes expected return as:  
 E R#- − R%- = β#) E R)- − R%- +	β#.E SMB- +	β#2E(HML-) (3.2) 
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where SMB-, small minus big, represents the return differentials between stocks with 
small market capitalization and stocks with big market capitalization, and HML-, high 
minus low, represents the return differentials between stocks with high book-to-market 
equity and stocks with low book-to-market equity.  
 
While there is strong empirical evidence that SMB- and HML- capture cross-sectional 
variation in asset returns associated with well-known market anomalies such as size, 
leverage, book-to-market equity and earning-to-price ratios (Fama & French 1992, 
1993), the three-factor model has not proven to capture the short-term momentum 
effect  discovered by Jegadeesh & Titman (1993). In response to this shortcoming, 
Carhart (1997) extended the three-factor model by adding a momentum factor which 
captures the return differentials between previous winnings stocks and previous 
loosing stocks. The four-factor model of expected return is hence given as:  
  E R#- − R%- = β#) E R)- − R%- +	β#.E SMB- +	β#2E HML-+	β#5E(MOM-) (3.3) 
where MOM- represents the return differentials between previous winning stocks and 
previous loosing stocks.  
 
While the aforementioned expected return models are designed to capture the effects 
of the most common market anomalies, others are left unexplained. For instance, using 
a sample of US stocks between 1973 to 1997, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) document 
55 
 
a negative relationship between with high capital investments and future performance. 
Analysing this performance in a Carhart (1997) four-factor regression setting led them 
to conclude that “[…] the negative abnormal capital investment/return relation is 
independent of the previously documented long-term return reversal and secondary 
equity issue anomalies” (p.677). Novy-Marx (2013) expose another anomaly which 
previous models fail to capture. Specifically, the author finds a strong positive 
relationship between profitability (defined as gross profits-to-assets) and return. 
Motivated by these empirical observations, Fama and French (2015) suggest a five-
factor model which they define as: 
 E R#- − R%- = β#) E R)- − R%- +	β#.E SMB- +	β#2E HML-+	β#7E(RMW-) +	β#9E(CMA-) (3.4) 
 
where RMW- represents the return differentials between stocks with robust and weak 
profitability, and CMA-, represents the return differentials between stocks with low 
and high capital investments. Based on evidence from US stocks between 1963 and 
2013, the authors find that the five-factor model is explaining more of the variation in 
average stock returns.  
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3.4 Performance measurements 
The principal objective of performance measurements employed in empirical finance 
research is straight-forward: to compare the returns of a given investment portfolio, 
such as a mutual fund or equity index, with the returns of a suitable market 
benchmark. For this comparison to be useful, it should, ideally, be based on a 
theoretical model that makes predictions regarding expected returns. It is, therefore, 
necessary for the investment portfolio and the corresponding benchmark to share all 
characterises that could influence expected returns. As pointed out by Aragon and 
Ferson (2006), this is also why expected return models and performance 
measurements have developed in tandem over the past four decades. The purpose of 
the section is to discuss and motivate a series of performance measurements that can 
be utilized to to meet the research objectives of this thesis. The common thread is that 
they are concerned with measuring the return of assets on a risk-adjusted basis. That 
is, returns are adjusted to account for risk differentials between the portfolio of interest 
and its corresponding benchmark.  
 
3.4.1 The Sharpe ratio  
The Sharpe ratio, developed by Sharpe (1966), measures a portfolio’s risk premium 
(i.e., portfolio return net of the risk-free rate) divided by its standard deviation. In this 
context, the standard deviation of portfolio return serves a proxy for risk. Hence, the 
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ratio will indicate how much the return that is generate for a given level of risk. It is 
computed as follows:  
 
SR = R# − R%σ#  (3.5) 
 
where R# − R% is the excess mean return of portfolio p over the risk free rate and σ= is 
the standard deviation of portfolio p. In other words, the higher the ratio the more 
favourable is the risk-adjusted return. It should be noted that the Sharpe ratio does not 
incorporate any information regarding the portfolio’s market benchmark. Standard 
procedure is therefore to compute the ratio for the benchmark as well and then 
compare the results.  
 
3.4.2 The Treynor ratio 
The Treynor ratio, introduced by Treynor (1965), differs from the Sharpe ratio in that 
it measures the excess portfolio return in relation to the systematic (market) risk rather 
than standard deviation. It is computed in the following way: 
 
TR = R# − R%β#  (3.6) 
where β= is the portfolio beta (or systematic risk) of portfolio i.  
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3.4.3 The Jensen’s alpha measure 
Following the logic of the CAPM, Jensen (1968) recognized that the model’s 
prediction regarding expected return and risk also can be used to evaluate portfolio 
performance. The measure, known as ‘Jensen’s alpha’, compares an asset’s realized 
returns with its theoretical expected returns as predicted by the CAPM. To obtain the 
Jensen’s alpha, one estimates the following time-series regression: 
 R#- − R%- = α# +	β# R)- − R%- + ε#- (3.7) 
 
Where R#- is the return of portfolio i at time t, R%- is the risk-free rate at time,  α# is the 
intercept of the regression, β# is the beta value of portfolio i, R)- the return of the 
market benchmark at time t and  ε#- is the random error term. Following the discussion 
from earlier, it is clear that the CAPM predicts α#	to be zero. Hence, if α# turns out to 
be positive and statistically significant, this means that asset i has earned an actual 
return above its expected return (i.e., outperformance), a negative and significant α# 
implies actual return is below its expected return (i.e., underperformance), and a zero α# implies a similar performance.  
 
The Jensen’s alpha is widely considered to be the most frequently employed 
performance measure in financial research. Originally, Jensen (1968) used the 
measure to evaluate the performance of 115 US mutual funds and it has ever since 
been synonymous with testing fund managers ability to generate above market returns. 
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However, the measure is also widely used to test the performance hypothetical stock 
portfolios and passive instruments, such as equity indices and exchange traded funds.   
3.4.4 The Fama & French (1993) three factor model 
As previously discussed, one of the main criticism of the CAPM is the assumption that 
cross-sectional variation in asset returns can be explained entirely by the single factor 
beta.  This criticism gained momentum following the vast amount of empirical 
evidence of market anomalies in the 1980s and 1990s. The seminal work of Fama & 
French (1992, 1993), resulting in the now well-known three-factor model, therefore 
paid a significant contribution to the performance measurement practice.  The model 
departs from the empirical observations of financial premiums associated with value 
stocks (Basu 1977) and small cap stocks (Banz 1981). By incorporating these factors, 
the authors argued, one would end up with a model that better explain the cross-
section in asset returns. The rationale for this reasoning is that, assuming that there is a 
rational pricing mechanism of assets, then stock returns should correctly proxy for the 
sensitivity to risk factors in returns. In a similar fashion as the Jensen’s alpha, the 
three-factor model of expected return can also be written as time-series regression 
performance measure: 
 R#- − R%- = α# +	β# R)- − R%- + γ#SMB- + δ#HML- + ε#- (3.8) 
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where SMB- (small minus big) is the difference in return between a portfolio of small 
stocks and a portfolio of big stocks and HML- (high minus low) is the difference in 
return between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of low book-
to-market stocks. Fama & French find that adding the size and value factors as 
explanatory variables results in model that captures about 90% of the return variation 
in a diversified stock portfolio.    
 
3.4.5 The Carhart (1997) four factor model 
One market anomaly not captured by the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model is 
the short-term momentum effect documented by  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). When 
evaluating a sample of mutual funds, Carhart (1997) therefore proposed an extension 
of the three-factor model that, in addition to risk factors associated with market beta, 
size and value, also control momentum. The specification of the time-series regression 
can hence be written as:  
 R#- − R%- = α# +	β# R)- − R%- + γ#SMB- + δ#HML- + ζ#MOM- + ε#- (3.9) 
 
Where MOM- is differences in return between previous winning stocks and previous 
loosing stocks. Including the momentum effect was mainly a way for Carhart (1997) 
to capture specific skills of fund managers. From this perspective, the four-factor 
model is primarily suited for analysing the performance of actively managed 
portfolios. However, in light of the Fama & French (2004) argument that the four-
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factor model is “[…] legitimate in applications where the goal is to abstract from 
known patterns in average returns to uncover information-specific or manager-specific 
effects” (p.40), the model also appears appropriate when analysing passive investment 
instruments, such as equity indices.  
 
3.5 Concluding remarks  
In its essence, conventional asset pricing theory is concerned with understanding the 
relationship between expected returns of financial assets and risk. In the spirit of 
Markowitz (1952), this current thinking subscribes to the notion of rational, risk 
averse investors that select portfolios according to a mean-variance efficient paradigm. 
This implies a positive relationship between return and risk. Departing from the well-
known Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965) and Mossin (1966), this chapter has considered the most significant 
developments in the asset pricing literature over the past four decades.  
 
Despite its significant popularity, the CAPM has proven to perform poorly when 
empirically examined.  For instance, early evidence by Friend and & Blume (1970) 
and Black et al. (1972) disproved the prediction that beta is the only relevant factor in 
explaining the cross-sectional variation in asset returns.   Subsequent tests also 
revealed stock market patterns, so-called anomalies, which beta fail to capture. These 
include the financial premium of factors such as size (Basu 1977), value (Banz 1981), 
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leverage (Bhandari 1988) and short-term momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). 
These empirical shortcomings of the CAPM led to the emergence of multifactor 
models, such as the Intertemporal Asset Pricing Model by Merton (1973), the three-
factor model by Fama & French (1993) and the four-factor model by Carhart (1997). 
Overall, these model were proven to explain more of the variation in asset returns.  
 
Based on the literature on expected return models, this chapter has also considered a 
series of popular measurements that can be used to evaluate the risk-adjusted 
performance of equity investments. Starting with Jensen (1968), it was showed that 
the CAPM can be incorporated into a time-series regression framework to evaluate 
investment performance. The key variable of interest in these regression tests is the 
intercept, which later became known as the Jensen’s alpha. The CAPM predicts the 
intercept to be zero, whereby a positive (negative) intercept indicate a return better 
(worse) than what is theoretically predicted.  Following the development in expected 
return models, the sophistication of these performance measures has increased over 
time. When applied to a diversified portfolio of stocks, the most sophisticated 
performance measures have an explanatory power of over 90%. This allows to draw 
precise conclusions regarding the return and risk characteristics of investments.  
 
When used in empirical research, it is however important to acknowledge the 
limitations and potential weaknesses of using these performance measures. All 
expected return models, starting with the CAPM, are based on restrictive assumptions 
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about market structures and investor behaviour under uncertainty. Indeed, this implies 
that any results derived from the models should be interpreted with caution.    
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Chapter 4 
AN ISLAMIC EQUITY INDEX PERFORMANCE PUZZLE11 
 
Abstract 
Analysing the financial performance of global and regional Islamic equity indices, we 
document these indices to outperform benchmarks on a global and developed market 
level. These results appear for multiple providers and remain after controlling for 
investment styles, back-testing bias, and omitted variable bias. To explain this puzzle, 
we investigate fundamental, behavioural and research design related explanations. 
From a fundamental perspective, liquidity constraints might theoretically cause 
Islamic equities to carry higher risk however empirically we are finding Islamic 
indices to be less risky during the recent credit crisis. Behaviourally, the previously 
found Ramadan performance boost does not seem to explain the performance recorded 
in this study. When we eliminate the effect of the financial services industry from 
conventional benchmarks, however, the explanatory power of our model rises even 
further, and the performance for several Islamic indices is heavily reduced. In other 
words, many Islamic indices appear to have yielded a significant outperformance 
during the recent years of financial turmoil due to their critical position towards risk-
free interest and the conventional financial services industry. This implies that they 
represent a viable alternative for risk-averse passive investors, especially during 
periods of high uncertainty around financial services. 
                                               
11 Content of this chapter is used in a working paper entitled An Islamic Equity Premium Puzzle, co-
authored by Andreas Hoepner and Kais Bouslah.  
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4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the financial performance of equity markets 
that comply with Islamic principles. We argue that, conceptually, these markets are 
best characterized by Islamic equity indices, which represent the Shari’ah-compliant 
sub-universes of major international equity indices. Dow Jones launched the first 
Islamic index in 1999 and today most major index providers offer similar indices (e.g. 
FTSE, MSCI, Russell, S&P), resulting in a wide range of benchmarks for Islamic 
investors. Analysing the performance of these indices allows us to separate the merits 
of the Islamic equity investment approach from the specific skills of fund managers 
(Schröder, 2007). In other words, analysing the financial performance of indices 
instead of funds controls for interfering aspects such as fund manager (market timing) 
skills and management fees. As a result, we purely measure the extent to which 
Islamic screens impact performance. Academic interest has gradually increased in line 
with the growth of the Islamic finance industry. While earlier studies analyse only a 
few indices (e.g., Hakim & Rashidian, 2004; Hashim, 2008), a more recent strand of 
literature (e.g., Lobe, Rößle, & Walkshäusl, 2012) incorporate somewhat larger data 
sets and use more sophisticated performance measurements. However, there is no 
consensus in the literature regarding the performance of Islamic equity indices.  
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Our paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we develop a research 
design for the analysis of the financial performance of Islamic equity investments, 
which addresses a number of methodological shortcomings commonly present in 
previous studies. First, we employ a strict matching approach where all Islamic indices 
have corresponding benchmarks from the same index family. When comparing 
screened, and unscreened financial portfolios, matching index pairs are considered 
crucial to ensure reliable results (Kreander et al., 2005). In contrast, existing 
multifamily index studies, such as Lobe et al. (2012) generally use benchmark indices 
from a single provider. Second, we control for possible back-testing biases. Many 
Islamic indices offer back-tested performance data for their screening methodologies 
as part of their historical return data, and we argue that the performance can be 
significantly higher during this period for marketing reasons. Third, our analysis 
includes two approaches to sampling length, as we analyse indices both over their 
individual full data history and during their longest possible common sample period. 
Fourth, we construct an alternative, ex-financials benchmark variable. This allows us 
to specifically investigate the implications of the exclusion of financial stocks by 
Islamic investors through a comparison of Islamic indices performance vis-à-vis an all 
stock and an ex-financials benchmark. Fifth, we employ measurements related to 
financial crises and periods of market downturns not previously used in the Islamic 
index literature.  
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Our second contribution rests on our empirical findings, which brings new 
perspectives on the performance of Islamic equity markets. An important issue in the 
current Islamic finance literature is the lack of consensus regarding financial 
performance of Islamic equity indices. Previous studies have reported that Islamic 
equity markets either perform similar to the overall market, or in some cases 
underperform or outperform depending on the overall market condition (Girard & 
Hassan, 2008; Hussein, 2004). In contrast, we provide evidence that Islamic indices in 
many cases outperform their conventional counterparts. We document this 
outperformance in important contexts such as on global and developed country level. 
It appears for multiple providers and is robust to advance econometric modelling.  
 
Our third contribution results from our ability to statistically explain our results. First, 
we find and control for a back-testing bias embedded in several Islamic indices. That 
is, many Islamic indices tend to perform better in back-tested performance periods 
compared to the ‘real’ period. Nevertheless, the alpha of many Islamic indices remains 
fairly constant after controlling for back-testing bias. Similarly, our results can also 
not be explained by the previously found Ramadan premium (Białkowski, Etebari, & 
Wisniewski, 2012). By isolating and controlling for the effects of critical events, such 
as financial crises, we found that Islamic indices performed relatively better during the 
recent credit crisis. These results reiterate that the investment philosophy embedded in 
Islamic finance (e.g., the ban of interest and excessive risk-taking) result in improved 
downside risk features. Finally, and most importantly, when we exclude financial 
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stocks from the conventional benchmarks the performance of Islamic indices are 
heavily reduced. This finding implies that many Islamic indices have yielded superior 
return due to their exclusion of financial stocks (as a result of their philosophical 
disagreement with the concept of interest). It should, however, be noted that these 
results are robust only to the specific sample period covered in this study.  
 
The remaining parts of this paper are structured as follows. Section two provides a 
brief background to the rationale of Islamic equity investing and a review of the 
existing literature on the performance of Islamic equity indices. Section three 
discusses the theoretical arguments that form the basis of our hypotheses. In section 
four, we present the characteristics of the data, the data collection process as well as 
the construction of benchmark factors. Section five presents the main performance 
analysis and discussion of the results. In section six, we seek to explain the Islamic 
index performance. In section seven, we provide our concluding remarks and potential 
future research avenues.  
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 Islamic equity investing fundamentals 
Islamic finance is an investment philosophy that adheres to Islamic principles based 
on Shari’ah law.12 These principles are manifested in four prohibitions that signify the 
                                               
12 Shari’ah law is based on two sources: the Holy Quran and the Sunnah which is the saying and action 
of Prophet Mohammad.  
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compliance with Islam whereby the first three refer to transactions and the fourth to 
products and services (Ayub, 2009): (i) the prohibition of riba states that any form of 
gain must be justified by an effort or risk-taking. Hence, all forms of effortless 
guaranteed interest common to the western financial system are strictly forbidden in 
business transactions. (ii) The prohibition of maysir implies that one cannot increase 
wealth by the games of chance which prevent speculation. (iii) The prohibition of 
gharar forbids investors to deal with financial transactions that involve uncertainty or 
hazard caused by lack of clarity regarding the subject matter or the price in a contract 
or exchange, such as conventional derivatives, short-selling and insurance. (iv) The 
prohibition of haram products and services states that investors should not invest in 
products that do not comply with Shari’ah law (Warde, 2010).  
 
To adhere to the above prohibitions, Islamic equity investing applies a set of negative 
screens to ensure that the investable universe is halal, which is the Arabic translation 
of the word for “allowed”. The screening process is a two-step procedure where firms 
first must pass the industry screening and then a set of financial screens. The screening 
criteria must be defined by a Shari’ah advisory board that normally is constituted by a 
group of experts in Islamic law. The purpose of the industry screening is to exclude 
firms that are involved in business activities that are considered sinful or harmful to 
societies. Although somewhat inconsistent, there seems to be a consensus among 
Shari’ah scholars of what industries should be considered sinful (Derigs & Marzban, 
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2008). Common prohibited sectors include alcohol, entertainment, pork-related 
products, pornography, tobacco and the weapons industry.  
 
In contrast to other forms of social norm based investing, Islamic investors are also 
restricted from investing in firms with unsatisfying financial characteristics. The main 
motivation for looking into a firm’s financial statements is that business transactions 
cannot involve interest in any form (due to the prohibition of riba). Most publicly 
traded firms, however, are substantially integrated into the conventional (interest-
based) banking system. Hence, a zero tolerance on interest payments would virtually 
eliminate the investable universe. To overcome this issue, Shari’ah scholars have 
agreed to define threshold levels for the respective accounting ratios (El-Gamal, 
2006). Typically, Islamic index providers examine firms based on four financial 
characteristics: (i) Liquidity – the sum of a firm’s liquid assets13 cannot represent too 
much of its total market value as the profit must be from non-liquid assets. (ii) Interest 
– since Shari’ah strictly bans interest as a source of income, the interest screen is 
concerned with identifying the proportion of the total profit that stem from such 
activities. (iii) Debt – interest is not only banned as a source of income but also as a 
payment form. Hence, to pass the debt screen a firm cannot be highly leveraged. (iv) 
Non-permissible income – as multinational public firms often have several business 
activities, it could be the case that some parts of their overall business entail haram 
                                               
13 Liquid assets normally refer to cash, cash equivalents and other assets that converted into cash in less 
than 12 months.  
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activities. Shari’ah boards allow a certain level for such income subject to haram 
purification rule (i.e., charitable giving on the part of the profit generated from such 
activities).  
 
Despite being a cornerstone of Islamic equity investing, the screening process is not 
controlled by regulatory authorities, with a few exceptions such as of Malaysia. 
Instead, index providers are free to use their own advisory boards that define the 
screening criteria based on their interpretation of Shari’ah. The screening criteria have 
proven to be inconsistent among index providers (Derigs & Marzban, 2008). Table 4.1 
displays an overview of the screening criteria used by the index providers included in 
our analysis. While the business screens are quite similar, the financial screens differ 
substantially. More specifically, there is a difference on whether market capitalization 
or total assets is used to determine a firm’s value. For instance, Dow Jones, Russell 
and S&P use market capitalization while MSCI and FTSE use total assets. 
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Table 4.1 Index provider screening norms 
 
Dow Jones   MSCI   FTSE   Russell   S&P 
Accounting based screening                   
Debt ratio Total debt  / market 
capitalization: <33% 
  Total debt / total 
assets: <33.33% 
  Total debt / total 
assets: <33.333% 
  Debt / market 
capitalization: <33% 
  Total debt  / market 
capitalization: <33% 
                    
Liquidity ratio Accounts receivables / 
market capitalization: 
<33% 
  Accounts receivables + 
cash / 
 total assets: <33.33% 
  Accounts receivable & 
cash / total assets: 
<50% 
  cash, deposits & 
receivables / 
market capitalization: 
<70% 
  Accounts receivables / 
market capitalization: 
<33% 
                    
Interest ratio Cash + interest-bearing 
securities / market 
capitalization: <33% 
  Cash + interest-bearing 
securities / total assets: 
<33.33% 
  Cash + interest-
bearing securities / 
total assets: <33.333% 
  cash, deposits & 
interest bearing 
securities/ market 
capitalization: <33% 
  Cash + interest-bearing 
securities / market 
capitalization: <33% 
                    
Non-permissible income ratio       (Non-Permissible 
Income other than 
Interest Income) / 
Revenue < 5% 
  (Non-Permissible 
Income other than 
Interest Income) / 
Revenue < 5% 
  (Non-Permissible Income 
other than Interest 
Income) / Revenue < 5% 
Business activity screening                   
Advertising & media     yes   		   yes   yes 
Adult entertainment     yes   yes   yes   yes 
Alcohol yes   yes   yes   yes   yes 
Cinema     yes   yes         
Cloning         		   yes   yes 
Conventional finance yes   yes   yes       yes 
Entertainment yes       		         
Gambling     yes   yes   yes   yes 
Hotels     yes   yes   yes     
Music     yes   yes         
Pork-related products yes   yes   yes   yes   yes 
Tobacco yes   yes   yes   yes   yes 
Trading of gold & silver         		   yes   yes 
Weapons and defence yes   yes   yes   yes     
The following table reports the Shari’ah screening criteria used by each index provider, respectively. The upper half of the table reports the accounting based screening. Dow Jones, 
Russell and S&P use screens based on market capitalization, while MSCI and FTSE use total assets. The threshold levels for the debt and interest ratio are almost identical (i.e., 33% 
to 33.333%), while for the liquidity ratio the gap is substantial (i.e., 33% (Dow Jones, S&P), 33.33% (MSCI), 50% (FTSE), 70% (Russell)). Liquidity is defined as either account 
receivables (Dow Jones, S&P), account receivables plus cash (MSCI, FTSE) or cash, deposits and receivables (Russell).  Dow Jones does not disclose detailed information regarding 
entertainment related activities.  Instead, they bundle such activities under the ‘entertainment’ category. While all providers employ very similar business activity screens, only Russell 
and S&P screen out firms involved in cloning and trading of gold and silver.  
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4.2.2 Empirical evidence on Islamic index performance 
Earlier studies on Islamic index performance are characterised by small data samples 
and use of rather simplistic performance measurements, such as Sharpe ratio and 
Jensen’s alpha. Most of these studies do not find any difference between Islamic and 
conventional indices on a risk-adjusted basis (Albaity & Ahmad, 2008; Habib & 
Islam, 2014; Ho et al., 2014; Hussein, 2004; Jouaber-Snoussi, 2012). However, 
Hussein and Omran (2005) report evidence indicating that Islamic index performance 
depends on the overall market conditions, where Islamic indices tend to outperform in 
bull market periods while underperforming in bear markets. This is surprising from a 
theoretical perspective since the Islamic accounting screens have rather conservative 
characteristics and could hence be expected to lead to better risk properties (i.e.,  
outperformance in bear markets). 
 
More recent studies use larger datasets and standard performance measurements. For 
example, Walkshäusl and Lobe (2012b) analyse 35 MSCI Islamic country indices 
from June 2002 to June 2011 using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model with MSCI’s 
conventional indices as market benchmarks. They conclude that their “results provide 
supportive evidence that religious stock screens in the context of index-based Sharia-
compliant investments do not reduce financial performance” (Walkshäusl & Lobe, 
2012b, p. 62). It is noteworthy that they found the US and developed market Islamic 
indices to significantly outperform but only during their financial crisis sample 
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(January 2008 to June 2011). These results are also confirmed by Arouri, Ben Ameur, 
Jawadi, Jawadi, and Louhichi (2013) who found Islamic indices tracking the 
European, US and World regions to offer superior risk and return trade-offs during the 
financial crisis in 2007-2008.  
 
Using a ratio and style analysis, Walkshäusl and Lobe (2012a) analysed MSCI Islamic 
indices of eight regions over the sample period June 2002 to May 2012 and find 
Islamic indices to outperform in developed regions but underperform in emerging 
regions. Their findings also reveal that the investment style for Islamic indices in 
developed markets is oriented towards growth stocks and in emerging markets the 
performance is mostly driven by a large cap stock tilt. Since MSCI launched their 
Islamic index series in July 2007, both studies depend less on live (real-time) data 
collected since the index launch than on back-tested data that MSCI used to develop 
the index product. Hence, these results should be interpreted with care, as they might 
be affected by substantial back testing bias. Finally, Lobe et al. (2012) employed the 
Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s Alpha measures to analyse the performance of aggregated 
portfolios based on 155 Islamic indices (72 of these indices were further analysed in a 
Carhart four-factor setting) between January 2001 and June 2012. Overall, it was 
concluded that no significant difference in performance exists between Islamic and 
conventional indices.  
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Outside the Islamic index literature, our study is related to two particular studies 
which examine important aspects that could improve the understanding of potential 
drivers of Islamic equity performance. First, Derigs and Marzban (2009) studied the 
performance implications of employing different Shari’ah screening strategies to a set 
of financial portfolios, which resulted in several interesting observations. First, 
building financial portfolios based on the screening practises of several providers, one 
could achieve improved risk and return attributes. Second, introducing a hypothetical 
screening approach where the Shari’ah compliance is measured on a portfolio level 
rather on a single asset level, the efficient frontier for an Islamic equity portfolio could 
be improved significantly, achieving a risk and return profile similar to a conventional 
portfolio. Finally, it was concluded that if Islamic investors were to use the current 
screening practises, they are better off using market capitalization than total assets as a 
divisor in the financial ratios. 
 
Second, Białkowski et al. (2012) studied the effect Ramadan on stock prices in 14 
Muslim countries. Drawing on theories from positive psychology, the authors 
hypothesized that Ramadan, one of the five pillars of Islam which is the religious 
practice of fasting from dawn to sunset during the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, 
could have a positive impact on stock prices. This Ramadan month could increase 
investor optimism because it increases social awareness and solidarity among 
Muslims.  Consistent with this prediction, they found that stock markets in Muslim 
countries perform significantly better during the Ramadan month compared to the rest 
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of the year. An interesting observation was these markets became less volatile during 
Ramadan, despite sharp increases in stock returns.  
4.3 Hypotheses  
Opponents of Islamic equity investing would argue that its religious constraints are 
likely to harm the performance attributes of Islamic indices. The negative screening 
undertaken by index providers to meet compliance with Shari’ah imply significant 
reduction of the investable universe. This could result in a financial cost due to less 
favourable risk-return trade-offs (Renneboog, Ter Horst, & Zhang, 2008). Empirical 
observation made by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) also implies that certain market 
segments excluded by Shari’ah-based screening generate superior risk-adjusted 
returns. This could mean that Islamic indices will face relatively worse performance 
when compared to unconstrained market benchmarks. Furthermore, since the 
accounting-based screening will exclude stocks that do not meet the criteria of certain 
financial ratios, notwithstanding financial performance, the returns of Islamic indices 
can be further reduced.  
 
On the contrary, proponents of Islamic equity investing would argue that its ethical 
focus is likely to enhance performance characteristics due to risk reduction.  For 
instance, Renneboog et al. (2008) postulate that firms that comply with ethical screens 
are less likely to be affected by costs related to unethical activities. Furthermore, 
77 
 
Shari’ah-based screens exclude firms that operate with high levels of financial 
leverage and  firms that are involved in speculative financial activities (Ahmed, 2010). 
Avoiding such firms could eventually drive the average return above the overall 
benchmark, especially during periods of financial crises. For instance, Arouri et al. 
(2013, p. 3412) found that “the impact of the current crisis on the Islamic finance 
industry is less marked than on conventional finance”. Following the arguments 
discussed above, we arrive at the following hypotheses:  
 
H0: The performance of Islamic equity indices, relative unconstrained counterparts, is 
indifferent from zero 
 
H1: The performance of Islamic equity indices, relative unconstrained counterparts, is 
different from zero 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Islamic index data 
As previously discussed, one of the main shortcomings of analysing equity indices that 
they are purely hypothetical, hence making it difficult incorporating trade-related 
information. Two alternative research settings would allow to incorporate such 
information. The first approach would entail obtaining firm-level data and effectively 
construct Shari’ah-compliant portfolios, following the screening methodologies made 
available by index providers and mutual fund managers. The main disadvantage of this 
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approach, however, is that screening for Shari’ah compliance is not always a straight 
forward process, but involves careful consideration of Shari’ah expertise. Hence, 
following such a procedure could result in a portfolio that would not necessarily be 
compliant with Islamic principles in practise.  
 
A second alternative approach that would allow to incorporate tradable information 
would be to analyse Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). An ETF is a financial instrument 
aimed to track the movements of a broader stock market index, where the price is 
determined by the value of its underlying constituents. In other words, using ETF 
rather than index data would allow to include tradable data while maintaining the 
advantages of passive investment products.  The main disadvantage, however, is that 
the number of Shari’ah-compliant ETFs are few which would have limited the scope 
of our analysis significantly. Nevertheless, given the similarity between ETFs and 
indices, we would expect the performance to be very similar. 
 
Two main attributes differentiate our dataset from most previous Islamic index 
studies. First, we include Islamic indices from five providers: Dow Jones, MSCI, 
FTSE, Russell and S&P. This allows us to analyse the financial impact of different 
screening methodologies reported in Table 4.1. This is an important aspect as Derigs 
and Marzban (2008) found substantial differences concerning the divisor in the 
financial ratios used by index providers. In the case of our sample, FTSE and MSCI 
use total assets to define a firm’s value while Dow Jones, Russell and S&P use market 
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capitalization. The first approach assumes that a firm’s books should determine its 
value while the latter approach suggests a market-driven valuation approach. 
Practically, the financial screens used by FTSE and MSCI should, therefore, be more 
stringent than the others, as market values exceed book value of assets substantially in 
most industries. In total, our sample includes 32 indices that together cover ten 
regional and global markets. Collectively, our sample stretches from September 1996 
to September 2012. Total return data (i.e., closing price which includes dividends) for 
all indices are obtained from Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters Datastream and in some 
cases from the index providers directly. All data is in USD and we compute monthly 
return as follows: 
R"# = ln	( P",#P",#+,) 
 
(4.1) 
where R"# is the monthly return of the index i at time t, ln  stands for the natural 
logarithm, and  P",# is the total return index at time t. For statistical reasons, we exclude 
all indices with a sample period of less than 30 month. 
4.4.2 Benchmark data 
Throughout our analysis, we employ a matched pair approach. That is, each Islamic 
index has a conventional market benchmark from the same index family. This is 
crucial as index providers could have asset universes that differ considerably (e.g., in 
size, weighting scheme). From a research design perspective, using matched pairs in 
the analysis of screened portfolios enhances research quality (Kreander et al., 2005). 
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Intuitionally, this approach also acknowledges the potential critique of data mining 
that could arise from employing a single market benchmark index to multifamily 
index setting. If a single index is used, then it can be questioned whether the market 
benchmark has been chosen on the basis of a favourable outcome. To systematically 
use market benchmark from the corresponding index family would, in contrast, make 
the analysis robust to a potential data mining bias via arbitrary benchmark suggestions.    
 
Tailored benchmark factors are constructed for all regions, following the 
methodologies of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) when constructing the 
size, value and momentum factors. The data for these factors are obtained from Style 
Research database which has been used in several previous studies (e.g., Derwall, 
Koedijk, & Ter Horst, 2011; Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec, 2011). Following the 
aforementioned reasoning for using customized benchmark factors, we also utilize 
different risk-free rate proxies for each geographical market, respectively. This is done 
to enhance the practical relevance of the results as the choice of risk-free rate will 
reflect choice of the local investor. Exposure to a foreign rather than local risk-free 
asset will, for most investors, result in higher transactions cost and therefore being a 
less attractive option. The risk-free asset (either 3-month treasury bill or the 3-month 
interbank rate) of the largest economy in each region is used, resulting in the following 
choices: World, Developed, Emerging and North America: the US 3-month T-bill, 
Europe and Eastern Europe: the 3-month LIBOR rate, Asia-Pacific: the Japanese 3-
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month T-bill, BRIC and Latin America: the Brazilian 3-month T-bill,  and the Nordic 
Countries: the Swedish 3-month T-bill.  
 
4.4.3 Islamic index descriptive statistics  
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.2. It can be observed that 17 out of 
the 32 Islamic indices have higher mean excess return than their conventional 
counterparts while 14 have higher standard deviations.  Interestingly, all five Islamic 
indices with a global exposure have superior mean excess returns, and all but one 
(Dow Jones) have lower standard deviation. Table 4.2 also reports the Sharpe ratio 
(i.e., mean excess return divided by its standard deviation) and suggest that 18 of the 
indices exercise more favourable reward-to-risk characteristics. The many cases of 
negative Sharpe ratios is most likely a result of the sample period, which covers the 
global financial crisis in 2008-2009. Column four and five report the base date and 
launch date of each Islamic index, respectively. Any difference between the two 
indicates that the Islamic index is subject to back-tested performance history. That is, 
the index has been constructed with the advantaged of hindsight. Potential 
implications of back-tested performance history will be further investigated in Section 
4.5.4.   
 
As illustrated in Table 4.1, all index providers in our sample employ somewhat 
different methodologies when screening for Shari’ah compliance. As an indication of 
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the stringency of these screens, one would therefore want to consider how many firms 
that constituting the respective Islamic and conventional index. Focusing on the global 
market level, in end of 2013 the number constituents for the respective Islamic 
(conventional) index is as follows: Dow Jones 2177 (6882), MSCI 856 (2434), FTSE 
1378 (2882), Russell 3200 (10042) and S&P 3486 (10537). Here, two observations 
can be made. First, it most cases, the screening process undertaken by index providers 
typically exclude two thirds of the firms. The one exception is FTSE where the 
number of firms is (only) reduced in half. Potentially, the less apparent reduction in 
could be due to FTSE’s relatively lax liquidity ratio (see Table 4.1). Second, 
constituted by four-digit firms in all but one case (i.e., MSCI), it appears that Islamic 
indices, at least on a global level, are to be considered well-diversified. 
.
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of Islamic and benchmark indices 
  Index name   Base 
date 
Launch 
date 
  Mean   St dev.   Sharpe ratio 
  Islamic BM     Islamic BM   Islamic BM   Islamic BM 
World                             
Dow Jones DJIM World Index Dow Jones Global   Dec-95 May-99   0.0029 0.0009   0.0513 0.0498   0.0572 0.0179 
MSCI MSCI ACWI Islamic MSCI ACWI   Aug-08 Aug-08   0.0010 -0.0010   0.0581 0.0617   -0.0571 -0.0627 
FTSE FTSE Shari’ah All-World FTSE All-World   Sep-03 Oct-07   0.0044 0.0041   0.0491 0.0510   0.0887 0.0805 
Russell Russell-Jadwa Shari’ah Global  Russell Global   Jul-07 Jun-09   0.0024 0.0003   0.0533 0.0581   0.0456 0.0057 
S&P S&P Global BMI Shari’ah S&P Global BMI   Apr-08 Apr-08   0.0005 -0.0016   0.0615 0.0633   0.0075 -0.0252 
Developed                             
Dow Jones DJIM Developed Markets Index Dow Jones Developed Markets   Dec-95 May-99   0.0024 0.0008   0.0506 0.0490   0.0470 0.0170 
FTSE FTSE Shari’ah Developed Index FTSE Developed Index   Oct-07 Oct-07   -0.0026 -0.0016   0.0589 0.0624   -0.0439 -0.0258 
Russell Russell-Jadwa Shari’ah Developed  Russell Developed   Jul-07 Jun-09   0.0036 0.0069   0.0785 0.0855   0.0459 0.0809 
Emerging                             
Dow Jones DJIM Emerging Markets Index Dow Jones Emerging Markets    Dec-95 May-99   0.0029 0.0007   0.0797 0.0795   0.0358 0.0094 
MSCI MSCI Emerging Markets Islamic MSCI Emerging Markets   Aug-08 Aug-08   -0.0005 0.0003   0.0890 0.0880   -0.0894 -0.0876 
FTSE FTSE Shari’ah Emerging Index FTSE Emerging Index   Oct-07 Oct-07   -0.0060 -0.0010   0.0877 0.0874   -0.0683 -0.0111 
Russell Russell-Jadwa Shari’ah Emerging Russell Emerging Markets   Jul-07 Jun-09   0.0025 0.0006   0.0558 0.0600   0.0448 0.0099 
S&P S&P Emerging BMI Shari’ah S&P Emerging BMI   Jan-08 Jan-08   -0.0037 -0.0007   0.0841 0.0872   -0.0441 -0.0079 
Asia Pacific                             
Dow Jones DJIM Asia/Pacific Index Dow Jones Asia/Pacific    Dec-95 May-99   0.0030 0.0003   0.0606 0.0557   0.0495 0.0058 
MSCI MSCI AC Asia Pacific IMI Islamic  MSCI AC Asia Pacific IMI    Aug-08 Aug-08   -0.0014 -0.0016   0.0692 0.0661   -0.0705 -0.0678 
FTSE FTSE Shari’ah Asia Pacific Index FTSE Asia Pacific Index   Oct-07 Oct-07   -0.0051 -0.0022   0.0631 0.0670   -0.0804 -0.0331 
S&P S&P Asia Pacific BMI Shari’ah S&P Asia Pacific BMI   Jun-07 Jun-07   0.0034 0.0045   0.0624 0.0633   0.0541 0.0705 
BRIC                             
MSCI MSCI BRIC Islamic Index MSCI BRIC Index   Aug-08 Aug-08   -0.0042 -0.0109   0.1008 0.0995   -0.1051 -0.1105 
FTSE FTSE Shari’ah All-World BRIC Index FTSE All-World BRIC Index   Oct-07 Oct-07   0.0025 -0.0104   0.0744 0.0702   0.0330 -0.1480 
S&P S&P BRIC Shari’ah S&P BRIC 40   May-07 May-07   0.0026 0.0005   0.0920 0.0932   0.0283 0.0058 
Eastern Europe                             
MSCI MSCI EM Eastern Europe Islamic Index MSCI EM Eastern Europe Index   Aug-08 Aug-08   -0.0123 -0.0120   0.1172 0.1192   -0.1294 -0.1311 
FTSE FTSE Shari’ah Eastern Europe Index FTSE Eastern Europe Index   Oct-07 Oct-07   -0.0060 -0.0028   0.0876 0.0859   -0.0685 -0.0327 
Europe                             
Dow Jones DJIM Europe Index Dow Jones Europe Index   Dec-95 May-99   0.0008 0.0006   0.0537 0.0421   0.0141 0.0132 
MSCI MSCI Europe Islamic Index MSCI Europe Islamic   Aug-08 Aug-08   -0.0013 -0.0048   0.0782 0.0759   -0.0794 -0.0807 
FTSE FTSE Shari’ah Europe Index FTSE European Index    Oct-07 Oct-07   -0.0069 -0.0056   0.0728 0.0787   -0.0943 -0.0718 
Latin America                             
MSCI MSCI EM Latin America Islamic MSCI EM Latin America   Aug-08 Aug-08   -0.0072 -0.0063   0.1039 0.0962   -0.1111 -0.1026 
FTSE FTSE Shari’ah Latin America Index The FTSE Latin America Index   Oct-07 Oct-07   -0.0150 -0.0084   0.0765 0.0725   -0.1958 -0.1161 
Nordic                              
MSCI MSCI Nordic Countries Islamic Index MSCI Nordic Countries Index   Aug-08 Aug-08   -0.0073 -0.0035   0.0849 0.0912   -0.0922 -0.0947 
FTSE FTSE Shari’ah Nordic Index FTSE Nordic 30 Index    Oct-07 Oct-07   0.0003 0.0058   0.0778 0.0794   0.0035 0.0727 
North America                             
MSCI MSCI North America Islamic Index MSCI North America Index   Aug-08 Aug-08   0.0026 0.0011   0.0530 0.0573   -0.0504 -0.0562 
FTSE FTSE Shari’ah North America Index FTSE North America Index   Oct-07 Oct-07   0.0069 0.0093   0.0449 0.0456   0.1546 0.2035 
S&P S&P North America BMI Shari’ah S&P North America BMI    Apr-08 Apr-08   0.0051 0.0047   0.0563 0.0623   0.0912 0.0750 
The following table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of Islamic indices and their corresponding conventional benchmarks. Column one displays the geographical region and respective index provider. 
Column two and three reports the name of the each Islamic index and corresponding conventional benchmark index (BM), respectively. Column four and five reports the base date and launch date for each Islamic 
index, respectively.  The potential difference between the base date and the launch date represent the period of back-tested performance. Column six to seven, eight to nine and ten to eleven report the monthly 
mean excess return, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio for the Islamic and corresponding benchmark index, respectively.  
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4.5 Main analysis 
The following section offers a detailed outline of each step of the analysis and the 
results. All regressions have been estimated using the Newey and West (1987) 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors that correct for both 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity that may be present in the data. To examine the 
implications of investing according to Islamic principles, we analyse the performance 
of Islamic indices compared to their conventional counterparts using two risk-adjusted 
performance measures, namely the Jensen’s Alpha obtained from the standard CAPM 
model, and the alpha obtained from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, which 
controls for size, value and momentum risk factors. We also estimate the tracking 
error for all indices to investigate the impact of the Islamic screening process.   
4.5.1 Jensen’s Alpha 
We estimate the widely used Jensen’s Alpha (Jensen, 1968) which is defined as: 
 R"# − R%# = α" +	β" R+# − R%# + ε"# (4.2) 
 
where R"#is the continuous return of the Islamic index, R%# represents the risk free rate, α" is the abnormal risk-adjusted return of the Islamic index, β" represent the exposure 
to the systematic (market) risk and ε"# is the random error term. Following the results 
of the Jensen’s alpha regressions displayed in Panel A of Table 4.3, it can first be 
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observed that the performance of Islamic indices appears to vary across different 
geographical markets. On a global level, two Islamic indices exhibit a positive and 
statistically significant alpha of 20 and 29 basis points per month, respectively, while 
the remaining three indices do not perform statistically different from zero. Whereas 
the latter holds in a developed market context, it can be observed that two out five 
Islamic indices significantly underperform (up to 30 basis points) in an emerging 
market context.  
 
The results of the smaller geographical regions, displayed in Panel B of Table 4.3, tell 
a similar story. While most Islamic indices in these regions exhibit a performance 
statistically indistinguishable from market benchmark, there is some evidence of 
geographical differences. Specifically, two out of three indices in the BRIC region 
outperform while there is some evidence of significant underperformance in Latin 
America, the Nordic countries and North America.   
 
The mixed results documented across geographical markets is puzzling. An interesting 
observation is that Islamic indices provided by FTSE appear to perform relatively 
worse compared to other providers. For instance, the indices underperforming in Latin 
America, the Nordics countries and North America all belong to the FTSE index 
family. This could, instinctively, be associated with FTSE’s unique screening 
methodology. The figures discussed in Section 4.5.3 imply that their screening is 
significantly less stringent than the other providers.  
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4.5.2 Carhart four-factor model 
Next, we estimate the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, which extends the standard 
CAPM (which only accounts for the market risk factor i.e., excess market return) by 
including additional risk factors associated with size, value and momentum. We 
denote this model as follows: 
 -./ − -0/ = 1. +	2. -3/ − -0/ + 4.567/ + 8.96:/ + ;.6<6/ + =./ (4.3) 
 
To construct the size (567/) and value (96:/) factors we first divide the asset 
universe into two groups, firms with small market capitalization (S) (0%-50%) and 
firms with large market capitalization (B) (50%-100%). We then create portfolios 
based on book-to-price (book value of equity per share divided by price per share), 
resulting in the following three portfolios: High book value (HV) (top 30%), Medium 
book value (MV) (40%) and low book value (LV) (bottom 30%). We then define 567/ as the average return of (S/HV, S/MV, S/LV) minus the average return of 
(B/HV, B/MV, B/LV) and the 96:/ is defined as the average return of (S/HV, B/HV) 
minus the average return of (S/LV, B/LV). In the construction of the momentum 
(6<6/) factor we follow Carhart (1997) and define it as the return difference between 
previous winning firms (70%-100%) and previous loosing firms (0%-30%).  
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After controlling for size, value and momentum risk factors, the overall performance 
trend of the Islamic indices approximately the same as in the the Jensen’s alpha 
regression setting. However, some differences can be observed, most notably at the 
global, developed and emerging market level. First, with four out of five indices 
exhibiting a positive and significant alpha coefficient, the previously recorded 
outperformance on a global level is strengthen in four-factor regression setting. This 
outperformance, which is up to 41 basis points per month, appears to be driven by tilt 
towards short-term momentum stocks. That is, three of the outperforming indices have 
positive and significant momentum coefficients.  
 
Second, it can be observed that the performance on the developed market level moves 
from statistically insignificant to positive for two of the three indices (i.e., Dow Jones, 
Russell). In contrast to the global indices, this outperformance cannot be explained the 
tilt towards momentum stocks. For one if the indices, however, there is a tilt towards 
growth stocks. Third, as for the emerging market indices, the results are somewhat 
puzzling. Although the underperformance of the FTSE and S&P indices remain, and 
the Russell index also exhibit a significant underperformance, the emerging market 
index from Dow Jones seem to outperform with 31 basis points per month. This 
difference in performance could, potentially, stem from the more than 12 years longer 
return history of the Dow Jones index (see Table 4.2).  
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Directing the attention back to Panel B of Table 4.3 and the remaining geographical 
regions, we document mixed results for the Asia Pacific region. Here, the Dow Jones 
index significantly outperform with 44 basis points per month while the FTSE index 
underperform with 28 basis points. While the Dow Jones index has a tilt towards 
growth stocks and a beta value close to one (0.99), the FTSE index has a somewhat 
lower beta value (0.94) and is more oriented towards value stocks. As for the 
remaining regions the results of the four-factor regressions remain almost identical to 
the ones discussed on the previous section.   
 
In both a single and multifactor regression setting, the beta values vary between 0.89 
and 1.11. This implies that Islamic indices exhibit a risk approximately similar to the 
respective market benchmark. With exception of the momentum factor in global level 
multifactor regressions, most additional risk factors are statistically insignificant. This 
limits the possibility to explain performance in terms of factor loadings.  
 
When observing both panels of Table 4.3, it is evident that the Islamic indices 
provided by Dow Jones perform relatively better, overall, than the indices of the other 
four providers. For instance, not a single Dow Jones index is recorded to underperform 
and as mentioned above, in both an emerging and Asia Pacific market context, Dow 
Jones indices outperform while other indices underperform.  With a significantly 
longer return history of the Dow Jones indices, it can therefore be question whether 
the results are influenced by sample specific factors.  
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Table 4.3 Islamic index CAPM and Carhart regression results 
 
Panel A 
Provider CAPM 
  Carhart     CAPM 
adj r2 
Carhart 
 adj r2 
  Tracking  
error αi   βi     αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi       
World                                         
Dow Jones 0.0020 * 0.9990 ***   0.0026 *** 0.9905 *** -0.0940 * -0.1785 *** -0.0017    0.94 0.96   1.27% 
MSCI 0.0019  0.9250 ***   0.0030 * 0.9526 *** 0.0563  -0.0069  0.0590 *   0.96 0.97   1.09% 
FTSE 0.0005  0.9479 ***   0.0006  0.9613 *** 0.0326  -0.0092  0.0358 **   0.97 0.97   0.82% 
Russell 0.0020  0.9145 ***   0.0026 ** 0.9428 *** 0.0270  -0.0383  0.0580 **   0.97 0.97   1.16% 
S&P 0.0029 ** 0.9149 ***   0.0041 *** 0.9431 *** 0.0646  -0.0094  0.0557 **   0.98 0.98   0.94% 
Developed                                         
Dow Jones 0.0015  1.0007 ***   0.0019 * 0.9925 *** -0.0759  -0.1505 *** 0.0054    0.94 0.95   1.28% 
FTSE -0.0006  0.9235 ***   0.0012  0.9427 *** 0.0654  0.0280  0.0521    0.97 0.97   1.03% 
Russell 0.0021  0.8996 ***   0.0035 *** 0.9232 *** 0.0701  0.0120  0.0602    0.96 0.96   1.25% 
Emerging                                         
Dow Jones 0.0021  0.9694 ***   0.0031 ** 0.9702 *** -0.0906 ** -0.1099 *** -0.0225    0.93 0.94   2.03% 
MSCI -0.0008  1.0042 ***   -0.0009  1.0121 *** 0.0496  -0.0029  0.0171    0.99 0.99   1.06% 
FTSE -0.0033 * 0.9983 ***   -0.0037 ** 1.0052 *** 0.1115 ** 0.0348  0.0273    0.98 0.98   1.11% 
Russell -0.0027  0.9075 ***   -0.0029 * 0.9338 *** 0.0328  0.0035  0.1206 ***   0.98 0.98   1.10% 
S&P -0.0030 ** 0.9588 ***   -0.0031 ** 0.9573 *** 0.0621  0.0537 ** 0.0197    0.99 0.99   0.91% 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997) and Jensen’s alpha (1968) and tracking error estimations, as outlined in our main analysis section. Column one shows the 
respective region and index provider. Column two to six shows the Carhart alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors and column seven shows the adjusted r-squared value. Column 
eight shows the Jensen’s alpha, column nine the beta and column ten the adjusted r-squared value for the same model. Finally, column eleven displays the tracking error. Coefficient 
covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987). *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, 
respectively. 
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Panel B 
Region / Provider CAPM   Carhart     CAPM adj r2 
Carhart 
 adj r2 
  Tracking  
error αi   βi     αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi       
Asia Pacific                                         
Dow Jones 0.0027  1.0269 ***   0.0044 *** 0.9933 *** -0.0271  -0.2550 *** 0.0114    0.89 0.91   2.02% 
MSCI 0.0003  1.0379 ***   0.0007  1.0305 *** 0.0315  -0.0532  0.0087    0.99 0.99   0.83% 
FTSE -0.0022  0.9190 ***   -0.0028 * 0.9412 *** -0.0055  0.1031 ** 0.0215    0.96 0.96   1.30% 
S&P -0.0010  0.9715 ***   -0.0005  0.9886 *** 0.0776  -0.0853 * 0.0445    0.97 0.97   1.08% 
BRIC                                         
MSCI 0.0068 *** 1.0036 ***   0.0064 *** 1.0065 *** 0.0334  -0.0048  -0.0034    0.98 0.98   1.38% 
FTSE 0.0133 *** 1.0472 ***   0.0135 *** 1.0515 *** -0.0436  -0.0322  -0.0084    0.97 0.97   1.21% 
S&P 0.0019  0.9673 ***   0.0008  0.9752 *** 0.1055 ** 0.0039  -0.0173    0.96 0.96   1.84% 
Eastern Europe                                         
MSCI -0.0006  0.9724 ***   -0.0011  0.9958 *** 0.0191  -0.0121  0.0318    0.98 0.98   1.76% 
FTSE -0.0032  1.0060 ***   -0.0040  1.0182 *** -0.1264  -0.1690  0.0126    0.97 0.97   1.45% 
Europe                                         
Dow Jones 0.0010  0.9040 ***   0.0004  0.9238 *** -0.1318 *** -0.1977 *** 0.0430 **   0.93 0.95   2.19%  
MSCI 0.0035  0.9955 ***   0.0025  1.0419 *** -0.1422  -0.1345  0.1023 **   0.93 0.94   2.01% 
FTSE -0.0010  0.9034 ***   -0.0020  0.9499 *** -0.1023  -0.1373 ** 0.0702 *   0.96 0.97   1.39% 
Latin America                                         
MSCI -0.0005  1.0578 ***   0.0009  1.1115 *** 0.2907 *** 0.2058 *** 0.0283    0.96 0.96   2.08% 
FTSE -0.0062 *** 1.0380 ***   -0.0054 *** 1.0870 *** 0.2586 *** 0.1869 * 0.0135    0.97 0.97   1.40% 
Nordic Countries                                         
MSCI -0.0042  0.9049 ***   -0.0033  0.9575 *** 0.1575  0.0387  0.1260 ***   0.94 0.95   1.99% 
FTSE -0.0053 *** 0.9684 ***   -0.0040 ** 0.9951 *** 0.1599 ** -0.0046  0.0211    0.98 0.98   1.18% 
North America                                         
MSCI 0.0015  0.8998 ***   0.0025  0.9259 *** 0.0720  -0.0048  0.0532    0.95 0.95   1.20% 
FTSE -0.0021 ** 0.9789 ***   -0.0021 ** 0.9686 *** -0.0949  -0.0381  0.0005    0.97 0.99   0.51% 
S&P 0.0010  0.8954 ***   0.0006  0.8905 *** -0.0333  -0.0128  -0.0046    0.98 0.98   0.79% 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997) and Jensen’s alpha (1968) and tracking error estimations, as outlined in our main analysis section. Column one shows the 
respective region and index provider. Column two to six shows the Carhart alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors and column seven shows the adjusted r-squared value. Column eight 
shows the Jensen’s alpha, column nine the beta and column ten the adjusted r-squared value for the same model. Finally, column eleven displays the tracking error. Coefficient covariances 
and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987). *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively. 
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4.5.3 Tracking error 
We also compute the tracking error in order to analyse the impact of the screening 
methodology used by the respective provider. Following Statman (2006) we compute 
the tracking error by calculating the standard deviation of the residuals (i.e., the excess 
return over the risk-free rate of the Islamic index minus the excess return over the risk-
free rate of the market benchmark). The tracking errors in our sample (see Table 4.3) 
ranges from 0.5% to just over 2%, which implies that Islamic indices follow their 
benchmarks relatively closely. Interestingly, the tracking errors for the FTSE indices 
do not stand out from the rest of the sample. This implies that the relatively poor 
performance of some of its indices is unlikely due to the FTSE’s screening criteria.   
 
Our analysis has so far yielded consistent and significant results about the 
performance of Islamic indices in various regions. These results suggest that Islamic 
indices perform differently in various geographical contexts. While we witness an 
outperformance on a global level, developed markets and the BRIC region, Islamic 
indices typically underperform in emerging markets with the exception of the Dow 
Jones index. A number of indices provided by FTSE also underperform in smaller 
regions, such as Latin America, the Nordic region and North America. We consider 
our results highly reliable, as they are stretching over multiple providers and the 
regressions carry high explanatory power, making omitted variable biases unlikely. 
However, we cannot provide much evidence when it comes to explaining the results 
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(i.e., why Islamic indices underperform or outperform). The remaining sections are 
therefore devoted to finding explanations to the performance drivers embedded in 
Islamic indices.  
4.5.4 Is there a back-testing bias? 
Many available Islamic indices have a base date that starts prior to the actual launch 
date. In such cases, parts of an index performance are hence based on back tested data 
instead of data generated by a live performing index. For this reason, we, therefore, 
want to examine whether Islamic indices could be subject to what the literature 
sometimes refer to as a ‘look-ahead bias’: “forecasting the future by seeing the future” 
(Mahfoud & Mani, 1996, p. 558). Intuitively, a potential reason why Islamic indices 
could have a positive back-tested performance bias is that it, from a marketing 
perspective, looks better to have good past performance. Index providers have in fact 
acknowledged some aspects of this issue: “Another limitation of back-tested 
hypothetical information is that generally the back-tested calculation is prepared with 
the benefit of hindsight. Back-tested data reflect the application of the index 
methodology and selection of index constituents in hindsight” (S&P Dow Jones 
Indices, 2014, p. 10) 
 
In the case of SRI indices, Schröder (2007, p. 11) noted that back-tested performance 
resulted in better performance: “[t]here is clear evidence of a backward-looking bias. 
In fact, in every case when the available index time series has been calculated 
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backwards the estimated alpha is higher compared to the estimated performance when 
the data from the official inception date on are used”. In the next step of the analysis, 
we, therefore, choose to test whether Islamic indices experience a relatively higher 
return in their back-tested performance periods. To control for this, we add a back-
testing dummy variable to the Carhart model as follows: 
 R"# − R%# = α" +	β" R+# − R%# + γ"SMB# + δ"HML# + ζ"MOM#+ λ"BACKTEST"# + ε"# (4.4) 
 
where BACKTEST"# is defined as 1 in case an observation t is based on back-tested 
data and as zero otherwise. Table 4.4 displays the results of the Carhart regressions 
after controlling for a back-testing effect. Only indices that offer back-tested 
performance data are included in this regression specification, which results in a 
sample of nine indices. In line with our predictions, all significant back-testing 
coefficients have positive factors loadings. This implies that Islamic indices perform 
relatively better during periods of back-tested performance. The results are very strong 
for the Dow Jones indices, the index family that have by far the longest back-tested 
period (launched in 1999 with historical performance from December 1996). Given 
the strong significant back-testing coefficient in several regressions, we choose the 
model in equation 4.4 as our default model for the remaining parts of the analysis.
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Table 4.4 Results of Carhart (1997) estimations after controlling for back-testing bias 
Region/ Provider αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi   BTi   Adj R2 
World                           
Dow Jones 0.0018 * 0.9883 *** -0.0863 * -0.1719 *** -0.0037  0.0045 ** 0.96 
FTSE 0.0014  0.9650 *** 0.0419  -0.0034  0.0437 ** -0.0017  0.97 
Russell 0.0028 ** 0.9424 *** 0.0274  -0.0386  0.0580 ** -0.0004  0.97 
Developed                           
Dow Jones 0.0010  0.9889 *** -0.0699  -0.1453 *** 0.0013  0.0049 ** 0.95 
Russell 0.0032 ** 0.9242 *** 0.0703  0.0125  0.0603  0.0007  0.96 
Emerging                           
Dow Jones 0.0013  0.9764 *** -0.0916 ** -0.1111 *** -0.0170  0.0108 *** 0.94 
Russell -0.0009  0.9317 *** 0.0274  -0.0041  0.1120 *** -0.0043  0.98 
Asia Pacific                           
Dow Jones 0.0026  1.0033 *** -0.0242  -0.2409 *** 0.0212  0.0098 *** 0.92 
Europe                           
Dow Jones 0.0001  0.9226 *** -0.1313 *** -0.1973 *** 0.0419 * 0.0020  0.95 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997) plus back-testing dummy regressions, as outlined in our main analysis section. Column one shows the 
respective region and index provider. Column two to six shows the Carhart alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors. Column seven displays the back-testing 
coefficient and column eight the adjusted r-squared value. Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based 
on (Newey & West 1987), *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively. 
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4.6 Potential explanation of the results  
As previously mentioned, we have so far not been able to explain where the 
documented outperformance and underperformance of Islamic indices stem from. In 
this section, we, therefore, control for a number of possible explanations associated 
with crises and market downturn risk. Similarly, we also investigate possible 
behavioural and research design related explanations.   
4.6.1 Is there a risk management effect? 
It has been argued that many attributes of the Islamic financial system serve as a risk 
management function. For Islamic equity investors, one important attribute that affects 
their investment decisions is the prohibition of gharar, as it forbids investors to get 
involved in speculation and excessive risk taking. Companies involved in such 
activities (e.g., conventional financial institutions) are therefore not considered in the 
investment process. Similarly, Islamic investors must avoid investing in highly 
leveraged stocks. This conservative investment approach is therefore believed to limit 
the risk of Islamic indices in times of market turmoil (Ahmed, 2010). Recent empirical 
evidence confirms this view. For instance, Hoepner et al. (2011) argued that the 
investment style of Islamic mutual funds, with low risk characteristics (such as low 
debt to equity ratios), may result in a hedging effect against stock price volatility. 
Furthermore, Arouri et al. (2013) found that the Islamic equity market was less 
affected than the conventional equity market during the financial crisis.  
96 
 
 
To assess the downside risk management effect of Islamic indices we first utilize a 
dummy varible, a past Performance dummy (PP), whuch is set to minus one when the 
market return falls short of risk-free rate and to zero otherwise. Incorporating it into 
our regression framework allows us to control for performance of Islamic indices 
during market downturns. Furthermore, to test the performance in times of continuing 
market drawdowns we also include a variable developed by Hoepner and Zeume 
(2013). Much like the past performance dummy, the Hoepner & Zeume variable (HZ) 
is set to zero when the market return exceeds the risk-free rate. When the market 
excess return over the risk-free rate is negative for a given observation, however, it 
represents a measure of drawdown, which Hoepner and Zeume define as the absolute 
value of the sum of the negative excess return of the given observation plus all 
negative excess returns directly preceding the given observation (i.e., any 
uninterrupted series of directly preceding observations with negative excess returns). 
Hence, the HZ variable differs from the PP dummy as it captures the ability of fund 
managers or investment strategies to prepare for longer-term consecutive market 
losses, the so-called drawdowns. Including both variables into equation (4.4), we 
arrive at the following regression specification:  
 R$% − R'% = α$ +	β$ R-% − R'% + γ$SMB% + δ$HML% + ζ$MOM% +δ$BACKTEST% + θ$PP% + χ$HZ% + ε$%  (4.5) 
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The results of the regressions are displayed in Table 4.5. We can observe only a few 
significant PP coefficients and those are both positive and negative. Hence, these 
results are rather mixed but suggest that Islamic and conventional indices perform 
very similar during occasional market downturns. Similarly, there are not many 
significant HZ coefficients, there are, however, more positive than negative factors 
loadings, which implies that some Islamic indices seem to be superior their 
conventional counterparts during periods of consecutive market downturns. 
Potentially, this could be explained by the fact that the Islamic debt ratio screen 
excludes firms that rely too much on debt where excess leverage having been shown 
to be risky in long-term market downturns (Opler & Titman, 1994). The alphas, 
however, remain reasonably consistent, suggesting that market downturns do not 
explain the results. 
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Table 4.5 Results of Carhart (1997) estimations after controlling for back-testing bias and downside risk 
 
Region/ Provider Panel A αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi   BTi   PPi   HZi   Adj R2 
World                                 
 Dow Jones 0.0039 ** 0.9540 *** -0.0848 * -0.1701 *** -0.0053  0.0041 ** 0.0019  0.0046  0.96 
MSCI 0.0014  0.9931 *** 0.0903  0.0121  0.0703 **     0.0260  -0.0009  0.97 
FTSE 0.0031  0.9366 *** 0.0382  -0.0072  0.0403 ** -0.0020  -0.0046  0.0033  0.97 
Russell 0.0041 * 0.9106 *** 0.0108  -0.0488  0.0511 ** -0.0002  0.0018  -0.0158  0.97 
S&P 0.0066 ** 0.8979 *** 0.0392  -0.0274  0.0467 *     0.0041  0.0156  0.98 
Developed                                 
 Dow Jones 0.0031 * 0.9507 *** -0.0715  -0.1451 *** 0.0000  0.0045 ** -0.0061  0.0043  0.95 
FTSE 0.0018  0.9421 *** 0.0774  0.0330  0.0554      0.0091  0.0020  0.97 
Russell 0.0023  0.9364 *** 0.0684  0.0129  0.0610  0.0008  -0.0020  -0.0010  0.96 
Emerging                                 
 Dow Jones 0.0011  0.9824 *** -0.0888 ** -0.1104 *** -0.0162  0.0107 *** 0.0113  0.0005  0.94 
MSCI 0.0022  0.9621 *** 0.0136  -0.0196  -0.0110      -0.0273 *** 0.0025  0.99 
FTSE 0.0005  0.9386 *** 0.0640  0.0122  -0.0087      -0.0330 *** 0.0043  0.99 
Russell 0.0034  0.8673 *** -0.0136  -0.0227  0.0771 *** -0.0038  0.0050  -0.0317 *** 0.98 
S&P 0.0008  0.8922 *** 0.0186  0.0350  -0.0202  0.0034  -0.0013  0.0320 *** 0.99 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997) estimations including the Past Performance and Hoepner & Zeume (2009) dummies. Column one shows the respective 
region and index provider, column two to six shows the Carhart alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors, respectively. Column seven displays the factors loading for the back testing 
coefficient and column eight and nine display the HM and HZ dummy coefficients, respectively. Finally, column ten shows the adjusted r-squared values for each regression. 
Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987), *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant 
level, respectively. 
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Region/ Provider Panel B αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi   BTi   PPi   HZi   Adj R2 
Asia Pacific                                 
 Dow Jones 0.0041  0.9751 *** -0.0314  -0.2429 *** 0.0202  0.0102 *** -0.0229  0.0017  0.92 
MSCI -0.0002  1.0429 *** 0.0330  -0.0505  0.0103      -0.0002  -0.0020  0.99 
FTSE -0.0031  0.9610 *** 0.0321  0.1065 *** 0.0309      0.0273  0.0023  0.96 
S&P 0.0007  0.9666 *** 0.0611  -0.0822 * 0.0386      0.0016  0.0093  0.97 
BRIC                                 
 MSCI 0.0105 *** 0.9508 *** 0.0214  -0.0134  -0.0203      -0.0241 ** 0.0053  0.98 
FTSE 0.0151 *** 0.9996 *** -0.0540  -0.0352  -0.0371      -0.0624  -0.0026  0.97 
S&P 0.0091 *** 0.8545 *** 0.0806 * -0.0102  -0.0518 **     0.0061  0.0726 *** 0.97 
Eastern Europe                                 
 MSCI -0.0030  1.0219 *** 0.0427  0.0082  0.0409      0.0090  -0.0030  0.98 
FTSE -0.0020  0.9608 *** -0.1304  -0.1299  -0.0105      -0.0921 * -0.0068  0.97 
Europe                                 
 Dow Jones 0.0005  0.9137 *** -0.1354 *** -0.1993 *** 0.0409 * 0.0017  -0.0001  0.0077  0.95 
MSCI 0.0046  1.0664 *** -0.0768  -0.1020  0.1350 ***     0.0495  0.0096  0.94 
FTSE 0.0017  0.9196 *** -0.0830  -0.1246 ** 0.0786 **     0.0063  0.0081 * 0.97 
Latin America                                 
 MSCI 0.0049  1.0727 *** 0.2989 *** 0.2142 *** 0.0171      -0.0065  0.0074  0.96 
FTSE -0.0066  1.1175 *** 0.2810 *** 0.1952 * 0.0204      0.0274  0.0001  0.97 
Nordic Countries                                 
 MSCI -0.0039  0.9853 *** 0.1847  0.0436  0.1298 ***     0.0249 * 0.0024  0.95 
FTSE -0.0065 ** 1.0228 *** 0.1780 ** 0.0340  0.0217      -0.0022  -0.0058  0.98 
North America                                 
 MSCI -0.0014  1.0248 *** 0.1457  0.0289  0.0794 **     0.0668 ** -0.0032  0.95 
FTSE -0.0016  0.9508 *** -0.1057  -0.0425  -0.0056      -0.0264  -0.0005  0.99 
S&P -0.0005  0.9092 *** -0.0302  -0.0107  -0.0052  -0.0016   0.0334  -0.0084  0.98 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997) estimations including the Past Performance and Hoepner & Zeume (2009) dummies. Column one shows the respective 
region and index provider, column two to six shows the Carhart alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors, respectively. Column seven displays the factors loading for the back testing 
coefficient and column eight and nine display the HM and HZ dummy coefficients, respectively. Finally, column ten shows the adjusted r-squared values for each regression. 
Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987), *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant 
level, respectively. 
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4.6.2 How do Islamic indices perform during financial crises? 
A growing body of literature suggest that the principles underpinning Islamic financial 
products have a positive impact on the financial risk profile. Some studies even argue 
that several of the factors causing the recent credit crisis are prohibited in Islamic 
finance. For instance, one of the main factors trigging the Asian crisis was a growing 
presence of interest-based debt (Radelet & Sachs, 2000). Similarly, it has been argued 
that the most recent financial crisis was caused by excess risk-taking and the vast use 
of complex debt-based financial instruments, both of which are prohibited according 
to Islamic principles (Chapra, 2011). One could, therefore, argue that Islamic indices 
would outperform the market in times of lending crisis and general market turmoil. To 
test the performance of Islamic indices after controlling for financial crises, we include 
dummy variables for three major crises; (i) The Asian Crisis in 1997-1998 (ii) the dot-
com bubble in 2001 and (iii) the credit crisis in 2008-2009. Each dummy variable is 
equal to 1 in the period of financial crisis, 0 otherwise. 
 R"# − R%# = α" +	β" R+# − R%# + γ"SMB# + δ"HML# + ζ"MOM# +δ"BACKTEST# + π1"ACRIS# + π2"ICRIS# + π3"CCRIS# + ε"#   (4.6) 
 
As shown in Table 4.6, only a few indices included in the analysis are old enough to 
cover the Asian financial crisis and the Internet crisis. Several FTSE indices had to be 
excluded as the credit crisis occurred prior to their start date in 2009. The results 
suggest that Islamic indices still outperform on a global level and in developed 
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markets. The underperformance in emerging markets also remains, which suggest that 
the effects of financial crises cannot explain the results entirely. While Islamic indices 
seem to have underperformed during the Internet crisis, the large number of positive 
and significant CCRIS coefficients suggests a relatively better performance during the 
recent credit crisis. This is in line with Radelet and Sachs (2000) who pointed out 
excessive leverage as one of the main aggravating factors of financial crises. A 
possible explanation for this outperformance could, therefore, be a result of the 
financial screening (where firms relying on excessive debt are excluded). 
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Table 4.6 Results of Carhart (1997) estimations after controlling for back-testing bias and financial crises 
Region/ Provider Panel A αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi   BTi   ACRISi   ICRISi   CCRISi   Adj R2 
World                                     
 Dow Jones 0.0028 *** 0.9807 *** -0.0816 * -0.1585 *** 0.0005  0.0055 ** -0.0044  -0.0065 *** 0.0015  0.96 
MSCI 0.0013  0.9702 *** 0.0803  0.0172  0.0640 **             0.0063 ** 0.97 
FTSE 0.0006  0.9723  0.0503  0.0066  0.0445  -0.0013          0.0031  0.97 
Russell 0.0026 ** 0.9575 *** 0.0568  -0.0155  0.0632 *** -0.0039 *         0.0067 * 0.97 
S&P 0.0034 *** 0.9530 *** 0.0741  0.0009  0.0598 **             0.0033  0.98 
Developed                                     
 Dow Jones 0.0017  0.9869 *** -0.0590  -0.1289 *** 0.0083  0.0064 *** -0.0048 * -0.0058 ** 0.0034  0.95 
FTSE -0.0021  0.9512 *** -0.1003  -0.1349 * 0.0708 *             0.0006  0.97 
Russell 0.0032 ** 0.9476 *** 0.1155  0.0432  0.0694 * -0.0042 *         0.0095 ** 0.96 
Emerging                                     
 Dow Jones 0.0037  0.9658 *** -0.0959 ** -0.1119 *** -0.0242  0.0073  0.0020  -0.0083 * -0.0060 * 0.94 
MSCI -0.0018  1.0176 *** 0.0567  0.0047  0.0233              0.0030  0.99 
FTSE -0.0049 ** 1.0161 *** 0.1160 ** 0.0432  0.0375 *             0.0046  0.98 
Russell -0.0012  0.9460 *** 0.0440  0.0101  0.1200 *** -0.0088 **         0.0085 * 0.98 
S&P -0.0030 ** 0.9559 *** 0.0614  0.0526 * 0.0183              -0.0006  0.99 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997) estimations including the Asian crisis (ACRIS), dot com crisis (ICRIS) and the credit crisis (CCRIS) dummies. Column one 
shows the respective region and index provider, column two to six shows the Carhart alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors, respectively. Column seven displays the factor loading 
for the back testing coefficient and column eight to ten display the factors loadings for the ACRIS, ICRIS and CCRIS coefficients, respectively. Finally, column eleven shows the 
adjusted r-squared value for each regression. Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987). *, **, 
*** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively. 
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Region/ Provider Panel B αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi   BTi   ACRISi   ICRISi   CCRISi   Adj R2 
Asia Pacific                                     
 Dow Jones 0.0039 * 0.9918 *** -0.0337  -0.2371 *** 0.0173  0.0095 * -0.0025  -0.0048  -0.0026  0.92 
MSCI 0.0004  1.0340 *** 0.0406  -0.0507  0.0107              0.0013  0.99 
FTSE -0.0047 ** 0.9654 *** 0.0312  0.1118 *** 0.0357              0.0073 ** 0.96 
S&P -0.0010  1.0011 *** 0.0774  -0.0758 ** 0.0510 **             0.0048  0.97 
BRIC                                     
 MSCI 0.0044  1.0159 *** 0.0342  0.0043  0.0041              0.0077 * 0.98 
S&P 0.0026  0.9694 *** 0.1093 ** -0.0003  -0.0191              -0.0060  0.96 
Eastern Europe                                     
 MSCI -0.0018  0.9994 *** 0.0223  -0.0091  0.0327              0.0030  0.98 
Europe                                     
 Dow Jones 0.0017  0.9099 *** -0.1341 *** -0.1980 *** 0.0445 ** 0.0025  -0.0045 ** -0.0053  -0.0047  0.95 
MSCI -0.0014  1.0711 *** -0.0856  -0.0677  0.1098 **             0.0164 ** 0.95 
Latin America                                     
 MSCI -0.0035  1.1267 *** 0.2930 *** 0.1924 *** 0.0186              0.0152 ** 0.97 
Nordic Countries                                     
 MSCI -0.0073 *** 0.9828 *** 0.1534  0.0299  0.1285 **             0.0138 * 0.95 
North America                                     
 MSCI 0.0003  0.9524 *** 0.1064  0.0281  0.0605 *             0.0078 ** 0.95 
S&P -0.0016  0.9259 *** -0.0230  -0.0096  -0.0107              0.0131 *** 0.98 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997) estimations including the Asian crisis (ACRIS), dot com crisis (ICRIS) and the credit crisis (CCRIS) dummies. Column one 
shows the respective region and index provider, column two to six shows the Carhart alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors, respectively. Column seven displays the factor loading 
for the back testing coefficient and column eight to ten display the factors loadings for the ACRIS, ICRIS and CCRIS coefficients, respectively. Finally, column eleven shows the 
adjusted r-squared value for each regression. Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987). *, **, 
*** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively. 
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4.6.3 Ramadan effect 
Behavioural economists argue that stock prices can be substantially influenced by the 
mood of investors. For instance, researchers have found stocks prices to be positively 
affected by positive events such as sunshine (Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003) and 
upcoming holidays (Kim & Park, 1994). Ramadan is one of the five pillars of Islam, 
which is the religious practice of fasting from dawn to sunset during the ninth month 
of the Islamic calendar. Both Białkowski et al. (2012) and Al-Hajieh, Redhead, and 
Rodgers (2011) found stocks in Muslim countries to yield higher returns during 
Ramadan compared to the rest of the year. Their results were explained by the fact that 
Ramadan encourages Muslims optimism which has a positive effect on stock prices. 
We, therefore, expect Islamic indices to yield higher return during periods of 
Ramadan, and we test this by estimating the following regression: 
 R"# − R%#α" +	β" R*# − R%# + γ"SMB# + δ"HML# + ζ"MOM#+ λ"BACKTEST#+	ν"RAMADAN# + ε"# (4.7) 
 
where RAMADAN# is defined as the ‘amount’ of Ramadan days for a respective 
month. For instance, if Ramadan takes place from August 20 to September 20 for a 
given year, then the amount of Ramadan for August would be: 31-20=11 days divided 
by 31days=0.3548. Similarly, the amount of Ramadan for September would be 20 
divided by 30=0.6666 and all other months of the given year would have the value of 
0. In contrast to what we predicted, we do not find any consistent results supporting a 
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Ramadan effect as displayed in Table 4.7. The results could be explained by the fact 
that strong Muslim populations do not represent the countries and regions included in 
our data sample. Hence, a potential Ramadan effect might have disappeared due to the 
overwhelming influence of non-Muslim investors.   
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Table 4.7 Results of Carhart (1997) regressions after controlling for back-testing bias and Ramadan effect 
Region/ Provider Panel A αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi   BTi   Ramadani   Adj R2 
World                             
 Dow Jones 0.0017 * 0.9882 *** -0.0859 * -0.1716 *** -0.0036  0.0045 ** 0.0010  0.96 
MSCI 0.0040 ** 0.9488 *** 0.0545  -0.0057  0.0619 *     -0.0095 * 0.97 
FTSE 0.0015 * 0.9588 *** 0.0256  -0.0122  0.0367      -0.0089  0.97 
Russell 0.0033 ** 0.9404 *** 0.0234  -0.0401  0.0584 ** -0.0005  -0.0055  0.97 
S&P 0.0047 *** 0.9386 *** 0.0670  -0.0054  0.0565 **     -0.0071  0.98 
Developed                             
 Dow Jones 0.0009  0.9889 *** -0.0698  -0.1451 *** 0.0014  0.0049 ** 0.0006  0.95 
FTSE -0.0034 * 1.0037 *** 0.1106 ** 0.0351  0.0283      -0.0040  0.98 
Russell 0.0038 ** 0.9220 *** 0.0683  0.0121  0.0610  0.0005  -0.0058  0.96 
Emerging                             
 Dow Jones 0.0015  0.9766 *** -0.0930 ** -0.1116 *** -0.0169  0.0108 *** -0.0033  0.94 
MSCI -0.0010  1.0123 *** 0.0505  -0.0026  0.0168      0.0010  0.99 
FTSE -0.0011  0.9436 *** -0.0980  -0.1301  0.0687      -0.0100  0.97 
Russell -0.0008  0.9315 *** 0.0270  -0.0043  0.1120 *** -0.0043  -0.0005  0.98 
S&P -0.0029 * 0.9561 *** 0.0616  0.0541 ** 0.0201      -0.0024  0.99 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997) estimations including the ramadan dummy. Column one shows the respective region and index provider, column two to six 
shows the Carhart alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors, respectively. Column seven displays the factor loading for the back testing coefficient and column eight to ten display the 
factors loadings for the ramadan coefficient, respectively, Finally, column eleven shows the adjusted r-squared value for each regression. Coefficient covariances and standard errors 
are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987). *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively.                   
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Region/ Provider Panel B αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi   BTi   Ramadani   Adj R2 
Asia Pacific                             
 Dow Jones 0.0026 * 1.0036 *** -0.0242  -0.2409 *** 0.0213  0.0098 *** 0.0010  0.92 
MSCI 0.0014  1.0275 *** 0.0328  -0.0575 * 0.0113      -0.0068  0.99 
FTSE -0.0009  0.9242 *** 0.0258  0.0988 ** 0.0264      -0.0235 *** 0.97 
S&P 0.0000  0.9874 *** 0.0892  -0.0880 ** 0.0477 **     -0.0064  0.97 
BRIC                             
 MSCI 0.0064 ** 1.0065 *** 0.0334  -0.0048  -0.0034      0.0001  0.98 
FTSE 0.0137 *** 1.0519 *** -0.0410  -0.0335 ** -0.0060 *     -0.0019  0.97 
S&P 0.0017  0.9723 *** 0.1033 ** 0.0035  -0.0192      -0.0098  0.96 
Eastern Europe                             
 MSCI -0.0011  0.9959 *** 0.0190  -0.0123  0.0319      0.0003  0.98 
FTSE -0.0038  1.0173 *** -0.1272  -0.1729  0.0118      -0.0021  0.97 
Europe                             
 Dow Jones 0.0005  0.9236 *** -0.1304 *** -0.1968 *** 0.0427 * 0.0020  -0.0040  0.95 
MSCI 0.0035  1.0377 *** -0.1389  -0.1286  0.1034 **     -0.0094  0.94 
FTSE -0.0011  0.9436 *** -0.0980  -0.1301  0.0687      -0.0100  0.97 
Latin America                             
 MSCI 0.0008  1.1116 *** 0.2912 *** 0.2060 *** 0.0281      0.0003  0.96 
FTSE -0.0047 ** 1.0824 *** 0.2426 *** 0.1717 * 0.0119      -0.0086  0.97 
Nordic Countries                             
 MSCI -0.0027  0.9550 *** 0.1587  0.0473  0.1279 ***     -0.0063  0.95 
FTSE -0.0053 *** 1.0042 *** 0.1701 ** -0.0106  0.0214      0.0156 ** 0.98 
North America                             
 MSCI 0.0032  0.9232 *** 0.0706  -0.0041  0.0557      -0.0073  0.95 
FTSE -0.0025 ** 0.9733 *** -0.0860  -0.0337  0.0011      0.0039  0.99 
S&P 0.0006  0.8902 *** -0.0331  -0.0126  -0.0050      -0.0008  0.98 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997) estimations including the ramadan dummy. Column one shows the respective region and index provider, column two to six 
shows the Carhart alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors, respectively. Column seven displays the factor loading for the back testing coefficient and column eight to ten display the 
factors loadings for the ramadan coefficient, respectively, Finally, column eleven shows the adjusted r-squared value for each regression. Coefficient covariances and standard errors 
are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987). *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively.                   
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4.6.4 Full data history vs. common sample period 
The rapid growth of the Islamic finance industry has resulted in an increased number 
of providers offering Islamic indices. In a multifamily index study, there are, however, 
two issues which are relevant from a research design perspective. First, the fact that 
screening practises differ widely among index providers raises a question of how 
different screens impact index performance. Second, all index families included in our 
analysis have different base dates, which makes it difficult to compare the results. In 
order to compare the relative performance across the providers, we, therefore, 
construct a common period sample.  This sub-sample includes all indices that have a 
history of at least four years (September 2008 to September 2012), where all indices 
with short performance history are excluded.  
 
We perform the Jensen’s Alpha and Carhart regressions without a back-testing 
variable, as no back-tested data during this period exist. The results of the common 
sample analysis are displayed in Table 4.8 and can be summarized as follows. First, 
the results are very consistent with our estimations for the full data sample. Looking at 
the Carhart regressions, the outperformance remains at a global level, developed 
market level, and the BRIC region while Islamic indices underperform in emerging 
markets. Second, the financial performance seems to vary some across the providers. 
For instance, the outperformance at a global level range from 3.6% per annum (MSCI) 
to 5.5% p.a. (Dow Jones). Despite being a very simple form of comparison, it suggests 
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that different screening methodologies could lead to difference in financial 
performance.   
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Table 4.8 Results of Carhart (1997) estimations for the common sample period 
Panel A 
Region/ Provider CAPM model   Carhart model   CAPM Adj R2 
Carhart 
Adj R2 αi   βi     αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi     
Dow Jones 0.0040 *** 0.9333 ***   0.0046 *** 0.9541 *** 0.0139  -0.0376  0.0308    0.98 0.98 
MSCI 0.0019  0.9250 ***   0.0030 * 0.9526 *** 0.0563  -0.0069  0.0590    0.96 0.97 
FTSE -0.0001  0.9409 ***   0.0010  0.9693 *** -0.0302  -0.0761 * 0.0308    0.98 0.99 
Russell 0.0018  0.9146 ***   0.0033 ** 0.9498 *** 0.0756  -0.0114  0.0760    0.97 0.97 
S&P 0.0024 ** 0.9096 ***   0.0035 *** 0.9414 *** -0.0065  -0.0799 * 0.0329    0.98 0.99 
Developed                                 
  Dow Jones 0.0024 * 0.9269 ***   0.0038 ** 0.9473 *** 0.0310  -0.0077  0.0429    0.97 0.97 
FTSE -0.0015  0.9271 ***   -0.0012  0.9328 *** -0.0659  -0.0421  0.0028    0.98 0.98 
Russell 0.0020  0.9000 ***   0.0044 ** 0.9284 *** 0.1068  0.0332  0.0737    0.96 0.96 
Emerging                                 
  Dow Jones 0.0008  0.9400 ***   0.0001  0.9283 *** 0.0789 * 0.0366  -0.0513    0.99 0.99 
MSCI -0.0008  1.0042 ***   -0.0009  1.0121 *** 0.0496  -0.0029  0.0171    0.99 0.99 
FTSE -0.0040 ** 1.0023 ***   -0.0043 ** 1.0112 *** 0.0661  0.0027  0.0225    0.99 0.99 
Russell -0.0034  0.9054 ***   -0.0027 * 0.9411 *** 0.0725  0.0250  0.1509    0.98 0.98 
S&P -0.0032 ** 0.9594 ***   -0.0031 ** 0.9594 *** 0.0397  0.0353  0.0207    0.99 0.99 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997) and Jensen’s alpha (1968) for the common sample period. Column one shows the respective 
region and index provider. Column two to six shows the Carhart alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors and column seven shows the adjusted r-squared 
value. Column eight shows the Jensen’s alpha, column nine the beta and column ten the adjusted r-squared value for the same model. Coefficient covariances 
and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987). *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant 
level, respectively. 
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Panel B 
Region/ Provider CAPM model   Carhart model   CAPM Adj R2 
Carhart 
Adj R2 αi   βi     αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi     
Asia Pacific                                 
  Dow Jones 0.0018  1.0593 ***   0.0022 * 1.0330 *** 0.1417 ** -0.0825 * -0.0069    0.97 0.97 
MSCI 0.0003  1.0379 ***   0.0007  1.0305 *** 0.0315  -0.0532  0.0087    0.99 0.99 
FTSE -0.0034 * 0.9354 ***   -0.0034 * 0.9531 *** 0.0070  0.0583  0.0341    0.96 0.96 
S&P -0.0010  0.9715 ***   -0.0005  0.9886 *** 0.0776  -0.0853 ** 0.0445    0.97 0.97 
BRIC                                 
  MSCI 0.0068 *** 1.0036 ***   0.0064 *** 1.0065 *** 0.0334  -0.0048  -0.0034    0.98 0.98 
S&P 0.0021  0.9757 ***   0.0017  0.9840 *** 0.1299 ** 0.0448  0.0303    0.96 0.97 
Eastern Europe                                 
  MSCI -0.0006  0.9724 ***   -0.0011  0.9958 *** 0.0191  -0.0121  0.0318    0.98 0.98 
Europe                                 
  Dow Jones 0.0015  0.9069 ***   0.0008  0.9454 *** -0.1433 ** -0.1657 *** 0.0403    0.97 0.98 
MSCI 0.0035  0.9955 ***   0.0025  1.0419 *** -0.1422  -0.1345  0.1023    0.93 0.94 
FTSE -0.0016  0.9035 ***   -0.0023  0.9437 *** -0.1249  -0.1388  0.0559    0.97 0.97 
Latin America                                 
  MSCI -0.0005  1.0578 ***   0.0009  1.1115 *** 0.2907 *** 0.2058 *** 0.0283    0.96 0.96 
Nordic Countries                                 
  MSCI -0.0042  0.9049 ***   -0.0033  0.9575 *** 0.1575  0.0387  0.1260    0.94 0.95 
North America                                 
  MSCI 0.0002  0.9071 ***   0.0010  0.9406 *** -0.0235  -0.1032 * 0.0212    0.97 0.97 
S&P 0.0010  0.8954 ***   0.0015  0.9210 *** -0.0310  -0.0842 * 0.0138    0.98 0.98 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997) and Jensen’s alpha (1968) for the common sample period. Column one shows the respective region and index provider. 
Column two to six shows the Carhart alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors and column seven shows the adjusted r-squared value. Column eight shows the Jensen’s alpha, column 
nine the beta and column ten the adjusted r-squared value for the same model. Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based 
on (Newey & West 1987). *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively. 
112 
 
4.6.5 Conventional benchmarks vs. ex-financial benchmarks 
In contrast to indices complying with Islamic principles, standard conventional indices 
tend to be heavily weighted towards financial services stocks. Typically, this sector 
constitutes 20% or more of broad market indices. As a final attempt to explain our 
results, we choose to analyse the performance of Islamic indices relative to market 
benchmarks including non-financials stocks only. Since not all providers offer ex-
financials indices for all geographical markets in our sample, we construct an 
alternative, ex-financials benchmark return (!"#$%&), which we define as follows: 
 !"#$%& = 	)*+&,& + )*+&,& − )/01,& ∗ (45/01,& ÷ 45*+&,& − 45/01,& ) (4.8) 
 
where )*+&,& is the return of the overall market, )*+&,&is the return of the 
financial services sector, 45/01,& is the market value of the financial services sector 
and 45*+&,& is the market value of the overall market. The results of the ex-financials 
regressions are displayed in Table 4.9. All Russell and S&P indices had to be 
excluded, as we could not obtain necessary market capitalization data. Two important 
findings are worth discussing. First, when we use the ex-financials variable as a 
market benchmark we witness a substantial increase in the adjusted R-squared values 
for nearly all estimations. For instance, the adjusted r-squared values for the global 
index regressions increased by 2,45% (Dow Jones), 2,17% (MSCI), 1,79% (FTSE) 
and we can observe a value as high as 99,45% (FTSE Emerging). This implies that our 
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model explains more of the return variation compared to the standard Carhart (1997) 
model. Here, it should also be noted that the adjusted r-squared values in the standard 
Carhart regressions are quite high and typically range from 93% to 97%. An 
interesting topic for future research would be to develop an Islamic asset pricing 
model where conventional financial services stocks are excluded from market 
benchmarks.  
 
A second interesting observation is related to the performance implications of 
applying an alternative ex-financials benchmark. In several cases, Islamic indices 
seem to perform similarly or worse when applying the new benchmark. For instance, 
the outperformance of the Dow Jones World Index found using the standard 
benchmark disappears almost completely. Similarly, the insignificant results of the 
FTSE world index turn into a significant underperformance, and the positive alpha of 
the Dow Jones Asia Pacific index gets reduced. This implies that the good 
performance of several Islamic indices is largely due to the exclusion of financial 
stocks. However, as the outperformance is not due to a bias but an integral part 
embedded in the indices, the alphas should be considered genuine. Hence, some 
Islamic indices seem attractive for both Muslim and non-Muslim investors alike. It 
should, however, be noted that not all indices experience this change since some of the 
alphas remain fairly constant, such as the FTSE Emerging Index. However, we 
consider these results to support the notion that investing according to Islamic 
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principles could offer risk management advantages, which appears to be associated 
with the exclusion of financial stocks. 
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Table 4.9 Results of Carhart (1997) estimations with standard and ex-
financials benchmarks 
Panel A 
Region/ Provider αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi   Adj R2 
World                       
Dow Jones standard benchmark 0.0026 *** 0.9905 *** -0.0940 * -0.1785 *** -0.0017  0.96 
Dow Jones ex-financials 0.0005 * 1.0345 *** -0.0873 *** -0.1138 *** -0.0030  0.98 
                        
MSCI standard benchmark 0.0030 * 0.9526 *** 0.0563  -0.0069  0.0590 * 0.97 
MSCI ex-financials 0.0001  1.0154 *** -0.0033  -0.0079  -0.0014  0.99 
                        
FTSE standard benchmark 0.0006  0.9613 *** 0.0326  -0.0092  0.0358 ** 0.97 
FTSE ex-financials -0.0014 *** 1.0134 *** 0.0169  0.0124  -0.0021  0.99 
                        
Developed                       
Dow Jones standard benchmark 0.0019 * 0.9925 *** -0.0759  -0.1505 *** 0.0054  0.95 
Dow Jones ex-financials -0.0001  1.0447 *** -0.0728 ** -0.0945 *** 0.0064  0.98 
                        
FTSE standard benchmark 0.0012  0.9427 *** 0.0654  0.0280  0.0521  0.97 
FTSE ex-financials -0.0022 * 1.0096 *** -0.0064  0.0027  -0.0024  0.99 
                        
Emerging                       
Dow Jones standard benchmark 0.0031 ** 0.9702 *** -0.0906 ** -0.1099 *** -0.0225  0.94 
Dow Jones ex-financials 0.0008  0.9814 *** -0.1044 *** -0.1039 *** -0.0338 ** 0.96 
                        
MSCI standard benchmark -0.0009  1.0121 *** 0.0496  -0.0029  0.0171  0.99 
MSCI ex-financials -0.0013  1.0306 *** -0.0456 * -0.0357 ** -0.0212  0.99 
                        
FTSE standard benchmark -0.0037 ** 1.0052 *** 0.1115 ** 0.0348  0.0273  0.98 
FTSE ex-financials -0.0035 *** 1.0280 *** 0.0128  0.0030  0.0011  0.99 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997)  regressions with standard and ex-financials 
benchmarks. Column one shows the respective region and index provider, column two to six shows the Carhart 
alpha, beta, smb, hml and mom factors and column seven displays the adjusted r-squared value. Coefficient 
covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 
1987), *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively. 
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Panel B 
Region/ Provider αi   βi   SMBi   HMLi   MOMi   
Adj 
R2 
Asia Pacific                       
Dow Jones standard benchmark 0.0044 *** 0.9933 *** -0.0271  -0.2550 *** 0.0114  0.91 
Dow Jones ex-financials 0.0042 *** 1.0479 *** -0.0393  -0.2006 *** 0.0030  0.94 
                        
MSCI standard benchmark 0.0007  1.0305 *** 0.0315  -0.0532  0.0087  0.99 
MSCI ex-financials 0.0000  1.0648 *** -0.0981 ** -0.0813 *** -0.0365 *** 0.99 
                        
FTSE standard benchmark -0.0028 * 0.9412 *** -0.0055  0.1031 ** 0.0215  0.96 
FTSE ex-financials -0.0032 ** 0.9811 *** -0.0704  0.1357 *** 0.0075  0.97 
Europe                       
MSCI standard benchmark 0.0025  1.0419 *** -0.1422  -0.1345  0.1023 ** 0.94 
MSCI ex-financials 0.0000  1.1285 *** -0.0866  -0.0364  -0.0163  0.96 
                        
FTSE standard benchmark -0.0020  0.9499 *** -0.1023  -0.1373 ** 0.0702 *** 0.97 
FTSE ex-financials -0.0038 *** 1.0077 *** -0.0626  -0.0538  -0.0267  0.98 
                        
Latin America                       
MSCI standard benchmark 0.0009  1.1115 *** 0.2907 *** 0.2058 *** 0.0283  0.96 
MSCI ex-financials -0.0083 *** 1.1232 *** 0.2085 *** 0.1516 *** 0.0432  0.97 
                        
Nordic Countries                       
MSCI standard benchmark -0.0033  0.9575 *** 0.1575  0.0387  0.1260 *** 0.95 
MSCI ex-financials -0.0036 * 0.9784 *** 0.1181  0.1562  0.0736  0.96 
                        
FTSE standard benchmark -0.0040 ** 0.9951 *** 0.1599 ** -0.0046  0.0211  0.98 
FTSE ex-financials -0.0038 *** 1.0243 *** 0.1082  0.0101  -0.0866 ** 0.99 
                        
North America                       
MSCI standard benchmark 0.0025  0.9259 *** 0.0720  -0.0048  0.0532  0.95 
MSCI ex-financials 0.0000  0.9732 *** 0.0226  0.0037  0.0063  0.98 
The following table displays the results of the Carhart (1997)  regressions with standard and ex-financials 
benchmarks. Column one shows the respective region and index provider, column two to six shows the Carhart alpha, 
beta, smb, hml and mom factors and column seven displays the adjusted r-squared value. Coefficient covariances 
and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987), *, **, *** 
represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the financial performance of Islamic equity indices. The chapter 
distinguishes itself from most previous work by carefully addressing several 
methodological shortcomings that could explain the mixed results documented in the 
existing Islamic index literature. The steps towards a cleaner and more robust research 
approach can be summarized as follows. First, in contrast to many previous Islamic 
index papers, our data sample includes a large number of indices from multiple 
providers that together cover ten geographical markets. Second, throughout the 
analysis we maintain a strict matching approach which includes matched index pairs 
from the same provider and customized risk factors. Third, we account for possible 
back-testing biases that could be embedded in Islamic indices.  Forth, we examine two 
sample periods length which allows us to (i) analyse potential performance 
implications of different screening practises currently used in the industry and (ii) 
better compare the performance of Islamic indices with different start dates. Fifth, we 
control for potential effects associated with market downturns and financial crises.  
Finally, we construct a refined market benchmark that excludes financials firms. 
 
The first part of our analysis was concerned with analysing the risk-adjusted 
performance of Islamic indices. Our results suggest that this performance depends on 
the geographical context. We find that Islamic indices outperform their conventional 
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benchmarks on global and developed market level, as well as in the BRIC region. We 
consider these results very sound, as this equity premium appears for multiple 
providers and remain constant in our sub-sample analysis. In contrast, many Islamic 
indices seem to underperform in the emerging market region. Some evidence also 
suggests an underperformance in other regions, such as Latin America and the Nordic 
region.  
 
The second part of the analysis was concerned with explaining the results, and can be 
summarized as follows. First, several Islamic indices in our sample seem to have a 
back-testing bias embedded in the performance history, resulting in relatively higher 
returns during periods of back-tested data. Controlling for this bias showed some 
evidence of a decrease in alpha, but this was marginal. Furthermore, many Islamic 
indices seem to have yielded a superior risk-adjusted return during the recent credit 
crisis, even though controlling for this only resulted in a marginal reduction of alpha. 
Finally, the single most important factor when explaining the results appears to be the 
exclusion of financial stocks. When excluding the financial sector from our market 
benchmark, the previously found alpha disappears while the explanatory power of the 
regression model increases.  
 
The findings presented in this paper could be seen as step towards a deeper 
understanding of the pricing of Islamic equity markets. Future research on Islamic 
equity investing is encouraged to further investigate the implications of constructing 
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alternative market benchmarks. Similarly, it would be interesting to adopt a similar 
research approach on Islamic mutual funds, an industry that has grown with the rapid 
pace in recent years. The paper should also be considered highly relevant to investors 
and policymakers as it shows that the unique attributes embedded in Islamic equity 
investing could provide competitive investment strategies for both Muslim and non-
Muslim investors alike. 
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Chapter 5 
 
DETERMINANTS OF ISLAMIC INDEX PERFORMANCE 
 
Abstract 
This chapter is concerned with the determinants of Islamic index performance. Based 
on an extensive sample of Islamic country indices across 46 markets, we examine 
whether the risk-adjusted performance of these indices is explained by country level 
factors associated with the economic, cultural, governance and religious environment. 
Furthermore, we also consider whether different Shari’ah screens influence 
performance. We find that the risk-adjusted performance of Islamic indices is 
significantly determined by the stock market environment, the money supply 
environment and the level of the Muslim population. This implies that country-level 
factors are important to consider when investing in Shari’ah-compliant portfolio. The 
performance also appears to be related to the Shari’ah screening norms adopted by the 
index providers.   
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5.1 Introduction 
Islamic finance is considered one of the fastest growing sectors of the financial 
industry. Shari’ah-compliant mutual funds have exhibited a particular strong growth 
and have doubled in numbers between 2007 and 2013 (see Figure 2.3). With 
background to this growing significance, there has been mounting academic interest in 
the performance attributes of Islamic equity investments.  The most dominant research 
question in this literature stream is whether Shari’ah-based stock screening impact 
financial performance. In previous studies, this issue has been addressed by analysing 
the performance of Islamic equity portfolios relative to unconstrained market 
benchmarks.  These have been reported to underperform (Hayat & Kraeussl, 2011; 
Nainggolan, How, & Verhoeven, 2013), outperform (Ashraf, 2013), or perform 
similar to the overall market (Albaity & Ahmad, 2008; Girard & Hassan, 2008; Hakim 
& Rashidian, 2004; Walkshäusl & Lobe, 2012b). Hence, the extent to which Islamic 
investment principles impact financial performance is still a question subject to 
debate.    
 
Relative performance aside, one area that has been scarcely investigated is the 
determinants of Islamic index risk-adjusted performance. Although empirical 
observations have taught us that this performance could be determined by factors such 
as the stock market environment (e.g., Elfakhani et al., 2005; Girard & Hassan, 2008; 
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Hussein, 2004)14 and the geographical context (e.g., Hoepner et al., 2011)15, the 
evidence to date is limited. Outside the Islamic finance literature, this issue has 
received considerable more attention. For instance, Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and 
Ramos (2012) study the determinants of an international set of mutual funds from 27 
countries by relating the funds’ Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha to fund characteristics 
and country level economic variables. Renneboog et al. (2008) incorporate data on 
screening activity, fund characteristics and investment style to determine the risk-
adjusted performance of socially responsible investment funds across 17 countries. In 
a related context, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) examine whether the drivers of 
corporate social performance (CSP) are determined by country factors related to the 
economic, cultural and legal environment.16 
 
This chapter seeks to contribute to the literature by studying the performance 
determinants of Islamic equity investment’s financial performance. To do this, we first 
compute the risk-adjusted performance (i.e., Jensen’s alpha) for a large sample of 
Islamic country indices across 46 markets.17 In a cross-sectional regression 
                                               
14 Specifically, sub sample analyses have revealed that Islamic indices have performed differently in 
bull and bear market periods.  
15 Hoepner et al. (2011) found Islamic mutual funds to exhibit relatively better risk-adjusted returns in 
countries with predominantly Muslim investors. 
16 There is no universal definition of corporate social performance. In the context of (Ioannou & 
Serafeim (2012) it is measured by the score of environmental, social and governance dimensions. 
17 An Islamic index can be thought of as the sub-universe of a conventional index, constituted only by 
stocks that comply with Islamic principles. These principles are based on interpretations of Shari’ah 
(Islamic law) and adherence to these principles is assured via the use of negative screens. Hence, for the 
purpose of analysing the direct implications of Islamic equity investing principles, such indices offer an 
ideal setting (Schröder, 2007). 
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framework, we subsequently investigate whether the performance of these indices is 
determined by a variety of country characteristics motivated by previous literature, 
such as economic, cultural, governance and religious factors. Furthermore, since the 
indices in our sample are constructed based on different Shari’ah screening norms, we 
complement the list of country characteristics with a set of proxy variables to capture 
the potential impact of different screens. The latter is similar to the approach by 
Renneboog et al. (2008) and Nainggolan, How, and Verhoeven (2015).  
 
The findings suggest that country-level characteristics can be important determinants 
of Islamic index risk-adjusted performance. We document the overall stock market 
environment to have negative and significant impact on Islamic index performance. 
This relationship implies that Islamic indices will perform relatively worse when the 
market does well and vice versa. Furthermore, there is a positive relationship with the 
level of money supply although the economic relevance appears marginal. 
Interestingly, we also find Islamic indices to perform relatively better in markets 
subject to higher Muslim populations. In contrast, neither cultural nor governance 
environment appears to be relevant determinants of performance. Concerning the 
screening characteristics, we find that financial ratios based on market capitalization, 
rather than total assets, positively contributes to the performance  
 
The remaining parts of this study are structured as follows. Section 5.2 covers the 
hypotheses development, Section 5.3 is concerned with data description, Section 5.4 
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outlines the research design, Section 5.5 discusses the results of the analysis and 
finally Section 5.6 provides a summary and concluding remarks.  
5.2 Research questions 
5.2.1 The interest rate environment 
Perhaps the most distinguished and well-known feature of the Islamic finance system 
is the prohibition of riba, or interest. In the context of Islamic equity indices, the ban 
of interest has three significant implications. First, these indices cannot be constituted 
of firms that rely on interest a source of income (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2011). To adhere 
to this principle, index providers employ negative screening that excludes firms 
subject to excess amounts of interest income. For instance, FTSE, one of the leading 
index providers, excludes from their Islamic indices all firms that have cash and other 
interest-bearing securities that exceed one third of the total assets, or where the interest 
income amounts for more than 5% of total revenue.  
 
The prohibtion of riba implies that interest not only is banned as source of income but 
also as a source of payment. Hence, a second implication for Islamic equity indices is 
that they cannot be constitued of firms that operate with high financial leverage, as 
these firms in most cases would face interest payments on their loans. Following once 
more the example of FTSE, their Islamic indices therefore exclude firms that have a 
total debt that exceeds one third of the total assets. The final implication of the 
probibtion of riba for Islamic equity indices is that they cannot be constitued of firms 
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operating in the financial services industry. Put simply, the reason that this industry is 
considered non-compliant with the riba principle is that interest represent a 
fundamental part in the business model.   
 
The exclusion of firms subject to the aforementioned characteristics implies that 
Islamic equity indices should be fundamentally different than their unconstrained 
index peers in terms of accounting fundamentals, size and sector allocation (Derigs & 
Marzban, 2008).  With background to these differences in characteristics, it seems 
reasonable to question whether the interest rate environment could influence the return 
differentials between Islamic equity indices and their unconstrained counterparts. For 
instance, in a high interest rate environment, the less leveraged firms constituting an 
Islamic index will face less costs associated with financial debt than firms constituting 
the less restrictive conventional index. In the contrary, in a high interest rate 
environment, firms constituting the conventional index is likely to enjoy higher profits 
from interest income. To investigate this performance related issue of the interest rate 
environment, we formulate the first research question as follows: 
 
1st research question: Is the interest rate environment a significant determinant of 
Islamic index risk-adjusted performance?  
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5.2.2 The level of money supply 
Considerable empirical evidence suggest that money supply, defined as “[m]oney and 
quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than 
those of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits 
of resident sectors other than the central government” (The World Bank, 2014), could 
influence stock returns (Blume, Kraft, & Kraft, 1977; Brunie, Hamburger, & Kochin, 
1972) but also  bank profitability (Molyneux & Thornton, 1992). As discussed 
previously, Islamic equity indices differ substantially from the conventional 
counterparts, partly in that they are not being investable in conventional banks and 
other financial institutions. Under the assumption that the profitability of this segment 
of firms depend on the money supply environment, it implies that it could influence 
the differentia performance Islamic equity indices versus their conventional 
counterparts. Hence, we aim to examine the following research question:  
 
2nd research question: Is the money supply environment a significant determinant of 
Islamic index risk-adjusted performance? 
5.2.3 Impact of overall stock market behaviour  
It is commonly accepted that stock markets move in cycles over time, being subject to 
so-called bull and bear market periods. Bull markets signify increased investor 
confidence, rising share prices and improved financial well-being, while bear markets 
imply the opposite: decrease in investor confidence, falling share prices and a 
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decreasing financial well-being (Gonzalez, Powell, Shi, & Wilson, 2005). As 
discussed in the formulation of the first research question, when screening for debt, 
Islamic equity indices are bound to take on less financial leverage than their 
conventional counterparts. Fundamentally, this implies that Islamic equity should 
carry relatively less risk during periods of market turmoil, while lagging behind 
conventional counterparts in optimistic market periods due to a smaller leverage effect 
(a result debt restrictions). To investigate the relationship between the overall stock 
market environment and the performance of Islamic equity indices relative 
conventional counterparts, the following research question is defined:  
 
3rd research question: Is the stock market environment a significant determinant of 
Islamic index risk-adjusted performance? 
5.2.4 The level of Muslim population 
Empirical evidence suggests that religion could be an important determinant of 
investor behaviour. For instance, Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) find that investors in 
Catholic countries (relative Protestant countries) are more likely to hold lottery-type 
stocks, and first day returns of initial public offerings are generally higher. These 
findings suggest that Catholics are more willing to speculate and take higher risk. 
Białkowski et al. (2012) find in stock markets where the populations are of Muslim 
majority, markets have historically enjoyed increased risk-adjusted returns during 
Ramadan. Salaber (2013) find that Catholic investors are more likely than Protestant 
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investors to shun sin stocks, and Golombik, Kumar, and Parwada (2011) find religion 
to impact investment managers asset allocation / strategies, although financial 
performance is not sacrificed. With background to these empirical observations, this 
study seeks to examine whether Islam could influence the performance of Islamic 
equity indices relative their conventional counterparts. Hence, the final research 
question is defined as:  
 
4th research question: Is the level of Muslim population a significant determinant of 
Islamic index risk-adjusted performance? 
5.3 Data 
This section is concerned with describing the data used in the analysis. First it outlines 
the various data sources that have been used to obtain necessary data, followed by a 
discussion of the method used to compute the dependent variable. Next, there is a 
detailed outline of key independent variables (which relate to the hypotheses) followed 
by a motivation of additional control variables.  
5.3.1 Data sources  
A number of data sources have been used to obtain necessary data for the analysis. 
Islamic index and market benchmark data are obtained from Bloomberg. Since the 
scope of the analysis spans over a wide range of countries, a critical issue the data 
coverage. For macroeconomic data we therefore rely on the World Bank database 
129 
 
(http://data.worldbank.org/), which merge data from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). Another advantage of this database is that all 
data is available in an annual frequency, which fits well with the research design 
employed in this study. Furthermore, cultural data is obtained from the Geert 
Hofstede’s website (http://geert-hofstede.com/), and governance data is from the 
World Governance Indicators Project. Finally, religious data comes from the CIA 
World Factbook. 
5.3.2 Dependent variable: risk-adjusted performance (Jensen’s alpha) 
The main dependent variable in this study is the Islamic index risk-adjusted 
performance for a large international set of Islamic country indices. Focusing on the 
determinants of performance (relative to conventional benchmark) rather than returns 
is motivated by the lack of understanding of drivers of the risk-adjusted performance. 
The dependent variable is constructed as follows. First, we obtain weekly Islamic 
index total return data (dividends re-invested) covering 46 developed and emerging 
market countries.18 It should be noted that we considered the inclusion of GCC 
country indices. This is an important Islamic finance region with large populations of 
Muslim investors. However, the data coverage for this region is poor which would 
                                               
18 Countries in alphabetical order: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South 
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and the 
United States 
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have had significant limiting effects on the analysis. Yet, it is to our knowledge the 
largest dataset used in an Islamic index study, as previous studies have incorporated a 
maximum of 35 countries (i.e., Abbes, 2012; Walkshäusl & Lobe, 2012b). 
Furthermore, the dataset includes indices from four providers, which allow us to 
control for the impact of screening characteristics (which will be discussed in detailed 
later). To ensure that all relevant Islamic indices are included, we review in detail the 
index supply of all major index providers.  
 
As for conventional market benchmarks we adopt the methodological approach of 
Kreander et al. (2005) and use matched index pairs, where each Islamic index has a 
corresponding conventional benchmark from the same index provider, respectively. 
This procedure is believed to enhance the research quality as each index pair (Islamic 
and the benchmark index) stem from the same asset universe. In total, the dataset 
spans from January 2008 to December 2012, where the start date and end date is 
determined by the launch of Islamic indices and the availability of independent and 
control variables, respectively.19 Indices with less than 23 weekly observations in a 
given year are excluded for statistical reasons. In preparing the data for the regression, 
we then transform all total return data into continuously compounded returns.20 To 
improve the statistical accuracy further, we use country-specific risk-free rates, which 
                                               
19 While some Islamic country indices were launched earlier (e.g., in 1999 Dow Jones launched a 
handful of country level indices), it was not until 2007 that providers started to launch Islamic country 
indices on broad scale. 
20 The formula used to compute continuous compounded returns : R9: = ln	( =>,?=>,?@A) where ln is the 
natural logarithm, P9,: is the price of index i at time t, and , P9,:CD is the price of index i at time t-1. 
131 
 
is represented by the investment yield of the local three-month treasury bill.21 In order 
to arrive at the risk-adjusted return of each Islamic index, we then estimate the 
Jensen’s alpha which stem from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). In its 
regression form the model is denoted as: 
 R9: − RE: = α9 +	β9 RH: − RE: + ε9: (5.1) 
 
The left hand side of the equation represents the excess return where R9: is the logged 
return of the Islamic index and RE: is the local risk-free. On the right hand side the α9 
represent the abnormal return of the index, β9 is the exposure to the systematic risk, RH: is the logged return of the market benchmark and ε9: stands for the random error 
term. The model is estimated annually between 2008 and 2012 
 
The fact that the present research design involves a two-stage estimation process calls 
for caution when interpreting the results. That is, alpha coefficients of Islamic equity 
indices are estimated in a first-stage, and in the second-stage estimation these 
coefficients form the dependent variable. Since the dependent variable is estimated 
one must acknowledge the potential risk that it is subject to so-called measurement 
error. In this context, measurement error can be described as a situation where the 
exact true value of a variable cannot be observed directly but has to be estimated 
(Hausman, 2001). For instance, if J0 represents the true (unobserved) value of the 
                                               
21 For countries that do not offer T-bills, we use instruments with similar characteristics. 
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dependent variable and J0∗ represents the estimated value of the dependent variable, 
then the measurement error (K0) can be defined as the difference between true and 
observed value, or: 
 K0 = J0 −	J0∗ (5.2) 
 
Suppose the model for describing the determinants of the true value of Islamic index 
risk-adjusted performance can be written as:  
 J0 = 	LM + LDN0 + ⋯+ L+N+ + P0 (5.3) 
 
where J0 is the true value of Islamic index performance, N+ represent relevant 
explanatory variables and P0 is the random error term, then, by incorporating the 
information in Equation 5.2, the model for describing the determinants of the 
estimated value of Islamic index risk-adjusted performance can be written as:  
 J0∗ = 	LM + LDN0 + ⋯+ L+N+ + P0 + K0 (5.4) 
 
In Equation 5.4, it can be observed that when the dependent variable is subject to 
measurement error, the error term of the regression is given by P0 + K0. This implies 
that using an estimated dependent variable will lead to an increase in regression 
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disturbance, whereby the regression output will be subject to lower statistical accuracy 
(Hausman, 2001; Wooldridge, 2012). Because of the general assumption that P0 and  K0 have zero means and is uncorrelated with the independent variables, it is however 
anticipated that a measurement error in the dependent variable presents no problems 
for the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators (Wooldridge, 2012). In other words, 
the principal price one has to pay for using an estimated dependent variable is larger 
standard errors and lower statistical accuracy. Hence, caution is recommended when 
interpreting the results of this two-stage estimation process.   
 
Several observations emerge from the descriptive statistics displayed in Table 5.1. 
Although the focus of this study is on the determinants of Islamic index performance 
rather than the performance itself, we still find it worth discussing the risk and return 
characteristics. First, the aggregated mean excess return for the Islamic indices is 
higher (lower) than the market benchmark in 20 (26) countries. On average, the annual 
mean return for the Islamic indices is -0.026 and conventional indices -0.010 which 
implies that conventional indices, on average, have yielded better mean returns during 
between 2008 and 2012. With a mean standard deviation of 0.331 (Islamic) and 0.334 
(conventional) it does not seem to be a significant difference in volatility. As an 
indication of the reward-to-risk profile, we calculate the Sharpe ratio.22 Again, we can 
observe similar risk and return characteristics of Islamic and conventional indices. In 
                                               
22 The Sharpe ratio is calculated by taking the mean excess return of index i divided by the standard 
deviation of the excess return history. 
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Table 5.1 we also display the mean alpha coefficients for each country, respectively. 
Islamic indices had a positive mean economic significance across the sample period in 
24 countries, while mean alpha for all indices is positive in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 
while being negative in 2012. 
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Table 5.1 Dependent variable summary statistics 
                Country N indices   Islamic index   Benchmark index   Mean Alpha 
  mean s.d. sharpe   mean s.d. sharpe   2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Australia 2   -0.004 0.398 -0.011   0.028 0.345 0.080   0.175 -0.005 0.034 -0.095 -0.113 
Austria 3   -0.141 0.372 -0.380   -0.072 0.387 -0.186   -0.084 -0.054 -0.058 0.070 0.004 
Belgium 3   -0.016 0.280 -0.058   -0.090 0.358 -0.251   0.117 -0.071 0.077 -0.070 -0.060 
Brazil 3   -0.103 0.424 -0.244   -0.015 0.396 -0.039   -0.037 -0.009 -0.064 -0.080 -0.077 
Canada 3   -0.053 0.381 -0.140   0.001 0.343 0.002   0.038 0.019 -0.003 -0.028 -0.093 
Chile 3   0.037 0.315 0.116   0.061 0.311 0.196   -0.109 0.023 -0.133 -0.003 -0.022 
China 3   -0.066 0.337 -0.195   0.047 0.325 0.144   -0.120 -0.054 0.026 0.032 -0.041 
Colombia 2   0.178 0.280 0.635   0.076 0.301 0.252   -0.129 -0.020 -0.036 -0.006 0.020 
Czech Rep 3   -0.120 0.342 -0.349   0.031 0.322 0.095   0.036 -0.073 -0.072 0.041 -0.082 
Denmark 3   0.060 0.297 0.203   -0.005 0.322 -0.015   0.187 -0.063 0.076 0.034 0.052 
Egypt 2   -0.018 0.338 -0.052   -0.062 0.332 -0.188   -0.133 0.158 0.052 0.257 -0.112 
Finland 3   -0.176 0.368 -0.477   -0.098 0.352 -0.278   0.077 -0.106 -0.090 -0.066 -0.016 
France 3   -0.035 0.303 -0.117   -0.085 0.339 -0.252   0.109 0.006 -0.027 0.060 0.015 
Germany 2   -0.031 0.336 -0.093   -0.032 0.332 -0.098   0.019 0.032 0.023 0.020 0.029 
Greece 3   -0.123 0.573 -0.214   -0.260 0.415 -0.627   -0.139 0.149 0.100 0.015 0.277 
Hong Kong 3   -0.016 0.246 -0.063   -0.121 0.337 -0.360   -0.019 0.078 -0.051 -0.043 -0.014 
Hungary 3   -0.111 0.410 -0.271   -0.075 0.425 -0.176   -0.066 -0.003 0.034 -0.038 -0.026 
India 3   -0.077 0.298 -0.259   -0.022 0.329 -0.068   -0.052 0.021 -0.029 0.007 -0.020 
Indonesia 3   0.002 0.342 0.006   0.050 0.355 0.140   -0.150 -0.045 -0.125 -0.108 0.065 
Ireland 3   -0.007 0.519 -0.014   -0.096 0.376 -0.255   0.163 0.156 0.301 -0.114 -0.264 
Israel 2   -0.074 0.208 -0.359   -0.072 0.291 -0.248   0.148 -0.033 -0.071 0.045 -0.079 
Italy 3   -0.037 0.353 -0.105   -0.115 0.322 -0.357   0.223 0.027 0.118 0.091 0.113 
Japan 4   -0.045 0.196 -0.232   -0.068 0.248 -0.275   -0.058 0.100 0.002 0.020 -0.064 
Luxembourg 1   -0.121 0.495 -0.244   -0.111 0.357 -0.311   0.014 0.035 0.121 0.257 -0.011 
Malaysia 3   0.063 0.182 0.345   0.121 0.190 0.639   0.021 0.035 -0.068 0.030 0.031 
Mexico 3   0.085 0.358 0.237   0.058 0.313 0.185   -0.017 0.098 0.103 -0.064 0.064 
Morocco 2   -0.075 0.205 -0.366   -0.013 0.264 -0.049   0.161 -0.089 -0.036 -0.020 -0.017 
Netherlands 3   -0.007 0.280 -0.025   -0.043 0.286 -0.151   -0.046 0.134 -0.007 -0.011 0.023 
New Zealand 2   0.028 0.277 0.099   -0.007 0.274 -0.024   0.075 -0.098 -0.047 -0.155 -0.013 
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Norway 3   -0.044 0.386 -0.114   -0.004 0.362 -0.010   0.142 -0.056 -0.053 0.008 -0.071 
Peru 3   0.033 0.388 0.085   0.090 0.373 0.241   0.038 0.016 -0.021 -0.044 -0.129 
Philippines 3   0.057 0.290 0.196   0.143 0.314 0.456   -0.039 -0.010 -0.120 0.062 -0.214 
Poland 3   -0.094 0.356 -0.265   -0.001 0.359 -0.002   -0.145 0.010 -0.029 0.051 -0.093 
Portugal 2   -0.248 0.336 -0.739   -0.111 0.333 -0.334   -0.115 -0.162 0.201 0.059 -0.224 
Russia 3   -0.089 0.444 -0.200   -0.103 0.406 -0.253   0.072 -0.099 -0.008 0.045 -0.021 
Singapore 3   0.020 0.260 0.078   -0.003 0.353 -0.010   -0.023 -0.012 0.030 0.050 -0.025 
South Africa 3   -0.001 0.366 -0.004   0.057 0.325 0.174   0.003 -0.029 -0.060 -0.020 -0.130 
South Korea 2   0.036 0.360 0.099   0.039 0.364 0.108   0.096 0.088 -0.026 -0.046 -0.028 
Spain 3   -0.005 0.321 -0.015   -0.046 0.366 -0.126   -0.008 -0.178 0.131 0.055 0.295 
Sweden 3   0.040 0.345 0.117   -0.019 0.373 -0.051   0.083 0.066 0.009 0.003 -0.033 
Switzerland 3   0.054 0.217 0.248   0.023 0.295 0.077   0.080 0.065 0.036 0.011 0.003 
Taiwan 3   0.039 0.245 0.161   0.241 0.375 0.642   -0.052 0.091 -0.020 0.056 0.022 
Thailand 3   0.071 0.302 0.234   0.153 0.282 0.542   -0.177 -0.111 -0.074 0.032 -0.125 
Turkey 3   -0.002 0.373 -0.004   0.071 0.385 0.186   -0.086 0.026 -0.013 0.048 0.049 
UK 2   -0.066 0.323 -0.203   -0.013 0.324 -0.039   0.088 0.057 0.013 0.022 -0.099 
US 4   0.021 0.213 0.101   0.008 0.246 0.031   0.017 0.032 -0.016 0.010 -0.040 
  128   -0.026 0.331 -0.062   -0.010 0.334 -0.018   0.008 0.003 0.003 0.010 -0.028 
The following table reports the summary statistics of the Islamic indices. Column one shows the respective country, column two displays the number (N) of indices included for each country, 
respectively. Column three to five and six to eight report the aggregated mean return, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio of the Islamic and benchmark indices, respectively. Finally, column nine to 
fourteen reports the aggregated mean alpha coefficients, obtained from the CAPM regressions. All figures have been annualized.   
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5.3.3 Key independent variables 
These are the variables that we primarily expect to be significant determinants of 
Islamic index risk-adjusted performance.  First, as a proxy for the interest rate 
environment we construct a variable (INTEREST) that contains the lagged official 
lending rate in each country, respectively. As it reflects the bank rate that “…meets the 
short- and medium-term financing needs of the private sector” (World Bank 2014), we 
consider it a suitable proxy for the interest rate environment.  
 
Second, to examine the impact of the money supply we construct a variable (M2) that 
contains the lagged level of money supply (M2) relative to the GDP in each country, 
respectively. This variable is predicated to have a positive impact on the risk-adjusted 
performance. Third, to capture the impact of the overall stock market environment we 
utilize a variable (STOCKMARKET) that captures the mean return of each benchmark 
index, respectively. Finally, to test whether the degree of Muslim population 
determines Islamic index risk-adjusted performance we collect from the CIA World 
Factbook data on the degree of Muslims in relation to the total population 
(MUSLIMPOP).23 
                                               
23 CIA World Factbook has been used in a number of prominent studies on religion and finance (e.g., 
Stulz & Williamson 2003). 
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5.3.4 Additional control variables 
Since the sample of Islamic indices stretches across 46 countries, there is an 
opportunity to explore the role of other country-level factors in explaining the risk-
adjusted performance. Hence, in addition to the key independent variables we also 
include a set of country-level control variables motivated by the previous literature. 
These are bundled in five categories: (i) economic environment (ii) investment styles 
(iii) cultural environment (iv) governance environment (v) screening characteristics. 
We consider the inclusion of this cross-section of country variables an important 
contribution as they have not been examined in the previous Islamic index literature. 
5.3.4.1 Economic environment 
In addition to the key independent variables, we also include additional economic 
variables motivated by previous literature. To control for the impact of fluctuations in 
exchange rates, we obtain annualized monthly average data on local currency units 
relative to the USD (CURRENCY). Once downloaded, the data is then transformed, 
so it expresses the annual change in percentage. To test how the level of inflation, 
impact the performance we use the consumer price index data (INFLATION), which 
is expressed as the annual percentage difference in average consumer prices. 
Furthermore, to control for the impact of government's economic policies we also 
include government spending data (GOVSPEND). This variable is defined as the 
percentage of government spending relative the GDP. All three variables are lagged 
one period.  
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5.3.4.2 Investment styles 
To control for how common investment styles impact Islamic index risk-adjusted 
performance, we follow the methodology of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart 
(1997) and construct investment style portfolios for each country and each year related 
to small versus big, value versus growth and momentum versus contrarian. We then 
note the mean annual return of these portfolios, resulting in three investment style 
variables: size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (MOM).  
5.3.4.3 Cultural environment  
Previous research suggests that culture can be an important determinant of the stock 
market performance.  Culture can be defined as “the collective programming of the 
human mind that distinguishes the members of one human group from those of 
another. Culture, in this sense, is a system of collectively held vales” (Hofstede, 1980, 
p. 24). Culture is believed to be important in a finance context since cultural 
preferences vary across the globe, and it is likely to affect investor behaviour 
differently (Stulz & Williamson, 2003). Or as Statman (2008, p. 38) puts it: “the 
collective set of common experiences that people of the same culture share will 
influence their cognitive and emotional approach to investing.”. 
 
Much empirical evidence supports the view of culture being an important determinant 
of investor behaviour. For instance, using religion and language as proxies for culture, 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) examine whether culture impacts investor rights. They 
140 
 
find that the culture is an important determinant, where, for instance, Catholic 
countries have weaker creditor rights than other countries. Beugelsdijk and Frijns 
(2010) find evidence that cultural distances can explain foreign bias in asset allocation. 
Specifically, investors in societies signified by high uncertainty avoidance invest 
relatively less foreign equity while the opposite apply for individualistic societies. 
Additional evidence that the individualistic dimension matters is provided by Chui, 
Titman, and Wei (2010) who find investors in less individualistic countries to put 
more emphasize on information considered as consensus, resulting in a stronger 
momentum effect compared to collectivistic countries. De Jong and Semenov (2002) 
find stock markets to be more developed in countries with low uncertainty avoidance 
and high masculinity.  
 
Motivated by these empirical observations we also include a set of variables to control 
for the cultural orientation for the countries in our sample. We follow previous 
literature and use the cultural dimension indices proposed by Hofstede (1980): Power 
distance  (PDI) is an index that measures the extent to which members with less power 
in a society accept power to be unequally distributed. Individualism versus 
collectivism (IDV) is an index that represents the degree of group belonging 
experienced by individuals. Long-term orientation (LTO) is an index that represents 
the degree to which societies focus on the future (long-term orientation) versus the 
present or the past (short-term orientation). Masculinity versus femininity (MAS) is an 
index that captures the distribution of roles between men and women.  
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5.3.4.4 Governance 
In a country level context, governance can be defined as “the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process 
by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect 
of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them ” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011, p. 222). The link 
between governance and finance is a widely researched topic. The general conclusion 
is that the governance related issues are relevant in finance context as they determine 
“countries' financial systems as the breadth and depth of their capital markets, the pace 
of new security issues, corporate ownership structures, dividend policies, and the 
efficiency of investment allocation” (La Porta, Lopez-de-SIlanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
2000, p. 4). Empirical evidence supports this notion. For instance, Barro (1996) found 
better Rule of law and political freedom to have a positive impact on economic 
growth. When studying a large sample of firms in 27 countries, La Porta, Lopez-de-
SIlanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) found corporate valuation positively correlated 
with shareholder protection and higher cash flow ownership by controlling 
shareholders.  
 
To control for the impact of country governance environment we include data on six 
governance indicators constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005): Voice 
and Accountability (ACCOUNTABILITY) captures the possibility for a population to 
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impact the choice of government and the freedom of association, expression and 
media. Political Stability (POLSTAB) captures the perception regarding the 
probability of instability and violence related to the political environment. 
Government Effectiveness (GOVEFF) captures quality of civil and public services and 
the extent to which these are independent of political pressure.  Regulatory Quality 
(REGQ) captures the degree to which governments apply regulations that promote 
developments in the private sector. Rule of Law (RULEOFLAW) measures how the 
rule of law is perceived with regard to the following variables: (i) government powers 
(ii) absence of corruption (iii) open government (iv) fundamental rights (v) order and 
security (vi) regulatory enforcement (vii) civil justice and (viii) criminal justice. 
Control of Corruption (CORRUPTION) captures the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain. All variables are ranging from -2.5 (worse outcome) to 2.5 
(best outcome).  
 
It should be noted that since its inception the WGI dataset has been subject to much 
criticism. These criticisms are summarized and discussed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2007), and include things like the problem with using different data 
sources in different countries (i.e., comparability), lack of precision in underlying 
variables, the fact that some indicators being biased as they stem from commercial 
sources, and that the values of the indicators are influenced by economic performance 
rather than its true value.  
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5.3.4.5 Islamic index screening characteristics 
As previously discussed, in order to adhere to the investment principles as stipulated 
by Shari’ah, Islamic index providers utilize negative screening to exclude firms 
considered impermissible from an Islamic perspective. Paradoxically, previous 
literature has made observations that this screening process differs widely across the 
industry (Derigs & Marzban, 2008),  which is also the case for the four providers 
included in our sample. For instance, while MSCI and FTSE use total assets as a 
divisor in the accounting ratios, Dow Jones an S&P use the 24 and 36 months trailing 
average market capitalization, respectively. Furthermore, S&P and FTSE are the only 
ones that employ a screen specifically for non-permissible income (5% of total 
revenue). To explore whether the use of different screens have an impact on the risk-
adjusted performance we include three dummy variables: MC24, which equals 1 if the 
index is constructed using financial screens based on the 24-month average market 
capitalization, and 0 otherwise. MC36, which equals 1 if the index is constructed using 
financial screens based on the 36-month average market capitalization, and 0 
otherwise. Finally, we include NC5%, which equals 1 if the index is constructed using 
5% non-compliant income screen, and zero otherwise. The variable that captures 
indices constructed using total assets is left out to avoid a dummy variable trap due to 
perfect multicollinearity between the variables. 
144 
 
Table 5.2 Overview of variables, definitions and data sources 
    Category Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variables ALPHA Intercept of CAPM regression Author 
Key  variables INTEREST The average annual official lending rate World Bank 
  M2 The average annual level of the money supply (outside banks and central government) relative the GDP of country World Bank 
  STOCKMARKET The mean return of overall stock market Author 
  MUSLIMPOP The Muslim population relative total population CIA Factbook 
Economic CURRENCY Annual percentage change in local currency relative the USD World Bank 
  INFLATION Annual percentage change in the consumer price index World Bank 
  GOVSPEND Annual government spending relative the GDP World Bank 
Style factors SMB Annual mean difference between the return of small stocks and big stocks Author 
  HML Annual mean difference  between the return of value stocks and  growth stocks Author 
  MOM Annual mean difference  between the return of previous winning stocks and previous losing stocks Author 
Culture PDI The power distance dimension in country i of Hofstede's (1980) cultural framework  Hofstede website 
  IDV The individualism versus collectivism dimension country i of Hofstede's (1980) cultural framework  Hofstede website 
  MAS The masculinity versus femininity dimension country i  of Hofstede's (1980) cultural framework  Hofstede website 
  LTO The long-term orientation dimension country i of Hofstede's (1980) cultural framework  Hofstede website 
  UAI The uncertainty avoidance dimension country i  of Hofstede's (1980) cultural framework  Hofstede website 
Governance ACCOUNTABILITY Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
WGI 
  POLSTAB Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
WGI 
  GOVEFF Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
WGI 
  REGQ Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
WGI 
  RULEOFLAW Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. 
WGI 
  CORRUPTION Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
WGI 
Screening MC24 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the index provider use financial ratios based on a 24 month moving average 
market capitalization, zero otherwise 
Index fact sheet 
  MC36 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the index provider use financial ratios based on a 36 month moving average 
market capitalization, zero otherwise 
Index fact sheet 
  5%NC Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the index provider employ a 5% non-compliant income screen, zero 
otherwise 
Index fact sheet 
 The following tables provides and overview of all variables included in the analysis. Column displays the variable category, column the variable name, column three a detailed variable 
description and column five the source. WGI stands for World Governance Indicators. 
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5.3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.3 displays the summary statistics for all explanatory variables used in the 
regression specifications, and Table 5.4 reports their mean values for each country, 
respectively. Focusing on the key independent variables (i.e., INTEREST, M2, 
STOCKMARKET, MUSLIMPOP) we can observe large variations for all over time 
and across the countries in the sample. For instance, INTEREST differs from 0.05% to 
47.3%, which suggest major differences in the interest rate environment. The lowest 
mean interest levels can typically be found in developed market countries (e.g., Japan 
2%, UK 2%, Germany 3%, US 5%) while many emerging market countries have 
significantly higher mean interest rate levels (e.g., Brazil 44%, Peru 21%, Indonesia 
14%, Colombia 13%). As for the level of the money supply (M2) we can observe quite 
the opposite, with high levels typically for developed market countries and low levels 
in many emerging market countries.  
 
The standard deviation for M2 is 77.8%, suggesting large variations. In this study, we 
predict the level of the Muslim population to be a significant determinant of Islamic 
index risk-adjusted performance. We can observe that the Muslim population 
(MUSLIMPOP) differ substantially across the sample, ranging from practically zero 
(i.e., Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Peru, Poland, 
South Korea, Taiwan) to well over 90% in countries such as Egypt, Morocco and 
Turkey.  Large variations are true also for additional variables capturing the country 
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level economic conditions. For instance, while INFLATION has a mean of 
approximately 3.5% across the sample, we can observe periods of deflation, -4.5%, to 
as high as 18.3%. It should be noted that these large variations are likely to be due to 
the critical events of the global financial crisis.  
 
Table 5.3 Summary statistics of explanatory variables 
 
Category Variable Mean St dev  Min Max 
Key independent variables INTEREST 0.072 0.069 0.005 0.473 
  M2 1.201 0.778 0.262 6.550 
  STOCKMARKET -0.001 0.008 -0.026 0.016 
  MUSLIMPOP 0.123 0.261 0.000 0.999 
Economic CURRENCY 0.990 0.078 0.841 1.295 
  INFLATION 0.034 0.029 -0.045 0.183 
  GOVSPEND 0.175 0.054 0.083 0.298 
Investment style SMB -0.011 0.098 -0.414 0.394 
  HML -0.014 0.098 -0.540 0.252 
  MOM 0.000 0.164 -0.889 0.649 
Culture PDI 0.559 0.216 0.110 1.040 
  IDV 0.511 0.236 0.130 0.910 
  MAS 0.518 0.202 0.050 0.950 
  LTO 0.499 0.219 0.068 1.000 
  UAI 0.631 0.244 0.080 1.120 
Governance ACCOUNTABILITY 0.674 0.834 -1.662 1.671 
  POLSTAB 0.261 0.907 -1.842 1.514 
  GOVEFF 1.013 0.816 -0.536 2.430 
  REGQ 0.968 0.735 -0.395 1.996 
  RULEOFLAW 0.862 0.910 -0.949 2.000 
  CORRUPTION 0.856 1.075 -1.088 2.525 
Screening MC24 0.022 0.148 0.000 1.000 
  MC36 0.356 0.479 0.000 1.000 
  5%NC 0.599 0.491 0.000 1.000 
  2009 0.164 0.371 0.000 1.000 
  2010 0.224 0.417 0.000 1.000 
  2011 0.224 0.417 0.000 1.000 
  2012 0.218 0.413 0.000 1.000 
The following table reports the summary statistics of all independent variables. Column one 
displays the category and column two the name of each variable, respectively.  Column three to 
six report the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for each variable, respectively. 
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Table 5.4 Summary statistics of country level independent variables 
  Key  variables   Economic   Investment styles   Culture   Governance 
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Australia 0.08 0.97 0.00 0.02   0.94 0.03 0.18   -0.03 0.05 0.13   0.36 0.9 0.61 0.21 0.51   1.19 0.75 1.46 1.47 1.45 1.72 
Austria 0.04 1.92 0.00 0.05   1.01 0.02 0.19   0.05 0.00 0.08   0.11 0.55 0.79 0.60 0.70   1.19 1.01 1.46 1.27 1.55 1.48 
Belgium 0.04 1.33 0.00 0.06   1.01 0.02 0.24   0.03 -0.06 -0.01   0.65 0.75 0.54 0.82 0.94   1.14 0.65 1.30 1.11 1.13 1.18 
Brazil 0.44 0.67 0.00 0.00   0.95 0.05 0.21   -0.01 -0.01 0.02   0.69 0.38 0.49 0.44 0.76   0.42 -0.11 -0.09 0.08 -0.17 -0.02 
Canada 0.04 1.20 0.00 0.02   0.97 0.02 0.21   -0.05 0.01 -0.11   0.39 0.80 0.52 0.36 0.48   1.17 0.84 1.47 1.39 1.49 1.69 
Chile 0.09 0.74 0.00 0.00   0.98 0.04 0.12   0.00 -0.07 0.03   0.63 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.86   0.88 0.42 1.03 1.24 1.07 1.17 
China 0.06 1.69 0.00 0.02   0.96 0.04 0.13   0.00 0.04 -0.04   0.80 0.20 0.66 0.87 0.30   -1.36 -0.44 0.11 -0.15 -0.30 -0.47 
Colombia 0.13 0.37 0.00 0.00   0.96 0.04 0.16   -0.01 0.06 0.01   0.67 0.13 0.64 0.13 0.80   -0.13 -1.38 -0.05 0.21 -0.33 -0.24 
Czech Republic 0.06 0.71 0.00 0.00   0.96 0.03 0.21   -0.04 -0.02 0.05   0.57 0.58 0.57 0.70 0.74   0.83 0.82 0.78 1.01 0.77 0.23 
Denmark 0.04 0.81 0.00 0.04   0.98 0.02 0.28   -0.08 -0.01 0.03   0.18 0.74 0.16 0.35 0.23   1.31 0.88 1.84 1.58 1.62 2.06 
Egypt 0.12 0.85 0.00 0.95   1.01 0.12 0.11   -0.01 -0.02 -0.05   0.70 0.25 0.45 0.07 0.80   -0.95 -0.68 -0.32 -0.19 -0.14 -0.50 
Finland 0.03 1.05 0.00 0.01   1.01 0.02 0.24   0.02 -0.08 0.02   0.33 0.63 0.26 0.38 0.59   1.26 1.19 1.79 1.45 1.62 1.93 
France 0.04 1.46 0.00 0.08   1.01 0.02 0.24   0.01 -0.04 -0.03   0.68 0.71 0.43 0.63 0.86   1.03 0.47 1.23 1.04 1.21 1.20 
Germany 0.03 1.85 0.00 0.06   1.01 0.02 0.19   -0.03 0.01 -0.11   0.35 0.67 0.66 0.83 0.65   1.12 0.73 1.31 1.29 1.39 1.43 
Greece 0.07 1.06 -0.01 0.05   1.01 0.03 0.18   -0.01 0.00 -0.09   0.60 0.35 0.57 0.45 1.12   0.73 0.06 0.47 0.62 0.57 0.00 
Hong Kong 0.05 3.15 0.00 0.02   1.00 0.03 0.09   -0.04 0.05 0.02   0.68 0.25 0.57 0.61 0.29   0.41 0.81 1.47 1.59 1.26 1.59 
Hungary 0.09 0.62 0.00 0.00   1.00 0.05 0.20   0.02 -0.12 -0.01   0.46 0.80 0.88 0.58 0.82   0.77 0.56 0.58 0.92 0.68 0.31 
India 0.11 0.75 0.00 0.14   1.01 0.09 0.11   -0.02 -0.05 0.04   0.77 0.48 0.56 0.51 0.40   0.36 -1.02 0.01 -0.27 0.01 -0.39 
Indonesia 0.14 0.39 0.00 0.87   0.99 0.06 0.09   0.12 -0.08 0.07   0.78 0.14 0.46 0.62 0.48   -0.05 -0.78 -0.21 -0.28 -0.53 -0.56 
Ireland 0.03 2.07 0.00 0.01   1.01 0.01 0.19   -0.03 -0.05 0.01   0.28 0.70 0.68 0.24 0.35   1.15 0.87 1.20 1.45 1.45 1.42 
Israel 0.06 0.92 0.00 0.25   0.96 0.03 0.23   -0.04 0.04 0.05   0.13 0.54 0.47 0.38 0.81   0.53 -1.12 1.09 0.99 0.73 0.63 
Italy 0.05 1.37 0.00 0.04   1.01 0.02 0.20   -0.03 -0.03 0.04   0.50 0.76 0.70 0.61 0.75   0.83 0.38 0.29 0.74 0.33 0.13 
Japan 0.02 2.21 0.00 0.00   0.93 0.00 0.19   0.05 0.01 -0.03   0.54 0.46 0.95 0.88 0.92   0.83 0.76 1.23 0.91 1.09 1.17 
Luxembourg 0.04 5.78 0.00 0.00   1.01 0.02 0.16   0.00 -0.14 0.06   0.40 0.60 0.50 0.64 0.70   1.29 1.20 1.40 1.44 1.50 1.71 
Malaysia 0.05 1.31 0.00 0.64   0.97 0.03 0.12   -0.02 0.03 -0.02   1.04 0.26 0.50 0.41 0.36   -0.41 0.06 0.93 0.40 0.41 0.08 
Mexico 0.07 0.29 0.00 0.00   1.03 0.04 0.11   0.00 0.03 0.07   0.81 0.30 0.69 0.24 0.82   0.10 -0.61 0.16 0.25 -0.50 -0.26 
Morocco 0.12 1.09 0.00 1.00   0.98 0.02 0.18   0.00 0.02 0.05   0.70 0.46 0.53 0.14 0.68   -0.63 -0.38 -0.11 -0.10 -0.19 -0.26 
Netherlands 0.03 2.15 0.00 0.06   1.01 0.02 0.27   -0.03 -0.06 0.05   0.38 0.80 0.14 0.67 0.53   1.28 0.76 1.45 1.47 1.49 1.81 
New Zealand 0.07 0.92 0.00 0.01   0.97 0.03 0.20   0.06 -0.04 0.04   0.22 0.79 0.58 0.33 0.49   1.28 0.99 1.48 1.52 1.56 1.98 
Norway 0.05 0.56 0.00 0.04   0.98 0.02 0.21   -0.06 -0.04 0.02   0.31 0.69 0.08 0.35 0.50   1.34 1.04 1.57 1.22 1.60 1.68 
Peru 0.21 0.34 0.00 0.00   0.97 0.03 0.09   0.02 0.01 -0.04   0.64 0.16 0.42 0.25 0.87   0.06 -0.76 -0.27 0.33 -0.56 -0.22 
Philippines 0.08 0.61 0.00 0.06   0.97 0.05 0.09   0.06 0.02 -0.03   0.94 0.32 0.64 0.27 0.44   -0.06 -1.36 0.02 -0.12 -0.46 -0.62 
Poland 0.06 0.53 0.00 0.00   1.00 0.04 0.18   -0.08 -0.01 0.01   0.68 0.60 0.64 0.38 0.93   0.80 0.74 0.44 0.74 0.48 0.30 
Portugal 0.04 1.68 0.00 0.01   1.01 0.02 0.21   -0.04 -0.06 -0.06   0.63 0.27 0.31 0.28 1.04   0.96 0.66 0.85 0.75 0.85 0.85 
Russia 0.11 0.47 0.00 0.10   1.02 0.10 0.19   0.01 -0.01 0.05   0.93 0.39 0.36 0.81 0.95   -0.73 -0.75 -0.34 -0.29 -0.69 -0.86 
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Singapore 0.05 1.26 0.00 0.14   0.96 0.03 0.10   0.01 -0.01 -0.05   0.74 0.2 0.48 0.72 0.08   -0.20 0.99 1.92 1.52 1.38 1.85 
South Africa 0.12 0.81 0.00 0.02   1.02 0.07 0.20   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01   0.49 0.65 0.63 0.34 0.49   0.47 0.02 0.38 0.36 0.07 0.11 
South Korea 0.06 1.40 0.00 0.00   1.04 0.03 0.15   -0.07 -0.01 0.02   0.6 0.18 0.39 1.00 0.85   0.57 0.33 0.98 0.74 0.81 0.37 
Spain 0.04 2.01 0.00 0.02   1.01 0.02 0.20   -0.07 -0.01 0.07   0.57 0.51 0.42 0.48 0.86   0.94 -0.24 0.81 0.97 0.96 0.86 
Sweden 0.04 0.91 0.00 0.05   0.98 0.02 0.26   -0.03 0.01 0.07   0.31 0.71 0.05 0.53 0.29   1.32 0.96 1.66 1.41 1.61 1.88 
Switzerland 0.03 1.50 0.00 0.05   0.93 0.01 0.11   -0.05 0.00 0.04   0.34 0.68 0.7 0.74 0.58   1.33 1.04 1.63 1.35 1.48 1.77 
Thailand 0.07 1.15 0.00 0.06   0.96 0.03 0.13   0.01 -0.03 0.02   0.64 0.2 0.34 0.32 0.64   -0.42 -1.07 0.22 0.17 -0.14 -0.28 
Turkey 0.04 0.52 0.00 0.98   1.04 0.08 0.14   -0.04 0.02 -0.01   0.66 0.37 0.45 0.46 0.85   -0.09 -0.76 0.25 0.26 0.07 0.06 
UK 0.02 1.68 0.00 0.04   1.03 0.03 0.22   -0.04 -0.02 0.02   0.35 0.89 0.66 0.51 0.35   1.10 0.31 1.32 1.43 1.41 1.35 
US 0.05 0.85 0.00 0.01   1.00 0.02 0.16   -0.04 0.03 -0.40   0.4 0.91 0.62 0.26 0.46   0.92 0.40 1.30 1.22 1.33 1.09 
The following table reports the mean country-level values for all independent variables. Column one displays the respective country, column two to five report the key independent variables (i.e., interest rate level, 
level of money supply (M2), stock market return, Muslim population). Column six to eight report the macroeconomic variables (i.e., local currency to USD, inflation, government spending) and column nine to eleven the 
investment style portfolios (i.e., size, value, momentum). Column twelve to sixteen displays Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, long-
term orientation versus short-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance). Finally, column seventeen to twenty two report the values of the governance indicators (i.e., accountability, political stability, governance 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption).  
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5.4 Research design 
The main purpose of this study is to analyse the determinants of Islamic index 
performance. Hence, we create a research design that allows us to explore the cross-
sectional differences between the annual risk-adjusted performance of Islamic indices 
and relevant country-level variables. Similar research designs have been applied in 
several contexts, most notably on mutual funds. For instance, Ferreira et al. (2012) 
study the determinants of an international set of mutual funds from 27 countries by 
regressing the Carhart (1997) alpha on a set of fund characteristics and country level 
economic variables. Renneboog et al. (2008) use variables related to screening 
activity, fund characteristics and investment style to determine the risk-adjusted 
performance of socially responsible investment funds in 17 countries. In a related 
context, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) examine whether drivers of corporate social 
performance (CSP) is determined by country factors related to the economic, cultural 
and legal environment.24  
 
As the focus is on Islamic index risk-adjusted performance and not excess returns 
(relative market benchmark), we adjusted the research design to an annual setting, 
where the Jensen’s alpha of each Islamic index is estimated using weekly return data 
and then annualised, and further regressed on annualised (or fixed) explanatory 
                                               
24 There is no universal definition of corporate social performance. In the context of (Ioannou & 
Serafeim (2012) it is measured by the score of environmental, social and governance dimensions. 
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variables. In order to make the analysis robust to potentially time-varying effects, this 
process is repeated for each year in the sample.25  To explore whether the explanatory 
variables significantly determine the risk-adjusted performance, we perform bivariate 
and multivariate regressions. The regressions are performed using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method with White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors. 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Bivariate regression results 
The results of the bivariate regressions are displayed in Table 5.5 We can observe that 
the INTEREST coefficient is significant and negative, which implies that a high (low) 
interest rate environment harms (enhances) Islamic index risk-adjusted performance. 
Furthermore, the results imply that the level of the money supply is positively 
correlated with the performance. Money supply (M2) is positive and significant at the 
1% level, although the economic significance is marginal (0.0004). The stock market 
environment (STOCKMARKET) has a significant negative impact on Islamic index 
performance. Furthermore, while we can observe a positive relationship between 
Islamic index performance and the level of Muslim population (MUSLIMPOP), the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant.  
 
                                               
25 An alternative approach to analyse the determinants of risk-adjusted performance in a time-varying 
setting would be to run rolling regressions. For instance, Ferreira et al. (2012) estimate a four factor 
alpha every quarter, based on the past 36 months return history. 
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Focusing on the economic control variables, the rate of the local currency relative the 
USD (CURRENCY) does not seem to impact performance, as the coefficient is 
insignificant across all estimations. The level of inflation (INFLATION) however is 
negative and statistically significant, and the government spending relative GDP 
(GOVSPEND) a positive impact on Islamic index performance. As for the investment 
style variables, the results suggest that the size factor (SMB) is negative and 
significant. In contrast, the value factor (HML) and the momentum factor (MOM) do 
not seem to influence Islamic index performance.  
 
When controlling for the cultural environment, the power distance (PDI) and 
individualism (IDV) dimensions show a statistically significant relationship, where the 
PDI is negative and IDV positive. In contrast, all other cultural variables (i.e., 
masculinity versus femininity (MAS), long-term orientation versus short-term 
orientation (LTO), uncertainty avoidance (UAI)) do not seem to determine the risk-
adjusted performance. Interestingly, we can observe that the coefficients for all 
governance indicator variables (i.e., voice and accountability (ACCOUNTABILITY), 
political stability and absence of violence (POLSTAB), government effectiveness 
(GOVEFF), regulatory quality (REGQ), rule of law (RULEOFLAW), control of 
corruption (CORRUPTION)) are statistically significant and have a positive impact on 
Islamic index performance across all three estimations. As for the screening 
characteristics, it seems that the 5% non-compliant screen has a negative impact on 
Islamic index performance.  
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Table 5.5 Bivariate regression results 
CATEGORY VARIABLE Dependent variable: ALPHA     
Dependent variable: 
TSTAT 
Key independent variables INTEREST -0.0038 *** -5.161     -2.1284 *** -4.286 
  M2 0.0004 *** 3.603     0.1908 *** 3.293 
  STOCKMARKET -0.0307 *** -2.585     -23.5781 *** -4.173 
  MUSLIMPOP 0.0000  -0.105     0.0477  0.265 
Economic CURRENCY 0.0006  0.597     0.2449  0.396 
  INFLATION -0.0063 * -1.952     -3.1883 * -1.698 
  GOVSPEND 0.0040 *** 2.934     1.5917 * 1.766 
Investment style SMB -0.0023 ** -2.138     -1.1669 ** -2.324 
  HML 0.0003  0.280     0.3435  0.647 
  MOM 0.0002  0.488     0.3758  1.054 
Culture PDI -0.0009 ** -2.420     -0.3508  -1.469 
  IDV 0.0011 *** 3.440     0.4316 ** 1.997 
  MAS 0.0002  0.538     0.0664  0.266 
  LTO 0.0004  1.099     0.5824  2.493 
  UAI 0.0003  0.947     0.1711  0.818 
Governance ACCOUNTABILITY 0.0003 *** 2.755     0.1140 * 1.845 
  POLSTAB 0.0002 ** 2.541     0.1180 ** 2.205 
  GOVEFF 0.0003 *** 2.672     0.1530 ** 2.495 
  REGQ 0.0003 *** 3.120     0.1661 ** 2.391 
  RULEOFLAW 0.0003 *** 3.127     0.1369 ** 2.435 
  CORRUPTION 0.0002 ** 2.572     0.1080 ** 2.266 
Screening characteristics MC24 0.0001  0.495     0.0416  0.130 
  MC36 0.0002  1.330     0.2709 *** 2.616 
  5%NC -0.0004 ** -2.468     -0.2829 *** -2.810 
Yearly dummies 2009 0.0002  0.897     0.2823 ** 2.211 
  2010 0.0000  -0.131     -0.1377  -1.119 
  2011 0.0002  1.280     0.2261 ** 2.020 
  2012 -0.0005 ** -2.129     -0.5439 *** -4.103 
The following table reports the results of the bivariate regressions. The dependent variables are (1) the Jensen's Alpha (ALPHA) (2) the Jensen's alpha t-statistic (TSTAT). Key independent variables include 
the official lending rate (INTEREST), the level of money supply (M2), the return of the overall stock market (STOCKMARKET) and the level of Muslim population (MUSLIMPOP). Economic variables include 
the exchange rate of the local currency relative the USD (CURRENCY), the inflation rate proxied by the consumer price index (INFLATION) and the level of government spending relative the GDP 
(GOVSPEND). Investment style variables include size (SMB), Value (HML) and momentum (MOM).  Cultural variables include the power distance (PDI), individualism versus collectivism (IDV), masculinity 
versus femininity (MAS), long-term orientation versus short-term orientation (LTO) and uncertainty avoidance (UAI). Governance indicators include accountability (ACCOUNTABILITY), political stability 
(POLSTAB), government effectiveness (GOVEFF), regulatory quality (REGQ), rule of law (RULEOFLAW) and the level of corruption (CORRUPTION). Screening characteristics include a dummy variable for 
24 months market capitalization based financial screens (MC24), 36 months market capitalization based financial screens (MC36) and a dummy variable for the 5% non-compliant income screen (5%NC). 
Finally, annual dummies include dummy variables for each year of the sample (2008 left out to avoid the dummy trap). ***, ** and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. T-statistics 
are reported in italics.  
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5.5.2 Multivariate regression results 
The results of the multivariate regressions are reported in Panel A and Panel B of 
Table 5.6. The first estimation includes the key independent variables with no country 
fixed effects. The results indicate that the interest rate environment (INTEREST) is 
negatively and significantly related to Islamic index performance. Following the 
reasoning in the research question section, this relationship could stem from Islamic 
indices’ exclusion of firms relying on interest as a source of income or firms in the 
financial services sector.  Fundamentally, these two groups could, ceteris paribus, 
enjoy relatively better earnings in high interest rate environments. It can further be 
observed that the level of the money supply (M2) exhibits a positive relationship and 
the overall stock market environment (STOCKMARKET) a negative relationship. In 
contrast, there is no indication that the level of the Muslim population influences the 
performance. With a factor loading of 0.0291, changes in the stock market 
environment appear to influence performance significantly more than the interest rate 
environment (0.0026) and the level of money supply (0.0003). The coefficients of the 
INTEREST, M2 and STOCKMARKET, are statistically significant which suggest the 
results are robust. However, with an adjusted r-squared value of less than 0.05, it 
should be noted that the explanatory power of the model is marginal. Including 
additional explanatory variables and accounting for fixed effects should, however, 
result in a higher explanatory power.  
 
When controls for country specific factors are included (i.e., estimation 2), three 
interesting observations can be made. First, the statistically significant relationship 
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between performance and the interest rate environment (INTEREST) disappears and 
the factor loading of the coefficient moves from negative to positive. Second, there is 
a decrease in statistical significance between Islamic index performance and the 
money supply (M2) and the overall stock market environment (STOCKMARKET), 
respectively. Both variables are now statistically significant at the 10% level compared 
to a 5% level in estimation 1. Third, with an adjusted r-squared of 0.0944, it can be 
observed that including controls for country factors lead to a substantial increase in 
explanatory power.  
 
Following the results of the third estimation, it can be observed that when the group of 
economic variables (i.e., CURRENCY, INFLATION, GOVSPEND) is added to the 
model, the relationship between the degree of Muslim population and Islamic index 
performance turns statistically significant and positive. This relationship implies that a 
higher demand for Shari’ah-compliant stocks, given a larger pool of Muslim investors, 
could benefit Islamic indices.  Neither the exchange rate nor the level of inflation 
seems to exhibit any association with Islamic index performance. These coefficients 
are statistically insignificant in both estimations. The level government spending, on 
the other hand, appears to be positively related to performance. The results stay fairly 
consistent when adding the set of investment style variables (i.e., estimation 4). The 
relationship between performance and the interest rate environment remains 
insignificant, while the statistically significant impact of the money supply 
environment, the stock market environment and government spending stay about the 
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same. The results of this estimation suggest that neither size, value not momentum 
investment styles influence the risk-adjusted performance of Islamic indices.  
 
As can be seen in estimation 5, adding the influence of cultural dimensions (i.e., PDI, 
IDV, MAS, LTO, UAI) substantially impact the results recorded in the previous 
estimations. That is, the coefficients of M2, STOCKMARKET, MUSLIMPOP and 
GOVSPEND are no longer statistically significant. In contrast, there is now a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between Islamic index performance 
and the interest rate environment. This observation is in stark contrast to what was 
recorded earlier, where the INTEREST coefficient was negative. The results further 
suggest that the cultural context exhibits no association with Islamic index 
performance. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any governance dimensions (i.e., 
ACCOUNTABILITY, POLSTAB, GOVEFF, REGQ, RULEOFLAW, 
CORRUPTION) are significant determinants of Islamic index performance. When 
these variables are added to the regression (i.e., estimation 6), it can also be observed 
that IDV coefficient turns positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level). This 
implies that the performance of Islamic indices could perform better relative 
benchmarks in countries with individualistic values. 
 
Following the results of estimation 7, it appears that Shari’ah screening can be a 
relevant determinant of performance. There is a positive and significant relationship 
(at the 1% level) between risk-adjusted performance and accounting based ratios that 
are using a 36 months trailing market capitalization as a divisor (MC36), while the 
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non-compliant income screen (5%NC) has a negative impact (significant at the 5% 
level). These results suggest that the choice of Shari’ah screening norms does 
influence performance, although the impact appears marginal. Next, it can also be seen 
that when the screening variables are added, the INTEREST and GOVEFF 
coefficients become statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively, 
while IDV turns insignificant. Finally, including variables related to country 
governance result in an increase in adjusted r-squared value to 0.1458.  
 
In the final estimation, yearly dummy variables are added to the model in order to 
determine the impact over time. To avoid a dummy variable trap, the first year (i.e., 
2008) is excluded. The coefficients of these variables are all positive, suggesting that 
Islamic indices enjoyed higher risk-adjusted returns during this period compared to the 
first year of the sample. Interestingly, the coefficient for 2009 is much larger than the 
other years. This could, arguably, be due to the financial turmoil in that year, resulting 
in relatively higher performance for Islamic indices. Adding the annual dummy 
variables cause the STOCKMARKET coefficient to increase considerably from 
0.0142 to 0.0919. With other variables staying approximately the same, this is likely 
due to a high correlation between the STOCKMARKET and the annual dummies, as 
the financial crisis correlates highly with the annual dummies.  
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Table 5.6 Multivariate regression results 
 
PANEL A 
CATEGORY VARIABLE (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Key independent variables INTEREST -0.0026 *** -3.381   0.0044  0.749   0.0080  1.279   0.0092  1.459 
  M2 0.0003 ** 2.417   0.0012 * 1.960   0.0012 * 1.945   0.0012 * 1.935 
  STOCKMARKET -0.0291 ** -2.444   -0.0224 * -1.858   -0.0208 * -1.637   -0.0222 * -1.724 
  MUSLIMPOP 0.0002  0.652   0.0010  1.471   0.0015 * 1.904   0.0016 * 1.894 
Economic variables CURRENCY                 -0.0002  -0.248   -0.0003  -0.300 
  INFLATION                 -0.0042  -0.661   -0.0046  -0.725 
  GOVSPEND                 0.0064 * 1.959   0.0068 * 1.858 
Investment style variables SMB                         -0.0012  -0.889 
  HML                         -0.0005  -0.388 
  MOM                         -0.0004  -0.698 
                                  
  Country effects No      Yes      Yes      Yes     
  Constant -0.0002      -0.0016  -2.119   -0.0026 * -1.845   -0.0028 * -1.909 
  Adjusted r-squared 0.0372      0.0944      0.0962      0.0943    
The following table reports the results of the multivariate regressions, including the first, second and third category independent variables. Explanation of variables: the official lending rate (INTEREST), 
the level of money supply (M2), the return of the overall stock market (STOCKMARKET) and the level of Muslim population (MUSLIMPOP), local currency relative the USD (CURRENCY), the inflation 
rate proxied by the consumer price index (INFLATION) and the level of government spending relative the GDP (GOVSPEND), size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (MOM),). ***, ** and * represent 
the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. T-statistics are reported in italics 
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PANEL B 
CATEGORY VARIABLE (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Key independent variables INTEREST 0.0156 *** 2.592   0.0169 * 2.689   0.0142 ** 2.221   0.0215 *** 3.193 
  M2 0.0009  0.715   0.0009  0.692   0.0010  0.831   0.0003  0.204 
  STOCKMARKET -0.0149  -1.074   -0.0124  -0.912   -0.0102  -0.753   -0.0919 *** -2.712 
  MUSLIMPOP 0.0012  0.400   -0.0009  -0.249   0.0000  0.002   -0.0024  -0.597 
Economic variables CURRENCY -0.0004  -0.396   -0.0005  -0.419   -0.0002  -0.140   0.0003  0.244 
  INFLATION -0.0057  -0.898   -0.0063  -0.989   -0.0083  -1.319   -0.0125  -1.569 
  GOVSPEND -0.0014  -0.192   0.0014  0.174   0.0028  0.361   -0.0027  -0.320 
Investment style variables SMB -0.0012  -0.888   -0.0015  -1.096   -0.0016  -1.184   -0.0020  -1.433 
  HML -0.0006  -0.485   -0.0004  -0.337   -0.0006  -0.473   -0.0001  -0.094 
  MOM 0.0001  0.190   0.0001  0.106   0.0001  0.185   -0.0003  -0.495 
Cultural variables PDI 0.0032  0.161   0.0189  0.667   0.0112  0.395   0.0383  1.317 
  IDV 0.0068  0.918   0.0169 * 1.659   0.0134  1.349   0.0216 * 1.825 
  MAS -0.0030  -1.082   -0.0056  -1.546   -0.0048  -1.364   -0.0067 * -1.661 
  LTO 0.0033  0.418   0.0110  1.119   0.0075  0.768   0.0172  1.547 
  UAI 0.0034  0.864   0.0033  0.424   0.0048  0.619   -0.0015  -0.202 
Governance variables ACCOUNTABILITY         -0.0012  -0.485   -0.0011  -0.468   -0.0007  -0.276 
  POLSTAB         0.0008  0.777   0.0008  0.729   0.0012  1.232 
  GOVEFF         0.0025  1.548   0.0027 * 1.694   0.0028 * 1.750 
  REGQ         -0.0011  -0.676   -0.0012  -0.706   -0.0017  -1.061 
  RULEOFLAW         -0.0016  -0.949   -0.0013  -0.780   -0.0017  -1.045 
  CORRUPTION         -0.0006  -0.524   -0.0009  -0.731   -0.0009  -0.750 
Screening variables MC24                 -0.0003  -0.968   -0.0003  -1.180 
  MC36                 0.0007 *** 3.337   0.0007 *** 3.378 
  5%NC                 -0.0009 *** -4.492   -0.0009 *** -4.476 
Yearly variables 2009                         0.0024 *** 2.861 
  2010                         0.0017 *** 2.454 
  2011                         0.0016 *** 2.892 
  2012                         0.0017 *** 2.290 
                                  
  Country effects Yes       Yes      Yes      Yes    
  Constant -0.0087   -0.657   -0.0229   -1.375   -0.0177   -1.072   -0.0346 * -1.913 
  Adjusted r-squared 0.1162      0.1176      0.1458      0.1654    
The following table reports the results of the multivariate regressions, including the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh category independent variables. Explanation of variables: the official lending rate 
(INTEREST), the level of money supply (M2), the return of the overall stock market (STOCKMARKET) and the level of Muslim population (MUSLIMPOP), local currency relative the USD 
(CURRENCY), the inflation rate proxied by the consumer price index (INFLATION) and the level of government spending relative the GDP (GOVSPEND), size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum 
(MOM), power distance (PDI), individualism versus collectivism (IDV), masculinity versus femininity (MAS), long-term orientation versus short-term orientation (LTO) and uncertainty avoidance (UAI), 
power distance (PDI), individualism versus collectivism (IDV), masculinity versus femininity (MAS), long-term orientation versus short-term orientation (LTO) and uncertainty avoidance (UAI), dummy 
variable for 24 months market capitalization based financial screens (MC24), 36 months market capitalization based financial screens and a dummy variable for the 5% non-compliant income screen 
(5%NC). ***, ** and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. T-statistics are reported in italics 
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5.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has offered a modest attempt to explore the determinants of Islamic index 
performance. Specifically, it has been considered whether the risk-adjusted 
performance of national Islamic indices can be significantly related to country-level 
factors which proxies for the cultural, economic, governance and religious 
environment.  Furthermore, the chapter has also considered whether the different 
Shari’ah screening norms adopted by index providers have a diverse impact on the 
risk-adjusted performance of these indices. The results of this analysis can be 
considered an important contribution, as past work has been concerned primarily with 
the relative performance.   
 
The results of the cross-sectional regression analysis suggest that Islamic index 
performance is negatively related to the overall stock market environment. This 
implies that the risk-adjusted returns of these indices appear to increase when the 
overall stock market performs poorly, and vice versa. It was posited that this 
relationship is due to Islamic indices’ underinvestment in high leveraged stocks. That 
is, Islamic indices to be more risk averse in market downturns while in market 
upswings these indices will lag behind the market due to a smaller leverage effect.  
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The results also suggest that other country factors level factors determine Islamic 
index performance, although these appears to be less economically relevant. 
Specifically, a high (low) money supply environment has a (negative) impact on risk-
adjust returns, which also is the case for the degree of the Muslim population. The 
latter is in line with previous findings  on the cross-country performance of Islamic 
mutual funds (Hoepner et al., 2011). In contrast, neither the cultural nor the 
governance environment seems to be relevant in explaining Islamic index 
performance. Concerning the Shari’ah screening norms, we find accounting screens 
following a market capitalization based rulebook to impact performance positively, 
while the opposite is true for screens using a total assets based rulebook.  
 
It should be noted that the research presented in this chapter is subject to several 
limitations. First, while it can be argued that the scope of the data sample is 
comprehensive (i.e., 128 Islamic indices across 46 markets), it only covers the period 
2008 to 2012. This is because historical return data for country level Islamic indices 
prior to 2008 is limited, and reliable macroeconomic data for the year 2013 was not 
released until recently. Given the short time horizon, it is, therefore, fair to assume that 
the results of the analysis have been heavily influenced by the events surrounding the 
major credit crisis in 2008-2009.  
 
Second, as discussed earlier in the chapter, one issue of using an estimated dependent 
variable is the additional disturbance caused by a potential measurement error. Finally, 
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although this chapter has considered several explanatory variables typically discussed 
in the asset pricing and the cross-country performance literature, there are still many 
potentially relevant factors that have not been considered. The main reasons for this 
are the challenging task of obtaining country level data that is complete and consistent 
across such a diverse range of countries.  
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Chapter 6 
THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF SHARI’AH-BASED ACCOUNTING SCREENS 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
One of the fundamental pillars of Islamic finance is the prohibition of riba, which 
implies that business transactions must be free from the collection or payment of 
interest. Islamic equity investing, therefore, utilizes accounting-based screening to 
identify firms subject to non-permissible financial characteristics, such as excessive 
use of financial leverage and income generated from interest. The extent to which 
these screens impact financial performance remains one of the central empirical 
questions in the Islamic finance literature. This chapter examines the return and risk 
characteristics of a large set of Shari’ah-based accounting screens in isolation from 
each other, hence contributing with new empirical evidence to the literature. The 
results suggest that several screens have generated significant risk-adjusted returns. 
However, this is true only for screens based on market capitalization, and primarily in 
periods of market turmoil.   
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6.1 Introduction 
One of the fundamental pillars of Islamic finance is the prohibition of riba, which 
implies that business transactions must be free from the collection or payment of 
interest (El-Gamal, 2006). Islamic equity investing, therefore, utilizes accounting-
based screening to identify firms subject to non-permissible financial characteristics. 
This process, typically comprised by four accounting ratios, investigates the 
characteristics of firms concerning debt, liquidity, interest income and income from 
non-permissible business activities. Firms that do not fulfil the predetermined 
acceptance levels are not considered eligible to invest in, and hence excluded from the 
asset universe. Financial institutions across the industry adopt different Shari’ah 
screening norms resulting in the use of different ratios to define Shari’ah-compliant 
asset universes. Here, the most dominant difference is the use of either market 
capitalization or total assets to define firm value, which is used in the denominator in 
the different ratios. Furthermore, threshold levels (i.e., maximum acceptance level) in 
these ratios differ significantly 
 
Whether the accounting based screening process has an impact on performance is 
perhaps the central empirical questions in the Islamic equity investing literature. To 
address this issue, one literature stream has compared the performance of Islamic 
investment vehicles, such as mutual funds and equity indices, relative unconstrained 
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market benchmarks, where the difference in performance captures the potential 
screening impact. Although this research approach is useful to determine the 
effectiveness of Islamic investment principles, it is subject to some limitations. First, 
since the universe constituting these investment vehicles effectively is the results of 
multiple financial screens, it is only possible to measure the collective screening 
impact. Furthermore, the performance difference between Islamic portfolios and 
market benchmarks may also be driven by the business activity screening.26  Recent 
attempts to overcome this issue include comparing performance of Islamic indices 
subject to different screening norms (Ashraf, 2014; Lobe et al., 2012) and to construct 
hypothetical portfolios of  different screens (Derigs & Marzban, 2009; Marzban & 
Asutay, 2012). Nevertheless, there is still no evidence of individual screens.  
 
This chapter seeks to address these limitations by studying the financial impact 
accounting-based screens in isolation from each other. Making use of a wide range of 
accounting data, we construct hypothetical equity portfolios that correspond to rules of 
each financial screen, respectively. Apart from analysing the performance of all 
screens, the research design setting also allow us to examine whether the recorded 
differences in screening methodology, such as the choice of divisor in the financial 
ratios and different threshold levels have an impact on financial performance.  
 
                                               
26 The business activity screening is the other half the Shari’ah screening process, and is concerned 
with excluding firms that are involved  
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The findings of this chapter contribute extensively to Islamic equity performance 
literature. First, we find that many of the accounting screens used by Islamic investors 
result in significant abnormal returns. This is the case for all three screening categories 
considered in this study (i.e., debt, liquidity, interest income). The economic 
significance for many of these appears substantial. Second, the performance impact of 
the screens is largely determined by the choice of divisor. In many cases, screens 
based on market capitalization result in abnormal returns while screens based on total 
assets do not perform statistically different from zero. Third, some evidence suggests 
that more stringent screen (i.e., lower threshold levels) result in a greater 
outperformance. This suggests that a positive relationship between the level of 
Shari’ah compliance and financial performance.  Fourth, the findings also suggest that 
the performance impact of accounting screens depend highly on industry 
characteristics. For instance, we find total assets based debt screens to result in an 
outperformance in sectors characterized by high levels of tangible assets.  
 
The remaining parts of this chapter are structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides a 
background to the study. Characterises of accounting screens are discussed as well 
theories that can be related to the accounting screens.  Section 6.3 gives a detailed 
outline of the research objectives and academic and practical relevance. 6.4 is 
concerned with describing the data and portfolio construction while 6.5 shows the 
analysis and results. Finally, in 6.6 are the conclusions.  
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6.2 Capital structure theory  
The accounting based screening employed in Islamic equity investing result in 
portfolios that hold firms of which capital structure are tilted towards equity rather 
than debt. The role of capital structure has been extensively discussed in the corporate 
finance literature, and traces back to Modigliani & Miller (1958) (MM) and their 
irrelevance proposition. MM argue that firm value is independent of its capital 
structure, whereby the level of debt is irrelevant. A key concept shaping their 
proposition is the one of arbitrage. Specifically, it is argued that since investors can 
leverage themselves in an identical way and without any additional cost, the capital 
structure of the firm should not impact firm value (Fama, 1978). An important aspect 
of the irrelevance proposition is the different assumptions it is based upon. For 
instance, it assumes there is a perfect substitution of financing types, no bankruptcy 
costs, transaction costs, corporate taxes and all firms carry an equal risk. Naturally, 
much criticism has been pointed towards these assumptions, as they are unlikely to be 
true in the real world. For instance, firms with high amounts of fixed assets are likely 
to receive better credit rating and hence lower borrowing rate.  
 
In a subsequent paper, Modigliani & Miller (1963) presented a correction of their 
earlier paper with the motivation to “…increase somewhat the estimate of the tax 
advantages of debt financing under our model and consequently to reduce somewhat 
the quantitative difference between the estimates of the effects of leverage under out 
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model and under the naïve traditional view” (Modigliani & Miller 1963, p.442). Here, 
they argue that the optimal capital structure is achieved through the highest possible 
leverage as it will create a greater tax shield (i.e., reduction of corporate taxes from 
tax-deductible income). According to this view, total firm value would equal the value 
of the unleveraged firm value plus the benefits of the tax shield. This view was heavily 
critiqued by Miller (1977) who argued that in order to increase leverage additional 
bondholders will require higher interest rates, which will even any potential benefit of 
the tax shield.  
 
A second influential theory related to capital structure is the agency problem theory. 
The theory is concerned with describing the conflicting interest between corporate 
managers and owners. The free cash flow agency problem (Jensen 1986) suggests that 
in firms with substantial amounts of free cash flow, managers are more likely to invest 
in projects with less favourable net present value (NPV) to increase their personal 
compensation. Such activities would generate less return for the shareholders. Jensen 
(1986) argues that by increasing the financial leverage and hence reducing the free 
cash flow, managers are more limited to invest in projects with less favourable NPV. 
This agency problem hence states that leveraged firms are more successful as a result 
of managers being more efficient. 
 
From a Shari’ah perspective, assets should be in illiquid form whereby Islamic 
investors are prohibited from investing in stocks with excess liquidity. In this context, 
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liquidity can be defined as the ability to convert assets into cash or cash equivalents. 
This typically includes account receivables, cash and short-term investments. 
Fundamentally, liquidity is necessary to firms in order meet short-term financial 
obligations. Firms also maintain liquid assets for speculative purposes (i.e., profitable 
future investment opportunities) as well as a protection against future contingencies 
(Kim 1998). One could, therefore, argue that from this perspective, Islamic investors 
should be punished financially for holding low-liquidity stocks as a result of short-
term risk. However, one of the main drawbacks of liquid assets is the low profitability. 
The low risk associated with holding liquid assets is likely to yield lower return 
compared to invest in illiquid assets with higher risk.  
 
This relationship has been extensively studied in recent years and is subject to some 
contradicting views. Following Jensen (1986) and the free cash flow argument, firms 
should hold zero liquid assets to avoid managers investing in negative net present 
value projects instead of paying it out to shareholders. Similarly, the fact that liquid 
assets always are available at a fair price implies that the optimal strategy would be 
zero liquidity. However, market imperfections suggest that firms should hold excess 
liquidity. This is particularly true when external funding is costly. In contrast, pecking 
order theory (Myers & Majluf 1984) suggest that firms should hold liquid assets so 
that future investment opportunities could be financed with internal funds. (Kim 1998) 
argues that the optimal level of liquidity is positively correlated with the cost of 
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external financing. According to this argument, fewer liquid firms should perform 
relatively worse in times of costly external financing.  
6.3 Data  
6.3.1 Asset universe, financial returns and accounting data 
The dataset used in this study is utilized as follows. First, we obtain the annual 
constituents list of the FTSE All-World Index between 2002 and 2013. This index has 
several attractive features. First, as one of the leading stock market indices, it 
represents a practically relevant universe of stocks across a large number of developed 
and emerging market countries.. In total this represents approximately 5400 firms. 
Second, we follow the procedure of most index providers and exclude all stocks 
involved with unethical business activities. The rationale here is that we want to 
capture the accurate performance of the different financial screens. Here, we use the 
list of unethical firms presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.1). Specifically, we exclude 
from the constituents list firms with the following Industry Classification Benchmark 
(ICB) codes: Advertising & Media, Alcohol (3533, 3535), Financials (8000), Media 
(5500), Gambling (5752), Hotels (5753), Tobacco (3785) and Defence (2717). Firms 
involved with adult entertainment and pork-related products are identified using the 
S&P Capital IQ platform27. After this step is performed, we are left with 
approximately 3400 firms. 
 
                                               
27 Specifically, we search for relevant keywords in the business description 
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Third, from Thomson Reuters Datastream we obtain total return data (i.e., dividends 
re-invested) for all remaining constituents from January 2002 to December 2013. The 
data is then transformed into continuously compounded returns. To avoid a possible 
survivorship bias (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, & Ross, 1992), all stocks are 
included up until the point that they die. Fourth, for all remaining constituents we also 
obtain accounting data necessary to construct portfolios that correspond to the 
financial ratios. Specifically, this includes account receivables, cash, interest income, 
market capitalization, short-term investments, total assets, total debt and total revenue. 
Constituents with incomplete observations are excluded.  
 
Based on the accounting data contained in the dataset outlined previously, we form 
value-weighted portfolios of constituents which corresponds to the inclusion criterion 
of each screen, respectively. The exact definitions of these criteria are reported in 
Table 6.1. From this table, it can be observed that the portfolios are not mutually 
exclusive. To ensure practical relevance, we follow major providers of Islamic indices 
and repeat this process annually at the beginning of each year throughout the period of 
the sample. In total, there are 25 equity portfolios, which proxies for the characteristics 
of 7 debt screens, 11 liquidity screens and 7 interest screens.   
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Table 6.1 Portfolio definition 
Portfolio  Description of inclusion criteria 
Debt screens 
 TD / TA < 30% total debt(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 30% 
TD / TA < 33% total debt(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 33% 
TD / TA <33,33 total debt(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 33,33% 
TD / TA <37% total debt(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 37% 
TD / MC < 30% total debt(i,t) / market capitalization(i,t) must be less than 30% 
TD / MC < 33% total debt(i,t) / market capitalization(i,t) must be less than 33% 
TD / TA&MC <33% total debt(i,t) / total assets(i,t) & market capitalization(i,t) must be less than 33% 
Liquidity screens 
 AR / TA <33% account receivables(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 33% 
AR / TA <45% account receivables(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 45% 
AR+C/TA<50% account receivables(i,t)  plus cash(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 50% 
AR+C/TA<70% account receivables(i,t)  plus cash(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 70% 
AR+C+SI/TA<67% account receivables(i,t)  plus cash(i,t) plus short-term investments(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 67% 
AR+C+SI/TA<90% account receivables(i,t)  plus cash(i,t) plus short-term investments(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 90% 
AR/MC<30% account receivables(i,t) / market capitalization(i,t) must be less than 30% 
AR/MC<33% account receivables(i,t) / market capitalization(i,t) must be less than 33% 
AR/MC<45% account receivables(i,t) / market capitalization(i,t) must be less than 45% 
AR/MC<49% account receivables(i,t) / market capitalization(i,t) must be less than 49% 
AR+C+SI/MC<70% account receivables(i,t)  plus cash(i,t) plus short-term investments(i,t) / market capitalization(i,t) must be less than 70% 
Interest screens   
CSI/TA<30% cash(i,t) plus short-term investments(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 30% 
CSI/TA<33% cash(i,t) plus short-term investments(i,t) / total assets(i,t) must be less than 33% 
CSI/MC<30% cash(i,t) plus short-term investments(i,t) / market capitalization(i,t) must be less than 30% 
CSI/MC<33% cash(i,t) plus short-term investments(i,t) / market capitalization(i,t) must be less than 33% 
Int income/Rev<3% total interest income(i,t) / total revenue(i,t) must be less than 3% 
Int income/Rev<5% total interest income(i,t) / total revenue(i,t) must be less than 5% 
Int income/Rev<10% total interest income(i,t) / total revenue(i,t) must be less than 10% 
The following table reports the inclsuiion criteria of each screen, respectively. AC= Account receivables, C= Cash, CSI= Cash plus short-term investments, D= Deposits, FD= Financial 
debt, IBD= Interest bearing debt, IBI= Interest bearing investments, ID= Interest bearing deposits, II= Interest income, MC= Market capitalization, NCI= Non-compliant investments, 
OE= Owners Equity, TA= Total assets, TD= Total debt. 
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6.4  Analysis & Results 
6.4.1 Descriptive statistics  
The descriptive statistics of the 25 hypothetical portfolios are presented in Table 6.2 
and present a number of interesting observations. First, the average number of firms 
differ substantially across the portfolios. For instance, the smallest debt portfolio 
contains 799 firms while the largest has an average of 1264 firms. This clearly 
illustrates the diverse stringency of the different screens, and it is likely to assume that 
it will impact return and risk. The debt screens are more stringent than both the 
liquidity and interest screens. In fact, some portfolios are almost identical to the 
market benchmark in terms of size. This implies that some accounting ratios used in 
the industry have little or no impact. Second, mean excess returns above the market 
can be observed for all screening types (i.e., debt, liquidity, interest income), although 
this is true only for the market capitalization based ratios. This suggests that market 
capitalization based ratios generate higher mean returns compared to their total assets 
based counterparts.28 This is in direct contrast to Ashraf (2014, p. 7) who finds that “in 
terms of Shari’ah screening criteria based on return, it is evident that indices that use 
trailing market value of equity […] as a divisor for financial ratio calculation perform 
worse than that of [indices] using total assets as a divisor”. This is puzzling, note least 
as Ashraf’s study cover approximately the same period (i.e., 2000-2012). Arguably, 
                                               
28 For instance, the difference in monthly mean excess return between two debt screens is as large as 
0.0027% (or 3.24% per annum).  
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this illustrates the point made earlier in the chapter, that is can be problematic to draw 
conclusions regarding specific Shari’ah screens based on existing Islamic indices.   
 
Third, it seems that the threshold level only has a marginal impact on returns. For 
instance, the 7% difference in threshold levels between the laxest and most stringent 
total asset based ratios is only one basis point. The kurtosis and skewness estimate 
suggests that total assets based ratios deviate more from the normal distribution 
compared to the market capitalization based ratios, although this difference appears to 
be marginal. Finally, in addition to the descriptive statistics, Table 6.2 also presents 
the results of two common ratios commonly used to rank the reward-to-risk 
characterises of investment portfolios. These are the Sharpe ratio (defined as the 
portfolio excess return divided by the portfolio’s standard deviation) and the Treynor 
ratio (defined as the portfolio excess return divided by the portfolio’s systematic risk). 
Hence, the basic interpretation of these ratios is that the higher the ratio, the better 
risk-to-reward characteristic of the portfolio. It can be observed that all but two 
portfolios exhibit lower than benchmark Sharpe ratios. This implies that, when risk is 
defined by total volatility, Shari’ah screening result in somewhat better risk-adjusted 
performance. When the systematic risk is accounted for (i.e., the Treynor ratio), the 
number of portfolios with reward-to-risk characteristics below the market decreases 
from 25 to 15.  
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Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics 
Portfolio Descriptive Statistics   Ratio analysis N firms  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis Beta   Sharpe Treynor  
Debt screens                         
TD / TA < 30% 1035 0.0100 0.0159 0.1405 -0.2460 0.0517 -1.0952 6.9750 1.0075   0.1927 0.0099 
TD / TA < 33% 1141 0.0099 0.0152 0.1425 -0.2485 0.0522 -1.0983 7.0155 1.0133   0.1903 0.0098 
TD / TA <33,33 1150 0.0099 0.0154 0.1434 -0.2487 0.0523 -1.0923 7.0084 1.0138   0.1896 0.0098 
TD / TA <37% 1264 0.0099 0.0158 0.1468 -0.2487 0.0524 -1.0726 6.9651 1.0075   0.1883 0.0098 
TD / MC < 30% 830 0.0126 0.0176 0.1300 -0.2118 0.0473 -0.9572 6.2734 0.9236   0.2670 0.0137 
TD / MC < 33% 876 0.0126 0.0176 0.1311 -0.2144 0.0476 -0.9673 6.3292 0.9302   0.2637 0.0135 
TD / TA&MC <33% 799 0.0113 0.0165 0.1534 -0.2322 0.0504 -0.9378 6.6394 0.9500   0.2247 0.0119 
Liquidity screens                         
AR / TA <33% 1586 0.0095 0.0153 0.1607 -0.2573 0.0532 -1.0734 7.2437 0.9931   0.1783 0.0096 
AR / TA <45% 1652 0.0095 0.0151 0.1614 -0.2578 0.0535 -1.0640 7.1983 0.9983   0.1769 0.0095 
AR+C/TA<50% 1599 0.0094 0.0151 0.1613 -0.2585 0.0533 -1.0842 7.3170 0.9967   0.1770 0.0095 
AR+C/TA<70% 1634 0.0094 0.0148 0.1609 -0.2585 0.0533 -1.0859 7.2963 0.9979   0.1766 0.0094 
AR+C+SI/TA<67% 1644 0.0094 0.0147 0.1609 -0.2590 0.0535 -1.0828 7.2732 0.9969   0.1763 0.0095 
AR+C+SI/TA<90% 1678 0.0094 0.0148 0.1608 -0.2586 0.0535 -1.0714 7.2161 0.9996   0.1761 0.0094 
AR/MC<30% 1216 0.0119 0.0155 0.1522 -0.2188 0.0494 -0.8366 6.2031 0.9497   0.2418 0.0126 
AR/MC<33% 1259 0.0117 0.0152 0.1519 -0.2227 0.0499 -0.8684 6.2654 0.9582   0.2351 0.0123 
AR/MC<45% 1384 0.0113 0.0152 0.1546 -0.2332 0.0508 -0.9437 6.6241 0.9715   0.2213 0.0116 
AR/MC<49% 1413 0.0112 0.0155 0.1553 -0.2343 0.0509 -0.9480 6.6621 0.9750   0.2208 0.0115 
AR+C+SI/MC<70% 1329 0.0113 0.0158 0.1540 -0.2310 0.0505 -0.9348 6.5780 0.9651   0.2247 0.0117 
Interest screens                         
CSI/TA<30% 1677 0.0107 0.0147 0.1591 -0.2428 0.0520 -0.9806 6.8148 1.0000   0.2050 0.0107 
CSI/TA<33% 1677 0.0107 0.0146 0.1589 -0.2432 0.0520 -0.9845 6.8335 1.0000   0.2053 0.0107 
CSI/MC<30% 1667 0.0113 0.0162 0.1553 -0.2342 0.0506 -0.9552 6.7125 0.9991   0.2231 0.0113 
CSI/MC<33% 1669 0.0113 0.0162 0.1554 -0.2348 0.0507 -0.9578 6.7176 0.9993   0.2222 0.0113 
Interest income/Rev<3% 1595 0.0107 0.0150 0.1585 -0.2425 0.0519 -0.9872 6.8116 0.9934   0.2068 0.0108 
Interest income/Rev<5% 1639 0.0107 0.0150 0.1581 -0.2432 0.0520 -0.9909 6.8263 0.9972   0.2065 0.0108 
Interest income/Rev<10% 1665 0.0107 0.0148 0.1581 -0.2433 0.0521 -0.9899 6.8196 0.9989   0.2062 0.0108 
                          
Benchmark 1680 0.0111 0.0141 0.1211 -0.1820 0.0459 -0.7689 4.9893 1.0000   0.2427 0.0111 
Please note: the following table displays the descriptive statistics and ratio analysis. Column one shows the name of each portfolio and column two the corresponding formula, which 
the portfolio construction is based upon. Column three to nine displays relevant descriptive statistics and column ten to thirteen displays the results of the Sharpe, Treynor and Sortino 
ratios, respectively. AR: account receivables, C: cash, CSI: cash plus short-term investments, Int income: interest income, MC: total market capitalization, Rev: total revenue, SI: short-
term investments, TA: total assets and TD: total debt 
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6.5 Regression analysis 
To analyse the  risk-adjusted performance of the portfolios we follow much of the 
previous literature and employ the single-factor model proposed by Jensen (1968) 
(i.e., Jensen’s alpha) together with the extended four-factor model introduced by 
Carhart (1997). In addition to market risk, the four-factor model also controls for 
investment style factors associated with size, book-to-market and momentum. The two 
models are estimated with the following time-series regressions:   
 !"# − !%# = '" +	*" !+# − !%# + ,"# (6.1) 
 !"# − !%# = '" +	*" !+# − !%# + -"./0# + 1"2/3# + 4"/5/# + ,"# (6.2) 
 
where !"# is the continuous return of the portfolio i in month t, !%# represents the risk 
free rate at month t, '" is the abnormal return of portfolio i, *" represents the 
portfolio’s exposure to the systematic risk.  ./0# represents the difference in return 
between stocks with small market capitalization and stocks with large market 
capitalization at time t,   2/3#  represents the difference in return between stocks with 
high and low book-to-market ratios, /5/# represents the difference in return between 
previous winning stocks and previous loosing stocks. Finally, ,"# is the random error 
term. 
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The results of the Jensen’s Alpha and Carhart regressions are displayed in Table 6.3. 
Before discussing the results, it should be noted that we acknowledge the abnormally 
high adjusted r-squared values, which in several cases equals to 100%, or one (i.e., 
perfect fit). This is because some screens exclude just a few number of constituents, 
resulting in portfolios with almost identical characteristics as the market benchmark. 
Nevertheless, we include these portfolios to illustrate this point, and conclude that 
these portfolios exhibit similar return and risk characteristics as the overall market.  
 
It can be observed that several debt ratios generate positive risk-adjusted returns with 
up to 23 basis points per month. However, this is true only when market capitalization 
is used as a divisor, as all debt screens based on total assets do not perform statistically 
different from zero. With negative and significant smb factors loadings in almost all 
cases, it seems that excluding highly leveraged firms results in a tilt towards stocks 
with large market capitalization. This finding is in line with the established notion that 
small stocks tend to take on more financial debt (e.g., Titman & Wessels, 1988). It can 
further be observed that these portfolios have a tilt towards growth and momentum 
stocks.  Interestingly, the choice of divisor in the accounting ratios appears to be an 
important determinant of risk. As illustrated in the regression results, in the four-factor 
setting all debt screens based on market capitalization results in beta values ranging 
from 0.94 to 0.96, while the total assets based counterparts results in beta values 
around 1.02. A final observation regarding the debt ratios is that a more stringent 
threshold level, that is, 30% rather than 33%, generates a marginally greater 
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outperformance, suggesting that more stringent debt screening results in better 
financial performance.  
 
Market capitalization appears to be superior even when screening for liquidity. The 
results indicate that all screens based on market capitalization generate statistically 
significant abnormal returns, while the total assets based generate a performance 
indistinguishable from zero. These results appear in both a single and multifactor 
setting and can hence be considered statistically robust. It is noteworthy that the 
exclusion of high liquidity firms generates a beta value below one, which is the case 
for all liquidity screens. Arguably, one would expect that imposing liquidity 
constraints on a portfolio would lead to above market risk. Finally, the interest screens 
appear to have little or no impact on performance. This result is not surprising given 
the marginal size reduction associated with these screens (Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.3 Main regression results 
Portfolio Jensen's Alpha   Carhart (1997) four-factor model     CAPM Adj R2 
Carhart 
Adj R2 α   β     α   β   SMB   HML   MOM     
Debt screens                                     
TD / TA < 30% -0.0002  1.0075 ***   -0.0002  1.0166 *** -0.0459 *** -0.0360 *** 0.0193    99.21% 99.31% 
TD / TA < 33% -0.0003  1.0133 ***   -0.0003  1.0213 *** -0.0370 ** -0.0326 ** 0.0152    99.34% 99.40% 
TD / TA <33,33 -0.0003  1.0138 ***   -0.0003  1.0212 *** -0.0360 ** -0.0314 ** 0.0137    99.36% 99.42% 
TD / TA <37% -0.0002  1.0075 ***   -0.0003  1.0149 *** -0.0166  -0.0195 ** 0.0157 *   99.61% 99.64% 
TD / MC < 30% 0.0023 *** 0.9236 ***   0.0023 *** 0.9411 *** -0.0873 *** -0.0634 *** 0.0407 ***   98.53% 98.97% 
TD / MC < 33% 0.0021 *** 0.9302 ***   0.0021 *** 0.9461 *** -0.0774 *** -0.0567 *** 0.0371 ***   98.73% 99.07% 
TD / TA&MC <33% 0.0016 *** 0.9500 ***   0.0017 *** 0.9636 *** -0.0858 *** -0.0621 *** 0.0290 **   98.56% 98.90% 
Liquidity screens                                     
AR / TA <33% 0.0000  0.9931 ***   0.0000  0.9934 *** -0.0028  -0.0003  0.0017    99.99% 99.99% 
AR / TA <45% 0.0000  0.9983 ***   0.0000  0.9982 *** -0.0005  -0.0001  -0.0003    100.00% 100.00% 
AR+C/TA<50% -0.0001  0.9967 ***   -0.0001  0.9976 *** -0.0020  -0.0007  0.0031    99.95% 99.95% 
AR+C/TA<70% -0.0001  0.9979 ***   -0.0001  0.9987 *** -0.0013  -0.0003  0.0027    99.97% 99.97% 
AR+C+SI/TA<67% 0.0000  0.9969 ***   0.0000  0.9968 *** 0.0000  0.0014  0.0005    99.97% 99.97% 
AR+C+SI/TA<90% 0.0000  0.9996 ***   0.0000  0.9996 *** 0.0000  -0.0002 * -0.0003    100.00% 100.00% 
AR/MC<30% 0.0013 *** 0.9497 ***   0.0015 *** 0.9528 *** -0.0600 *** -0.0370 *** 0.0042    99.50% 99.62% 
AR/MC<33% 0.0011 *** 0.9582 ***   0.0013 *** 0.9599 *** -0.0536 *** -0.0311 *** 0.0018    99.64% 99.73% 
AR/MC<45% 0.0008 *** 0.9715 ***   0.0009 *** 0.9729 *** -0.0340 *** -0.0198 *** 0.0021    99.83% 99.87% 
AR/MC<49% 0.0007 *** 0.9750 ***   0.0008 *** 0.9763 *** -0.0313 *** -0.0185 *** 0.0019    99.86% 99.89% 
AR+C+SI/MC<70% 0.0009 *** 0.9651 ***   0.0010 *** 0.9682 *** -0.0387 *** -0.0247 *** 0.0057    99.78% 99.83% 
Interest income                                     
CSI/TA<30% 0.0000 ** 1.0000 ***   0.0000 * 1.0000 *** 0.0000  0.0000 * 0.0000    100.00% 100.00% 
CSI/TA<33% 0.0000 ** 1.0000 ***   0.0000 * 1.0000 *** 0.0000  0.0000 * 0.0000    100.00% 100.00% 
CSI/MC<30% 0.0000 *** 0.9991 ***   0.0000 *** 0.9994 *** -0.0005 * -0.0005 *** 0.0005 ***   100.00% 100.00% 
CSI/MC<33% 0.0000 *** 0.9993 ***   0.0000 *** 0.9995 *** -0.0003  -0.0005 *** 0.0004 ***   100.00% 100.00% 
Interest income/Rev<3% 0.0000  0.9934 ***   0.0000  0.9955 *** 0.0010  0.0013  0.0073 ***   99.97% 99.97% 
Interest income/Rev<5% 0.0000  0.9972 ***   0.0000  0.9974 *** -0.0019 * -0.0008  0.0008    100.00% 100.00% 
Interest income/Rev<10% 0.0000  0.9989 ***   0.0000  0.9991 *** 0.0000  0.0003  0.0008 *   100.00% 100.00% 
Please note: the following table displays the results of Jensen’s Alpha and Carhart (1997) regressions. Column one shows the name of each portfolio and column two the 
corresponding formula, which the portfolio construction is based upon. Column three, four and five display the alpha coefficient, beta coefficient and adjusted r-squared value of the 
Jensen’s alpha regressions, respectively. Column six to ten display the alpha, beta, value, size and momentum coefficients for the Carhart (1997) regressions. Coefficient covariances 
and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987). *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively.  
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6.5.1 Time-varying impact of screens  
In Chapter 2 it was illustrated how the stringency of the accounting screens is not 
constant, but vary over time. For instance, debt screens based on market capitalization 
were 10% to 15% more stringent after the global financial crisis compared to before. 
(e.g., Figure 2.5). The purpose of this section is, therefore, to examine how the risk 
and return characteristics of accounting screens evolve over time. To examine 
potential time-varying effects we divide the sample into two sub-samples, where the 
first half (2002-2007) represent the bull market, including the recovery after the 
dot.com bubble, and second half (2008-2013) represents the bear market, including the 
main events and the wake of the global financial crisis.  
 
The results of the multifactor regressions, displayed in Table 6.4, yield several 
interesting observations. First, it appears that the previously recorded outperformance 
of the market capitalization based debt ratios stem entirely from the second sub-
sample period, which implies that these ratios are very efficient in times of market 
turmoil (such as the global financial crisis). Arguably, the underlying reason for this 
outperformance is that the market capitalization based screens become more stringent 
when market value declines, hence serving as a form of risk management function. 
The fact that the beta values of these ratios are about 7% lower in the second sub-
sample periods supports this argument.  
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Screening for liquidity, on the other hand, seems to have generated positive risk-
adjusted returns in both sample periods (again, only true when market capitalization is 
used a divisor), although this outperformance seems to be twice as big in the second 
sub-sample.29 The fact that screening for liquidity is more efficient during turbulent 
market times appears a bit puzzling, as it would be fair to assume that higher levels of 
liquidity should be rewarded in periods of investor uncertainty. The factor loadings 
remain fairly constant for both sample periods, although the tilt towards growth stocks 
is reduced in the second half.  
 
                                               
29 For instance, at a 30% threshold level, the market capitalization based debt ratio generated an 
outperformance of 11 basis points per month in the first sub sample period, while in the second sub 
sample period the outperformance was 20 basis points.  
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Table 6.4 Sub-sample analysis 
Portfolio 2002-2007   2008-2013 
α   β   SMB   HML   MOM   Adj R2   α   β   SMB   HML   MOM     Adj R2 
Debt screens                                                 
TD / TA < 30% -0.0003  1.0287 *** -0.0384 * -0.0620 *** 0.0027  98.59%   0.0000  1.014 *** -0.031  -0.026 * 0.0311 **   99.59% 
TD / TA < 33% -0.0003  1.0316 *** -0.0416 * -0.0521 ** 0.0017  98.81%   -0.0002  1.019 *** -0.005  -0.016  0.0290 *   99.64% 
TD / TA <33,33 -0.0004  1.0329 *** -0.0400 * -0.0508 ** 0.0011  98.84%   -0.0002  1.019 *** -0.005  -0.015  0.0267 *   99.65% 
TD / TA <37% -0.0004  1.0191 *** -0.0220  -0.0157  0.0112  99.27%   -0.0002  1.014 *** 0.002  -0.011  0.0229 **   99.77% 
TD / MC < 30% 0.0007  0.9805 *** -0.0667 *** -0.1124 *** 0.0305 *** 98.67%   0.0036 *** 0.930 *** -0.061 ** -0.041 *** 0.0510 ***   99.31% 
TD / MC < 33% 0.0006  0.9811 *** -0.0605 *** -0.0903 *** 0.0279 ** 98.78%   0.0033 *** 0.936 *** -0.051 * -0.036 *** 0.0480 ***   99.36% 
TD / TA&MC <33% 0.0004  1.0034 *** -0.0695 *** -0.1017 *** 0.0166  98.41%   0.0028 *** 0.952 *** -0.056 * -0.040 *** 0.0415 ***   99.28% 
Liquidity screens                                                 
AR / TA <33% 0.0001  0.9902 *** -0.0028  -0.0049  0.0005  99.98%   0.0000  0.995 *** -0.002  0.000  0.0025 **   100.00% 
AR / TA <45% 0.0000  0.9972 *** -0.0002  -0.0016 * -0.0010 ** 100.00%   0.0000 * 0.999 *** 0.000  0.000  0.0003    100.00% 
AR+C/TA<50% 0.0000  0.9982 *** 0.0000  -0.0019 ** -0.0002  100.00%   -0.0002  0.998 *** -0.005  -0.002  0.0042    99.93% 
AR+C/TA<70% 0.0000 * 0.9998 *** 0.0000  0.0002  -0.0002  100.00%   -0.0001  0.998 *** -0.002  -0.001  0.0040    99.96% 
AR+C+SI/TA<67% -0.0001  0.9927 *** -0.0047  0.0166 *** 0.0043  99.93%   0.0000  0.998 *** 0.002  0.001  0.0001    99.99% 
AR+C+SI/TA<90% 0.0000  0.9996 *** 0.0000  0.0012 * -0.0004 * 100.00%   0.0000 * 1.000 *** 0.000  0.000  0.0000    100.00% 
AR/MC<30% 0.0011 *** 0.9687 *** -0.0493 *** -0.0835 *** -0.0039  99.63%   0.0020 *** 0.948 *** -0.049 ** -0.026 *** 0.0091    99.65% 
AR/MC<33% 0.0009 *** 0.9716 *** -0.0447 *** -0.0702 *** -0.0065  99.74%   0.0018 *** 0.957 *** -0.043 ** -0.021 ** 0.0076    99.76% 
AR/MC<45% 0.0007 *** 0.9765 *** -0.0293 *** -0.0475 *** -0.0009  99.85%   0.0012 *** 0.972 *** -0.029 ** -0.014 ** 0.0039    99.88% 
AR/MC<49% 0.0007 *** 0.9786 *** -0.0283 *** -0.0445 *** -0.0006  99.87%   0.0011 *** 0.976 *** -0.025 ** -0.013 ** 0.0037    99.90% 
AR+C+SI/MC<70% 0.0007 *** 0.9738 *** -0.0336 *** -0.0412 *** 0.0021  99.86%   0.0014 *** 0.967 *** -0.032  -0.019 ** 0.0091    99.82% 
Interest screens                                                 
CSI/TA<30% 0.0000  1.0000 *** 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 ** 100.00%   0.0000  1.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.0000 *   100.00% 
CSI/TA<33% 0.0000  1.0000 *** 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 ** 100.00%   0.0000  1.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.0000 *   100.00% 
CSI/MC<30% 0.0000 ** 0.9998 *** -0.0004 ** 0.0002  0.0001  100.00%   0.0000 *** 0.999 *** 0.000  0.000  0.0009 ***   100.00% 
CSI/MC<33% 0.0000 * 0.9998 *** -0.0003 ** 0.0001  0.0002  100.00%   0.0000 *** 0.999 *** 0.000  0.000  0.0007 ***   100.00% 
Interest income/Rev<3% -0.0001  0.9891 *** 0.0003  0.0171 ** 0.0116 ** 99.95%   0.0000  0.998 *** -0.005  -0.003  0.0051 **   99.99% 
Interest income/Rev<5% 0.0000  0.9963 *** -0.0007  0.0033  0.0004  99.99%   0.0000  0.998 *** -0.0040 * -0.002 * 0.0010    100.00% 
Interest income/Rev<10% 0.0000  0.9983 *** 0.0012  -0.0002  0.0009  100.00%   0.0000  0.999 *** -0.002 0** -0.001  0.0003    100.00% 
The following table reports the Carhart (1997) regression results for the two subsample periods 2002-2007 and 2008-2013.  Column one displays  the  financial ratio of the portfolio and column  two to seven 
and eight to thirteen report the  alpha, beta, smb, hml, mom and adjusted r-squared values  for the first and second sub sample,  respectively.  Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are based on (Newey & West 1987). *, **, *** represent a 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively.
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6.5.2 What is the performance in different sectors? 
In Chapter 2 it was illustrated that existing Shari’ah screening methodologies result in 
different levels of stringency. It was further shown that this stringency not only is 
time-dependent, but also varies across sectors. In fact, the most extreme case 
suggested that it could be up to a 60% difference in stringency for a single screen 
between two sectors, as measured number of firms excluded. In order to make the 
empirical results robust to potential return differentials across sectors, we construct 
some sector-specific sub-portfolios. To arrive at these sector-specific portfolios, we 
adopt the ICB sector structure, resulting in to the following nine sectors: Oil & Gas 
(0001), Basic materials (1000), Industrials (2000), Consumer goods (3000), 
Healthcare (4000), Consumer services (5000), Telecommunications (6000), Utilities 
(7000) and Technology (9000). We purposely exclude financials (8000) as it is 
practically irrelevant to consider this sector. Specifically, all major Islamic mutual 
funds and indices do not invest in the financial sector due to the interest-driven 
business model.  This is also true for firms in the insurance sector (8500) as this 
violates the prohibition of gharar (uncertainty). Next, we estimate the following four-
factor regression: 
 R"# − R%# = α" +	β" R+# − R%# + γ"SMB# + δ"HML# + ζ"MOM# + ε+# (6.3) 
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where R"# is the return of the sub-portfolio at time t and R+# is the return of the 
corresponding sector-specific market benchmark at time t. Replacing the overall 
market benchmark with a sector specific benchmark is essential to make the results 
robust to a potential sector-related performance bias. Hence, we arrive at the following 
sector benchmarks: Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Health 
Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities, and Technology.  
 
Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions are performed for each sector respectively, and 
the results are presented in Table 6.5 However, the beta, smb, hml and mom 
coefficients of the regressions, together with the adjusted r-squared values, are 
excluded for the reason to save space. Starting with the first category of debt screens, 
it can be observed that next to all ratios based on market capitalization lead to a 
statistically significant outperformance in seven out of the nine sectors in the sample. 
Only in Consumer Goods and Telecommunication does the impact of this group of 
screens result in a performance similar to benchmark. Interestingly, it appears that the 
degree of economic significance generated by a single screen depends largely on the 
characterises of the sector. For instance, applying the TD/MC<30% screen to the 
Technology sector generates an outperformance of 8 basis points per month while for 
the Utilities sector the outperformance is 64 basis points, (both results statistically 
significant at the 1% level). For this group of screens, there is no evidence that the 
threshold level is a significant determinant of performance.  
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In contrast to the debt screens based on a market capitalization based rulebook, debt 
screens with a total assets based divisor do not typically generate a performance 
statistically different than benchmark. Some sign of abnormal returns can be found for 
the Industrials sector and more significantly in the Healthcare sector. However, the 
TD/TA<30% screen actually generates a negative risk-adjusted performance in the 
Utilities sector. This observation strengthens the notion of Shari’ah-screens being 
sensitive to unique sector characteristics, as all three market capitalization based debt 
screens generate a large and highly significant outperformance in the Utilities sector.  
 
The group of liquidity screens tells a very similar story as the debt screens. That is, the 
majority of the screens based on market capitalization outperform in six sectors (Basic 
Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, Utilities, 
Technology) while in the remaining two (i.e., Oil & Gas, Telecommunications) the 
performance appears to be similar to the market. Generally, liquidity screens based on 
total assets appear to result in no difference in performance. While there is some 
evidence of outperformance in the Health Care sector, two screens lead to a 
marginally but statistically significant underperformance in the Industrials and 
Technology sector, respectively. Again, this underperformance occurs despite proof of 
market capitalization based screens outperform.  
 
Moving on o the final group of interest screens, it can be observed that most alphas are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Outperforming in seven out of the nine 
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sectors, the two screens based on market capitalization are the only interest screens 
that result in favourable return characteristics. The pattern of conflicting results within 
certain sector is also true for this group of screens, as the total assets based screens 
lead to underperformance in the Consumer Services and Utilities sector, respectively.  
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Table 6.5 Summary of sector specific four-factor alpha 
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Debt screens           
TD / TA < 30% -0.0002  -0.0002  0.0011  -0.0005  0.0001  0.0000  -0.0006  -0.0021 * 0.0000  
TD / TA < 33% -0.0002  -0.0001  0.0011 * -0.0006  0.0015 *** -0.0004  -0.0001  -0.0011  -0.0002  
TD / TA <33,33 -0.0002  -0.0001  0.0012 * -0.0006  0.0014 *** -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0013  0.0001  
TD / TA <37% -0.0002  0.0002  0.0010  -0.0003  0.0013 *** -0.0002  -0.0006  -0.0010  0.0001  
TD / MC < 30% 0.0014 ** 0.0030 ** 0.0039 *** 0.0010  0.0033 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0020  0.0064 *** 0.0008 *** 
TD / MC < 33% 0.0012 ** 0.0026 * 0.0035 *** 0.0011  0.0030 *** 0.0027 *** 0.0020  0.0053 ** 0.0011 *** 
TD / TA&MC <33% 0.0011 * 0.0023 * 0.0034 *** 0.0008  0.0034 *** 0.0021 ** 0.0006  0.0048 ** 0.0007 ** 
Liquidity screens                                     
AR / TA <33% 0.0000  0.0000  -0.0002  0.0001  0.0001 *** 0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0003 * 
AR / TA <45% 0.0000  0.0000  -0.0001  0.0000 ** 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 ** 0.0000  0.0000  
AR+C/TA<50% -0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  0.0003 * -0.0002  -0.0002  0.0000  -0.0006  
AR+C/TA<70% 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001 * 0.0000  -0.0002  0.0001  -0.0005  
AR+C+SI/TA<67% 0.0000  0.0000  -0.0002 *** 0.0001  0.0000  -0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0003  
AR+C+SI/TA<90% 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 *** 0.0000 ** 0.0000  0.0000 ** 
AR/MC<30% 0.0001  0.0013 ** 0.0026 *** 0.0015 * 0.0011 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0002  0.0039 *** 0.0012 *** 
AR/MC<33% 0.0000  0.0008  0.0022 *** 0.0012 * 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0002  0.0034 *** 0.0009 *** 
AR/MC<45% 0.0002  0.0004  0.0015 *** 0.0010 * 0.0006 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0004  0.0023 *** 0.0007 *** 
AR/MC<49% 0.0002  0.0003  0.0014 *** 0.0009 * 0.0005 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0003  0.0023 *** 0.0007 *** 
AR+C+SI/MC<70% 0.0001  0.0007 *** 0.0018 *** 0.0013 * 0.0007 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0003  0.0025 *** 0.0010 *** 
Interest screens                                     
CSI/TA<30% -0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0001  0.0000  -0.0009 ** 0.0002  -0.0002 ** -0.0011  
CSI/TA<33% 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  -0.0006 ** 0.0007  -0.0001 * -0.0006  
CSI/MC<30% 0.0003  0.0008 *** 0.0017 *** 0.0018 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0009  0.0014 * 0.0016 *** 
CSI/MC<33% 0.0002  0.0007 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0008  0.0014 ** 0.0014 *** 
Interest income/Rev<3% -0.0001  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  -0.0004  0.0001  
Interest income/Rev<5% 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  -0.0004 ** 0.0001  
Interest income/Rev<10% 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 * 0.0000  0.0000  -0.0002 ** 0.0000  
The following table reports the Carhart (1997) alpha coefficients for each sector, respectively. The beta, smb, hml and mom coefficients together adjusted r-squared values are not 
displayed for the sake of saving space.  
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6.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter was concerned with investigating the financial impact of the accounting-
based screening process used in Islamic equity investing. This process, typically 
comprised by four accounting screens, investigates the characteristics of firms 
concerning debt, liquidity, interest income and income from non-permissible business 
activities. By analysing the performance of hypothetical portfolios that satisfy the 
rules of a single rather than multiple screens, we addressed the empirically challenging 
issue of distinguishing their merits. The results of the empirical analysis can hence be 
viewed as a significant contribution, as existing evidence concerns only the collective 
impact of the Shari’ah screening process.   
 
First, we find that several debt screens generate significant abnormal returns, although 
this is only true for screens based on a market capitalization based rulebook. In 
contrast, screens following a total assets based rulebook typically perform similarly to 
the market. The difference in performance appears to be due to lower systematic risk, 
arguably caused by the greater stringency of the market capitalization based screens. 
Analysing the time-varying difference, however, revealed that this outperformance is 
not persistent over time but stem entirely from the period covering the global financial 
crisis. Furthermore, the liquidity screens using a market capitalization based rulebook 
also contribute positively to performance, although significantly less than the debt 
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screens. In contrast, interest screens appear to have little or no impact on financial 
performance. Taken together, the findings presented in this chapter suggest that the 
accounting based screening process does not harm investors’ financial performance. 
Rather, it appears to serve as a risk management function in periods of market turmoil, 
excluding firms subject to risky characteristics. This appears to be true, however, only 
when market capitalization is used a divisor.   
 
The analysis conducted in this chapter is subject to a number of limitations. First, due 
to data availability we have not been able to consider all accounting screens currently 
used in the industry. Most notably, this concerns the category of non-permissible 
income screens, which has not been considered at all. Second, while the portfolios 
have been constructed to capture the actual impact of the screens, this has been done 
to the best of our knowledge. It could be the case that some investors use a somewhat 
different methodology when performing their screening. Finally, while we only 
consider the financial impact of individual screens, it could also be interesting to study 
the performance of different screening combinations. This could be an interesting area 
for future research.  
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 Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
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7.1 Summary of thesis 
This Ph.D. thesis comprised four empirical essays on Islamic equity investing. Since 
its inception in the early 1990s, Islamic equity investing has developed into a 
multibillion dollar industry with thousands of Islamic mutual funds and equity indices 
available around the world. Although academic interest has followed the rapid growth 
of the industry, there is still much uncertainty surrounding the performance 
implications of integrating Islamic principles into investment strategies. The principal 
objective of the research presented in this Ph.D. thesis was to bring clarity to some of 
these issues.   
 
Chapter 2 was devoted to the institutional background of Islamic finance, including 
the historical development, sources of Islamic jurisprudence and the main prohibitions 
which the Islamic finance model rests upon. The current state of the Islamic equity 
market was also discussed, together with the fundamentals of Islamic equity investing. 
The second part critically examined the Shari’ah-based stock screening process, which 
can be considered the cornerstone of Islamic equity investing. Specifically, it 
addressed issues relating to current inconsistencies in Shari’ah screening norms, and 
how different screens impact the characteristics of Shari’ah-compliant asset universe 
in terms of size and asset allocation. Chapter 3 outlined the core principles of efficient 
market theory and the implications it has for investors seeking abnormal returns. 
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Furthermore, Chapter 3 also outlined the rationale for some of the most frequently 
used performance measures used in financial research.  
 
Chapter 4 investigated the return and risk characteristics of Islamic equity indices. It 
was argued that analysing passive indices, rather than actively managed mutual funds, 
provide a better opportunity to measure the direct impact of the Shari’ah-screening 
employed by these investment vehicles. This since it excludes disturbing elements 
such as fund manager fees and market timing skills. Based on the current state of the 
Islamic index literature, it is difficult to draw any certain conclusions regarding return 
and risk. It was argued that this uncertainty could stem from a number of limitations 
characterizing many previous studies, such as small data samples and simplistic 
performance measures. In addressing these issues, Chapter 4 analysed a large set of 
global and regional Islamic indices from five major index providers within a 
multifactor regression framework over the period 1996 to 2012. The results showed 
that Islamic indices typically do not lag behind their unconstrained market 
benchmarks. In fact, indices with a global and developed market exposure were 
proven to exhibit significant abnormal returns. These indices performed particularly 
well during the recent credit crisis, although the majority of the recorded 
outperformance stem from the exclusion of stocks in the financial industry. In sum, 
this chapter concluded that Shari’ah-based investment strategies could provide 
investors with a risk-averse investment option, especially during times of market 
turmoil around the financial services sector. 
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While existing research is concerned with the performance of Shari’ah-compliant 
equity indices relative conventional benchmarks, one area currently unexplored in the 
literature is what factors that determine this relative performance. Chapter 5 offered a 
modest attempt to address this issue. Specifically, it related the risk-adjusted 
performance of national Islamic indics across 46 markets to country level 
characterisics, such as the economic, cultural, governance and religious environment. 
Furthermore, since the providers of these indices use different Shari’ah screening 
norms when constructing their Islamic inidces, these screens where also considered as 
potential determinants of performance.  Overall, the findings from this analysis 
suggested that the country envrioment can be a signficant determinant of Islamic index 
risk-adjusted performance. The overall stock market envrionment was found to have a 
signficant negative impact, suggesting that Islamic indices will do relatively better in 
market downturns, and vice versa. Other factors that seem to determine performance 
include the money supply enviorment, the level of Muslim population and the 
difference in return between small cap and large cap stocks. Cultural and governece 
factors were found to have no signficant impact.  
 
Although the accounting-based screening is a central element in constructing Shari’ah-
compliant investment portfolios, the manner in which these screens influence return 
and risk is currently poorly understood in the literature. Most previous studies have 
addressed this issue by analysing the performance of existing investment vehicles, 
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such as Islamic equity indices and mutual funds. However, since these indices and 
funds are constructed using multiple accounting screens, any findings will concern 
their collective impact on performance. Chapter 6 addressed this issue by utilizing a 
research design that allowed to isolate the merits of individual screens.  This 
alternative approach contributed to the literature in two ways. First, it allowed to study 
the extent to which the different parts of the screening process (i.e., debt, liquidity 
interest-income) influence return and risk. Second, it enabled to investigate whether 
the different screening methods currently employed in the industry have a diverse 
impact on financial performance. It was found that both debt ant liquidity screens have 
generated positive risk-adjusted returns, although this is true only when market 
capitalization is used a divisor in the ratios.  
7.2 Discussion 
Much of the empirical evidence presented in this thesis suggest that Islamic equity 
investing offers competitive performance. Chapter 4 revealed that global and 
developed market Islamic indices have yielded a significant four-factor alpha of up to 
41 basis points per month or 4.92% per annum. Interestingly, this finding contradicts 
many previous studies, which have reported Islamic indices to either underperformed 
or performed similar to market benchmarks (Abbes, 2012; Albaity & Ahmad, 2008; 
Ashraf, 2013; Walkshäusl & Lobe, 2012b). However, the results appear to be robust, 
as they are documented for multiple providers and across different time periods. It was 
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further shown that the principal explanation for this outperformance is as a result of 
the exclusion of the financial services sector. When the financial sector was excluded 
from the market benchmark, the recorded outperform was significantly reduced.  
 
However, it appears that the financial success of Islamic investments is largely 
determined by the nature of the accounting-based screening. Already in Chapter 2 it 
was illustrated that screens based on market capitalization and total assets have a 
diverse impact in terms of size and asset allocation. On average, market capitalization 
based screens are more stringent, although this stringency vary across different sectors 
and over time. When combining the findings of Chapter 4 to 6, it is clear that market 
capitalization based screens have been superior total assets. For instance, in Chapter 4 
it was shown that the FTSE indices, which are constructed using total assets based 
screens, performed relatively worse on a risk-adjusted basis compared to Islamic 
indices using market capitalization based screens, such as Dow Jones and Russell30. 
Similarly, Chapter 5 reported a positive and significant relationship between market 
capitalizations based screening and risk-adjusted performance.  
 
Focusing on the return and risk characteristics of the accounting screens on an 
individual level, Chapter 6 then confirmed the relatively better performance generated 
                                               
30 For instance, in Table 4.3 (Panel A) it can be observed that FTSE is the only global index out of five 
that did not significantly outperform on a risk-adjusted basis. Furthermore, Panel B of the same table 
reports a significant underperformance for FTSE in Asia Pacific while the Dow Jones index 
significantly outperform.  These results stay consistent in common sample period setting (i.e., Table 
4.8) which imply that the results are not due to a sample time issue.  
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by market capitalization based screens. Specifically, debt and liquidity ratios based on 
market capitalization significantly outperformed during the duration of the sample, 
while the total assets based screens did not perform statistically different from zero. 
Interestingly though, the results of the sub-sample analysis revealed that the entire 
outperform came from the second half of the sample which included the turmoil 
around the global financial crisis. This implies that the dynamic stringency of market 
capitalization based screening (i.e., more (less) stringent when markets are down (up)) 
serves as risk management function. That is, in periods of market turmoil; these 
screens will exclude firms with more financial leverage, leading to a decrease in 
portfolio risk.  
7.3 Research limitations and directions for future research 
The research presented in this thesis is subject to a number of limitations. First, it 
should be acknowledged that the evidence stem from data that cover a relatively short 
time period. A longer time horizon is likely to have improved the statistical 
robustness. However, Shari’ah-compliant indices or funds were typically not launched 
until the early 2000s. On this note, the present thesis is believed to cover the longest 
time period in the literature. Second, in Chapter 4 and 5 it was argued that the impact 
of Shari’ah screening is best measured using passive indices rather than actively 
managed funds. Here, it should be noted that indices are hypothetical investment 
portfolios and hence non-investable. Perhaps the main disadvantage of analysing 
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indices is that trading-related aspects, such as liquidity risk, cannot be controlled for. 
Furthermore, indices allow us to analyse only the investment opportunities. Hence, 
whether Islamic fund managers have the ability to produce competitive returns is to 
consider a separate research question. Third, the asset universes in Chapter 6 and 7 are 
based on the constituents list of the FTSE All-World Index. While comprised of 
approximately 3000 firms globally, these are all firms with medium and large market 
capitalization. Hence, the evidence presented in these chapters is not robust to stocks 
with small market capitalization. Finally, it should be noted that the research presented 
in this thesis has been limited to the performance related aspects of Islamic equity 
investing. Hence, there were no aspirations made to consider other issues that might 
have emerged. One such example would be the issue of inconsistences in the Shari’ah 
screening norms highlighted in Chapter 2, which also fits into the standardization 
debate currently taking place in the Islamic finance literature.  
 
Several potential paths for future research has emerged from this thesis. First, it would 
be interesting to continue to explore areas related to determinants of Islamic equity 
performance. The empirical evidence presented in this thesis is based on a limited set 
of variables, which could be extended much further.  Furthermore, the analysis can be 
extended to include actively managed mutual funds. This area has started to be 
explored in a very recent study by Nainggolan et al. (2015). Second, it would be 
interesting to elaborate further with the Shari’ah screens presented in Table 2.1. 
Chapter 6 illustrated that these screens result in different return and risk 
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characteristics, which suggests opportunity for portfolio optimization. Work on this 
topic has in fact been carried out by Derigs and Marzban (2009). However, their 
analysis is limited to a handful screens, and covers what appears to be only one year of 
data.  
 
Third, empirical observations made in this thesis suggest that an interesting future 
research could investigate further the economic factors common for Islamic equity 
investments. When examining how individual accounting-based screens impact return 
and risk (i.e., Chapter 6), the results indicate that screening for Shari’ah compliance 
seem to result in portfolios that tilted towards large cap stocks and stocks with growth 
firm characteristics. A final potential path for future research emerging from the 
present thesis is to explore the opportunities for conventional fund managers to 
incorporate Islamic principles into their investment decision-making. For instance, the 
findings presented in Chapter 6 suggest that the risk management function of these 
funds could benefit from considering debt and liquidity ratios. 
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